dissenting:
Vincent is not entitled to a permanent injunction order.
I disagree that there has been proof entitling the entry of an injunction order. The trial court, in its five-page detailed order, did consider the involvement of the noncustodial parent and the impact on the custodial parent financially, emotionally, and physically if enjoined from removing the child.
I do agree with the majority that the proper method to determine the merits of the child’s moving out of the State of Illinois is controlled by section 609 of the Marriage Act.
The trial court did give serious and thoughtful consideration in making its ruling and did consider the factors set forth in section 13.5(a) of the Parentage Act. Section 13.5 permits an injunction against any party having physical custody of the child from removing the child “pending the adjudication of the issues of custody and visitation.” 750 ILCS 45/13.5(a) (West Supp. 2003). The factors set forth in sections 13.5(a)(1) and 13.5(a)(3) are proper considerations in determining the best interest of the child. It is clear from the trial court’s order it did adjudicate the issues of custody and visitation.
As pointed out by the majority, the Parentage Act, amended effective July 10, 2003, incorporated section 609 into Parentage Act removal cases. The issue of best interests of the child was not addressed by the court in the context of section 609.
In sum, this court should not enter a permanent injunction but should remand this case to the trial court to consider the best interests of the child, Callie, as required by section 609.
Hopefully, Callie will not get lost in our cumbersome, but sometimes necessary, judicial system.