delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondent, Tabitha H., appeals the orders of the circuit court of Lake County, finding her an unfit parent pursuant to sections l(D)(g), l(D)(m)(i), and l(D)(m)(iii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(g), (D)(m)(i), (D)(m)(iii) (West 2002)), and terminating her parental rights with respect to her daughter, K.H. Respondent contends that the trial court’s orders were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
On April 2, 2002, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights, alleging that she was unfit to parent her child. Specifically, the State alleged that respondent failed to protect K.H. from injurious conditions, failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the original removal of K.H., and failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of K.H., within both the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect and any nine-month period thereafter. A bench trial ensued.
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) reports that were admitted into evidence at trial explained the history of K.H.’s case. K.H. was born on December 15, 1997. The first incident involving domestic violence occurred in January 1999 when respondent’s paramour, Edward Golden, bit K.H. on the cheek, causing a bruise. Respondent was “indicated” as a result of this incident. On April 11, 1999, K.H. sustained a fractured leg, again at the hands of Golden. K.H. received no medical treatment for this injury until six days later when respondent finally took her to a hospital. At the hospital, respondent offered conflicting explanations for KH.’s injury but finally admitted that it was inflicted by Golden. Respondent was asked to have Golden leave her home. Respondent refused and made a care plan for K.H. to reside with respondent’s sister. Golden was arrested for domestic battery for a separate incident where respondent was the victim. On June 14, 1999, a court ordered that Golden have no contact with either respondent or K.H. Following Golden’s incarceration, K.H. was returned to respondent. K.H. was adjudicated neglected on October 7, 1999. After his release from jail, Golden was found living with respondent and K.H. On December 10, 1999, the court granted the State’s emergency motion to change placement. The court placed K.H. with her maternal grandparents. On October 19, 2000, respondent gave birth to a son, of whom Golden was the father.
Cynthia Peterson, a caseworker with Central Baptist Family Services, testified at trial. She stated that she became involved with respondent’s case in July 2000. In July 2000, Peterson met with respondent to discuss the objectives and tasks of respondent’s service plan. Respondent was given an overall satisfactory evaluation for each objective and most of her assigned tasks. On December 19, 2000, K.H. was returned to respondent.
Three weeks later, on January 9, 2001, when Peterson arrived at respondent’s home to take K.H. to daycare, she observed a “very large hand print” on the child’s face. Peterson described the mark as “a perfect hand print on her cheek.” Peterson asked respondent what had happened. Respondent replied that she had returned home from work late the night before and had not noticed the mark on K.H.’s face until the next morning when she got up. Respondent stated that she asked Golden, with whom she was once again cohabitating, what had happened and he replied that he had been “slap boxing” with K.H. while respondent was at work. Peterson testified that respondent defended Golden and “tried to rationalize that they had been playing.” Respondent and her children were placed in a shelter until Golden was arrested and incarcerated. After that, they were allowed to return home.
On February 2, 2001, respondent’s progress on her service plan was again evaluated. The goal was for K.H. to remain at home with respondent. On respondent’s objective of improving her parenting skills, she was given an overall evaluation of satisfactory. On respondent’s objectives of addressing domestic violence, cooperating with services, and securing stable housing, she was given overall evaluations of unsatisfactory. Respondent had discontinued her domestic violence counseling, was unable to pay her rent and utilities, was not working, and had allowed unapproved persons to watch her children.
On July 5, 2001, respondent and her children were evicted from their home for failing to pay rent. Respondent arranged for K.H. to live with respondent’s parents and for her son to live with Golden’s parents. On August 15, 2001, Peterson again evaluated respondent, establishing a single objective for respondent of providing for the safety of her children via a number of assigned tasks. Peterson also evaluated respondent on the objectives of the earlier plan. Respondent was given an overall evaluation of unsatisfactory because she had been evicted from her apartment and did not have a place to live. Peterson also pointed out that the service plan for that period mandated that respondent continue to cooperate with the service plan that was created on December 14, 2000. One of respondent’s tasks outlined in that service plan was to “actively participate” in domestic violence counseling. Peterson testified that respondent discontinued domestic violence counseling in January 2001 and had not resumed it by August 2001.
