dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Under the facts of this case, the Commission’s approval of the reclassification was a quasi-judicial decision subject to administrative review. The Commission’s actions — which included investigating the DCLRs’ claims, preparing a staff report, holding a hearing at which individual DCLRs voiced concerns, and issuing formal notice to plaintiffs’ counsel — remove this from a quasi-legislative function to a quasi-judicial function adjudicating the DCLRs’ rate of pay, cross-bidding, and bumping rights. Individual rights were clearly at stake here. See AFSCME, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 711, 681 N.E.2d at 1005.
Moreover, even if the functions were quasi-legislative, the reclassification was arbitrary and capricious because of the impact on the DCLRs. See AFSCME, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 713, 681 N.E.2d at 1006 (noting that when a decision is quasi-legislative, a court may not invalidate the regulation or administrative rule unless clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious). As such, this case is distinguishable from AFSCME, where no adverse affects were articulated:
“Rather, we agree with the defendants that the plaintiffs have failed to articulate how application of the new pay grade adversely affects them, especially considering that all employees entered the [Public Service Administration] classification at the same salary they had prior to the change, all employees moved into a salary range with at least as great a maximum salary as their previous range, and that most employees realized an increased maximum range with the change. Based on the record, we cannot say that the reclassification was arbitrary or capricious.” AFSCME, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 715, 681 N.E.2d at 1007.
Finally, contrary to the statement by the majority, the above quote indicates the appellate court in AFSCME did review the classification. As such, the AFSCME court’s determination that the reclassification was not arbitrary or capricious was not merely dicta.