Peterson testified on cross-examination that respondent regularly visited K.H. while K.H. was living with her grandmother. Also, respondent maintained regular contact with Peterson while Peterson was assigned to respondent’s case. Peterson testified that respondent had cooperated fully in the investigation and resolution of the January 8 domestic violence incident. Peterson testified that she was taken off respondent’s case because her one-year assignment to the case had expired.
Marcia Staggs testified that, like Peterson, she was a caseworker for Central Baptist Family Services. On October 22, 2001, respondent’s case was transferred to Staggs. Staggs’ testimony, along with documentary evidence that was introduced at trial, described proceedings that took place on September 26, 2001, one month prior to Staggs’ assignment to the case. Following a hearing conducted on September 26, 2001, the court removed K.H. from the custody of respondent and placed her with her maternal grandparents. Prior to that date, K.H. had resided with her maternal grandparents under a voluntary arrangement with respondent. A permanency order entered on the same date as the custody order provided that respondent was not allowed to remove K.H. from the custody of the grandparents. The same permanency order changed KH.’s permanency goal from return home to private or subsidized guardianship. A transcript of the permanency hearing is not included in the record on appeal, but Staggs testified that her understanding of the reason for these changes was that Golden was about to be released from prison and respondent had made a statement that she intended to return to him.
Staggs also testified about respondent’s progress in overcoming her problems with domestic violence. Staggs stated that, at the time that she took over the case on October 22, 2001, respondent had not participated in any domestic violence counseling since January 2001. Staggs prepared a new service plan and, in November, met with respondent. On December 10, 2001, Staggs evaluated respondent’s performance. Respondent was given an unsatisfactory evaluation on each of the four objectives that she was assigned. Respondent was rated unsatisfactory on addressing domestic violence issues because, at the time of the evaluation, respondent still had not participated in any domestic violence counseling. Respondent also was rated unsatisfactory on parenting because she had not attended parenting classes as she had been directed. Further, respondent was rated unsatisfactory on the objective of attending mental health counseling because she had attended no mental health counseling. Respondent’s progress also was rated unsatisfactory on the tasks of maintaining a job for at least six months, obtaining housing after paying a $3,000 debt, visiting K.H. weekly, developing a budget, and choosing her children over her paramours. Finally, respondent did not attend staff meetings, administrative case reviews, or court hearings. Staggs testified that, overall, respondent was very uninvolved with the case. As an example, Staggs cited the fact that respondent had called her only once during the 90-day review period, and that was to discuss her other child. Staggs also pointed out that no service plan tasks had been completed during the 90-day period.
For a period of approximately six weeks, from late December 2001 to early February 2002, respondent resided at A Safe Place, a domestic violence shelter. While respondent lived at the shelter, she received services related to various topics, including domestic violence, and she consistently visited K.H. The services that respondent received were mandatory if she was to reside at the shelter. Against Staggs’ advice, respondent left the shelter three days before she was scheduled to be discharged, in order to move in with a 45-year-old paramour. Staggs recommended that respondent, instead, move in with a female friend, move to a halfway house, or find some other arrangement that did not involve a paramour. Staggs testified that she believed that the biggest issue in the case was respondent’s tendency to gravitate toward abusive men and that this tendency prevented respondent from gaining independence and learning to take care of both herself and her children.
On March 7, 2002, another evaluation, covering the period since October 27, 2001, was conducted. Respondent received an unsatisfactory evaluation on three of the objectives — maintaining a domestic-violence-free lifestyle, demonstrating appropriate parenting skills, and addressing her mental health issues. Respondent received a satisfactory evaluation for her cooperation with services. Staggs was asked why respondent was rated unsatisfactory on complying with her domestic violence tasks when she had received services for six weeks while residing at A Safe Place. Staggs made clear that the reason for the unsatisfactory evaluation was that, although respondent was cooperative and received “some services” while at A Safe Place, she participated in no services for the remainder of the evaluation period.
During the period covered by the March 7, 2002, evaluation, K.H. was moved to a nonrelative foster home from her maternal grandparent’s house, because the grandmother was no longer able to care for K.H. On January 25, 2002, K.H. was placed in the foster home where she has resided since.
Respondent was evaluated again on September 4, 2002. (Respondent objected to this evidence and the trial court ruled that it would consider the evidence to the extent that it related to the time before the State filed its petition for termination of respondent’s parental rights on April 2, 2002.) Once again, respondent received an unsatisfactory evaluation on all of her assigned objectives. Respondent had not regularly attended domestic violence counseling, parenting classes, or mental health counseling. During this period, respondent did have a good record of visiting with K.H., but, on one occasion, respondent brought a paramour with her and introduced him to K.H. as “her new daddy.”
Respondent testified that she was 25 years of age and had resided in an apartment in Waukegan since February 2002. She had obtained a job as a care manager at Sunrise Assisted Living in Gurnee. Respondent testified that, at the time of the trial, she had been working at Sunrise Assisted Living for about three months and believed that it would be a long-term job because she enjoyed the work, was able to work a sufficient number of hours, and was comfortable there. While respondent held a number of jobs during the pendency of this case, most were for short periods of time. Her longest period of employment was from 1998 to January 2001 at a nursing home in Zion.
Respondent testified that K.H. lived with her for about 2xk to 3 years of the child’s life and that the only times they have not resided together were when the trial court originally removed the minor and since July 2001, when K.H. was voluntarily placed with respondent’s parents. Respondent testified that she and K.H. had developed a bond. When respondent visited K.H. during the period that K.H. was not living with respondent, they played together at the park, played games, colored, read stories, and engaged in other activities. Respondent explained that she missed visitation only when she had transportation difficulties or when she and her mother were having disagreements, so as to spare K.H. from observing those conflicts.
Respondent testified that she attended various domestic violence and parenting groups. She attended various programs at A Safe Place from December 1999 until February 2002. Respondent also testified that she had three caseworkers and always had regular and consistent contact with the first two, Wells and Peterson. Respondent initially thought that she needed to contact Staggs only every other week, but recently contacted Staggs every week.
Respondent also explained the January 8, 2001, incident where Golden slapped K.H. Respondent testified that she noticed a mark on K.H.’s face when she returned home from work that night and questioned Golden about it. Respondent also testified that, when Peterson arrived the next morning, she told Peterson about the incident and was very open. Respondent believed that she cooperated with Peterson. She also stated that she chose K.H. over Golden by going to a shelter. Respondent testified that she wanted K.H. returned to her. She stated that, because of her current job, she felt better able to support herself and K.H.
Respondent noted that she became delinquent on her rent and was evicted in July 2001. At that time, she voluntarily placed K.H. with K.H.’s maternal grandparents. Respondent had been working at the nursing home in Zion until January 2001 but took a leave of absence because she did not have a baby-sitter for her children. Until January 2001, respondent paid her rent on time. Respondent also testified that she has not allowed Golden to have any contact with K.H. since early 2001.
On cross-examination, respondent testified that K.H. was adjudicated neglected because Golden injured her in 1999. Respondent admitted that, when the injury occurred, she attempted to cover for Golden because she did not want to get him into trouble. Respondent acknowledged that, at the time of trial, she had not yet successfully completed domestic violence counseling or obtained a new psychological evaluation. She also admitted that she had stopped attending parenting groups. Respondent testified that she had not obtained an order of protection against Golden and had visited him in jail on more than one occasion.
Ann Wells, who was called by respondent, was respondent’s caseworker prior to Peterson and Staggs. Wells testified that she was a child welfare specialist employed with DCFS. In 2000, she was assigned to respondent’s case and prepared a service plan on which she evaluated respondent in May 2000. Wells assigned respondent six objectives, which were to maintain a suitable home, obtain a psychological evaluation, cooperate with DCFS, address her domestic violence issues, complete a parenting class, and maintain visitation with K.H. Wells evaluated respondent as satisfactory on all but the parenting class objective, as the class schedule conflicted with respondent’s work schedule and she was unable to attend regularly. Wells testified that she believed that respondent did a good job of parenting K.H. and was absorbing and using the information she got from the parenting classes that she did attend.
On cross-examination, Wells testified about respondent’s ongoing issues with domestic violence. She testified that, in March 2000, Golden struck respondent in the face, causing an injury to respondent’s lip. To Wells’ knowledge, respondent did not contact the police regarding this incident. Wells related that she had numerous conversations with respondent about domestic violence and believed that respondent did not contact the police out of fear and a desire to protect Golden. During the period that Wells was assigned to the case, she observed respondent become less consistent in obtaining domestic violence counseling.
Following argument, the trial court found that respondent was an unfit parent. The trial court specifically noted that respondent “cares about her child,” “has a relationship with her child,” and “loves her child.” The court also noted that visitations went well and that K.H. loved to see respondent and enjoyed the visits. The court determined, however, that respondent had not adequately addressed the issue of domestic violence.
The court noted that, in 1999, K.H. had been adjudicated neglected because respondent had not taken her for medical treatment for her fractured leg for several days. The court observed that respondent repeatedly put the interests of her paramours before the interests of her daughter and exhibited “an overall lack of progress” and “an overall inability to care for the minor and ensure her safety.” The court held that the State met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unable to protect K.H. from conditions in her environment that were injurious to her welfare, had not made reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child, and had not made reasonable progress toward the return of the child in any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect.
The case proceeded to the best interests hearing. Staggs was the only witness who testified at this stage of the proceedings.
Staggs testified that respondent had a dependent personality disorder and placed others first in her life, which put K.H. in jeopardy. Staggs observed that, at the last visitation between respondent and K.H. for which Staggs was present, respondent brought a paramour with her.
Staggs testified that, since January 25, 2002, when K.H. was placed in her current foster home, she has spoken increasingly less of her mother. K.H. refers to the foster home as her home and calls the foster parents “Mommy” and “Daddy.” The foster parents are ready, willing, and able to adopt K.H. The foster parents speak positively about respondent and have facilitated contact between K.H. and her biological relatives. K.H. has expressed a desire to stay with the foster parents and take their last name as her own. K.H. has told respondent how much the foster parents love her. The foster parents love K.H. unconditionally and are thrilled to have her in their home.
Staggs related an incident where, after completing a home visit at the foster home, she transported K.H. to day care. Staggs did not take the normal route that the foster parents took to the day-care center, and K.H. became very upset and began to cry. Staggs explained that she realized that K.H. must have thought that she was being taken to a new placement and would not see her foster parents again. Only when Staggs drove into familiar surroundings was she able to reassure K.H. that she was being taken to day care.
Staggs testified that stability and permanency were the most important factors in K.H.’s life. If respondent’s parental rights were not terminated, then K.H. would have no permanency, would remain insecure, and would experience other negative emotional and psychological effects. The court granted respondent’s request to consider her testimony from the fitness hearing regarding her visitation and bonding with K.H.
The trial court ruled that it was in K.H.’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The court acknowledged that there was a bond between respondent and K.H., but observed that it would not be in K.H.’s best interests to keep K.H. in legal limbo while respondent continued to attempt to work toward KH.’s return. The court also noted that, in her last visit with K.H., respondent had brought along “another paramour,” and it commented on the inappropriateness of that action. The court concluded that this behavior did not show that respondent did not love her daughter, but it illustrated that respondent was unable to care for her at that time and at any time in the near future. The court noted that K.H. was flourishing in her current foster placement, which was very good for her, especially her emotional well-being. The court terminated respondent’s parental rights and denied respondent’s motion to reconsider. Respondent timely appeals. On appeal, respondent contends that both the trial court’s unfitness finding and its determination of KH.’s best interests were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Respondent first argues that the trial court’s unfitness finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because termination of parental rights permanently and completely severs the parent-child relationship, a finding of parental unfitness must be based on clear and convincing evidence. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001). That said, we will reverse the trial court’s determination of unfitness only if it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208.
One of the specific bases on which the trial court found respondent unfit was that she failed to make reasonable progress toward the goal of returning K.H. home in a nine-month period after the initial nine-month period that followed the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m)(iii) (West 2002)). Respondent argues that this holding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Our supreme court has held that “the benchmark for measuring a parent’s ‘progress toward the return of the child’ under section l(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent’s compliance with the service plans and the court’s directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which later become known and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.” C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 216-17. Based on this rule, our view is that, in the instant case, the most relevant measure of respondent’s progress toward the goal of returning K.H. to respondent is respondent’s advancement on issues related to domestic violence, because K.H.’s exposure to domestic violence was the primary reason that she was adjudicated neglected and the primary concern of her caseworkers who testified at trial. We hold that the trial court’s ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In particular, we find that there was sufficient basis in the record for the trial court to conclude that respondent failed to make reasonable progress in addressing her tendency to expose her daughter to domestic violence.
In attempting to show that she made reasonable progress, respondent points to the satisfactory evaluations of her progress made by her caseworkers between the adjudication of neglect on October 7, 1999, and February 2001. Respondent attributes the poor evaluations she received thereafter to the fact that Staggs, her new caseworker, decided that returning K.H. to respondent’s custody was no longer an appropriate goal. Respondent also emphasizes that she continues to address her issues through counseling at A Safe Place and is working to get her daughter back. Respondent argues that she now has stable employment and is able to support herself and K.H.
It is true that respondent initially made some advances. In fact, based on this progress, K.H. was returned to respondent in December 2000, However, three weeks later a new incident of domestic violence occurred in which K.H. was slapped in the face, sustaining a handprint-shaped bruise. As the case progressed, respondent’s progress slowed. Specifically, respondent failed to complete her tasks related to domestic violence and failed to place her children’s needs ahead of those of her paramours.
Each of respondent’s three caseworkers testified about respondent’s difficulties in addressing her problems with domestic violence. First, although Wells believed that respondent made satisfactory progress in addressing domestic violence during her oversight of the case, she also testified that, as time went on, respondent became less consistent in obtaining domestic violence counseling. Further, during this period, respondent sustained an injury to her lip when she was struck in the face by Golden. To Wells’ recollection, respondent failed to immediately report this incident to police. Wells testified that domestic violence was a “continual ongoing issue” for respondent.
Next, Peterson testified that respondent did not consistently attend domestic violence counseling while she was assigned to the case. Significantly, Peterson testified that respondent discontinued domestic violence counseling in January 2001. Respondent did not resume counseling for the remainder of the period that Peterson was assigned to the case. Further, although Peterson observed some satisfactory progress by respondent, she noted that respondent was not able to maintain steady employment and living conditions. In her February 2, 2001, and August 15, 2001, evaluations, Peterson found respondent’s progress on her service plan unsatisfactory overall.
Staggs testified that this trend continued. Respondent did not attend domestic violence counseling except for the six-week period that she resided at A Safe Place. Respondent also stopped cooperating with service providers and continued to place her paramours first, as demonstrated by moving in with an older paramour against the explicit advice of her caseworker. Further, respondent brought her paramour along to visitation with K.H., introducing him to K.H. as her “new daddy.”
Although the three days at the domestic violence shelter that respondent decided to forgo may not be, in themselves, particularly important, the reason that respondent decided to forgo them, to move in with a new paramour, is important given the nature of this case. Respondent skipped her last three days at A Safe Place to move in with a new paramour, 20 years her senior, against the explicit advice of her caseworker. This is significant for two reasons. First, it represents a fresh incident where respondent put the interests of a paramour ahead of those of K.H. Specifically, rather than complete her program at A Safe Place and follow the advice of her caseworker not to move in with a paramour, two decisions that would have been beneficial to K.H., respondent chose to leave A Safe Place early to move in with a paramour. Second, according to Staggs, respondent’s moving in with a paramour represented negative progress in treating her dependent personality disorder because respondent needed to learn to live independently in order to overcome the disorder. Staggs explained why it was important that respondent not immediately move in with a paramour:
“[The State]: With [respondent] leaving so close to completing the program, what was your recommendation to her as far as living arrangements after leaving A Safe Place?
[Staggs]: Certainly we looked at a female friend, any kind of halfway house or — you know, anything but a paramour. That certainly was the — It appeared to be the biggest issue in this case, hooking up with paramours that were abusive. So the concern was for her to become independent. The psychological addressed also the dependent personality. Learning how to become independent and take care of herself and take care of her children.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, according to Staggs, respondent’s moving in with a paramour represented negative progress in treating the psychological issues that led respondent to repeatedly expose K.H. to physical abuse.
A consistent aspect of all three caseworkers’ testimony was that respondent was unable to sufficiently address and remedy the issues of domestic violence in her life. The “ ‘ “failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent” includes *** the parent’s failure to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan and correct the conditions that brought the child into care ***.’ ” C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 217, quoting 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m) (West Supp. 1999). Respondent sporadically attended various counseling designed to assist her in identifying and overcoming her issues related to domestic violence; however, the caseworkers all identified domestic violence as a continuing issue that respondent failed to consistently address or make progress in overcoming. The record demonstrates, and respondent herself admitted, that she did not complete her tasks related to domestic violence, even at the time of the termination hearings.
The sole question we must answer is whether the trial court’s finding that respondent failed to make “reasonable progress” during a nine-month period (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m)(iii) (West 2002)) was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The legislature has provided that a parent who does not make reasonable progress toward the return of her child during any nine-month period after the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect is unfit. 750 ILCS 50/ l(D)(m)(iii) (West 2002). As harsh as this may seem, this rule is not without purpose. This provision acts to abate the harm that a perpetual lack of permanency inflicts on children, because it mandates that parents must, with some degree of consistency, make reasonable progress toward their children’s return home or risk forfeiting their parental rights. By so doing, the provision balances the potential positive effect of time on a parent’s ability to care for his or her child with the negative effect of time on the child’s psyche. Simply put, a parent is required to make reasonable progress during a nine-month period. For this reason, respondent’s early success is not determinative. The trial court had an adequate basis to find that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to make reasonable progress in a nine-month period after the nine-month period that followed the adjudication of neglect. We hold that the trial court’s determination that respondent was an unfit parent under section l(D)(m)(iii) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Because parental rights may be terminated based on a single ground of unfitness (In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 422 (2001)), we need not consider the additional grounds of unfitness determined by the trial court.
The dissent begins its argument by generally indicting the juvenile court system as “plagued.” It is apparent that the dissent’s issues with the “system” are based on information outside of the record on appeal. Because our function is to decide this case based on the record, we limit our analysis to the issues arising therefrom.
The dissent’s other arguments are flawed because the dissent fails to follow the well-settled manifest weight standard of review (see, e.g., C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208), and instead reweighs the evidence, substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. In order for a court of appeals to reverse a trial court’s finding of unfitness, the opposite conclusion must be “clearly evident.” C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208. Moreover, our supreme court has explained that a trial court’s findings on unfitness should be given “great deference” because the trial court has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. In re Brown, 86 Ill. 2d 147, 152 (1981). The dissent’s failure to give proper deference to the trial court pervades its analysis. For example, the dissent bases its conclusions in large part on its assessment that one of the State’s witnesses, Staggs, was not credible. However, only the trial court heard Staggs testify and observed her demeanor. For this reason, the trial court was in a superior position to judge her credibility. Similarly, the dissent relies on respondent’s self-serving testimony that her counselor told her that she could discontinue counseling. The dissent defends this by stating that “the trial court made no findings at the close of the hearing that indicated that it did not find the respondent’s testimony credible on this issue.” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 469. However, the dissent does not cite, nor are we aware of, any authority for the proposition that the manifest weight standard of review applies only to explicit findings of fact. We note that respondent does not dispute that her caseworkers, who testified at trial, made clear to her that counseling was required. The plenary character of the dissent’s review undermines its conclusion that the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
We note also that the testimony in this case contains vague references that the judge and the parties, having been privy to previous hearings in this case, seem to adequately comprehend. Having presided over a custody hearing and two permanency hearings that are part of this case but not part of the record on appeal, the trial judge was in a particularly good position to understand the significance and context of the evidence presented. From the previous two sentences, the dissent concludes that we place “great weight” on the custody hearing and permanency hearings and “speculate as to what transpired at those hearings.” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 478. Our point is much narrower than this. We do not suggest that the trial court may rely on evidence presented at a previous hearing in finding a parent unfit. Rather, we observe that the trial court’s familiarity with the case may aid it in understanding the evidence presented at the termination hearing. Our point is simply that the rule that we are to give “great deference” to the trial court’s findings is quite apt in this case.
Next, the dissent repeatedly emphasizes the supposed high speed in which the State filed its petition to terminate parental rights and even goes so far as to assert that the State filed its petition “for the most minimal of reasons.” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 464. In so doing, the dissent treats the January 8, 2001, incident, where Golden slapped K.H. in the face, as if it were the first and only incident of domestic violence. In reality, K.H. was adjudicated neglected on October 7, 1999, more than 31/2 years before the State filed its petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. There were three reported incidents where Golden battered K.H., and a fourth where he battered respondent. At the hands of Golden, K.H. received a fractured leg, a bite on the face, and a blow to the face that left a clear handprintshaped bruise. Golden also “busted” respondent’s lip. The earliest of these incidents occurred in January 1999, more than four years before the State filed the petition to terminate parental rights. Thus, the State did not act “in the most rapid of fashions” (346 Ill. App. 3d at 464) but, rather, gave respondent a period of well over three years to successfully address her problems. Furthermore, we disagree with the dissent’s characterization of the repeated physical abuse of K.H. as “the most minimal of reasons.”
The dissent argues that respondent’s stay in a domestic violence shelter demonstrates reasonable progress. We do not dispute that the 42 days that respondent spent at A Safe Place represents some progress on her part. It is clear that respondent received mandatory services, including domestic violence counseling, while at the shelter, although we note that the dissent’s repeated descriptions of A Safe Place as “intensive domestic violence counseling” (346 Ill. App. 3d at 466) and as an “intensive domestic violence program” (346 Ill. App. 3d at 466) do not appear in the record. While we do not discount respondent’s efforts while at A Safe Place, the trial court had adequate basis to hold that respondent failed to make reasonable progress within a nine-month period because of respondent’s failure to make any progress either before or after her stay at the shelter. For an 11-month period, from January 2001 to late December 2001, respondent attended no domestic violence counseling. When respondent left the shelter, she again attended no domestic violence counseling.
The dissent also finds it determinative that there was no evidence of a new abusive relationship following the relationship with Golden. While we note in passing that the record does contain Staggs’ September 4, 2002, report indicating that Staggs observed bruising on one of respondent’s arms and heard that respondent’s new paramour was abusive, our view is that the State did not need to show new instances of domestic violence because it provided sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that respondent had a serious issue with exposing her children to domestic violence that she failed to make reasonable progress in addressing.
We do not share the dissent’s view that, because K.H. had been returned to respondent’s custody, respondent was doing what she was supposed to be doing. Absent the three instances of physical abuse of K.H. and the one incident of physical abuse of respondent, it would be none of the State’s business whether respondent successfully completed domestic violence counseling or with whom respondent chose to cohabit. However, precisely because of the ongoing domestic violence, a service plan was developed and respondent was obligated to comply with it and to make reasonable progress toward reuniting with her child. See C.N, 196 Ill. 2d at 217. The dissent seems to think that the condition at issue was limited to respondent’s relationship with one paramour, Golden. The social service experts and the trial court saw the incidents involving Golden as evidence of a broader problem with domestic violence. With respect to the caseworkers, this is evident from the fact that they repeatedly assigned respondent counseling to address what Wells termed respondent’s “continuing ongoing issue” with domestic violence. Respondent’s goal of extricating herself from a lifestyle of domestic violence required more than simply ending her relationship with Golden; it required that she successfully address her issues, psychological or otherwise, that led her to repeatedly allow her daughter to become a victim of domestic violence and to act, on multiple occasions, to protect her daughter’s abuser from the authorities.
Next, the dissent pursues at length an argument never even raised by respondent, namely, that the trial court’s decision cannot withstand appellate review because the psychological evaluation conducted of respondent was not submitted into evidence. While the exact breadth of the problem that the dissent sees with the psychological evaluation is unclear, the dissent apparently believes that without the psychological report there is insufficient evidence that respondent had problems, or at least problems of a psychological nature, that she needed to address through counseling. Thus, according to the dissent, “the State failed to demonstrate how K.H. would be harmed” if respondent failed to complete “additional mental health counseling.” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 470.
We note that the dissent does not cite any authority for the premise that the State must specifically “demonstrate how [a child] would be harmed” by a respondent’s failure to complete a task. In any case, our supreme court has stated that service plans “must reasonably relate to ‘remedying a condition or conditions that gave rise or which could give rise to any finding of child abuse or neglect.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 214, quoting 325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West 1998). Thus, in this case, the service plans needed to reasonably relate to remedying the conditions that caused K.H. to repeatedly be exposed to domestic violence.
One of the conditions that gave rise to the removal was respondent’s conduct in repeatedly exposing K.H. to Golden’s abuse. While we are not experts on the matter, mental health counseling and domestic violence counseling seem to us “reasonably related” (see 325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West 2002); C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 214) to remedying this condition. More significantly, respondent’s caseworkers are experts on the matter, and they all assigned respondent counseling in one form or another. Furthermore, we note that the State presented evidence that, on multiple occasions, respondent attempted to protect Golden from the authorities and rationalized Golden’s conduct with respect to K.H. We think that the trial court could have found that mental health counseling was reasonably related to remedying whatever condition caused respondent to engage in this conduct. Finally, both Peterson and Staggs testified about the psychological evaluation that was conducted of respondent. Staggs testified that the evaluation both diagnosed respondent with a dependent personality disorder and noted that she needed to learn to live independéntly. Likewise, Peterson testified that the evaluation recommended that respondent undergo therapy for self-esteem and domestic violence issues.
The dissent does not consider Staggs’ and Peterson’s testimony regarding respondent’s psychological condition because it is hearsay. It is true that Staggs’ and Peterson’s testimony regarding the content of the report is hearsay evidence. However, none of the parties objected to this testimony or, for that matter, at any time questioned the accuracy of Staggs’ testimony that the report said that respondent had a dependent personality disorder or Peterson’s testimony that the report recommended therapy for self-esteem and domestic violence issues. The most obvious reason for respondent’s failure to object to the caseworkers’ testimony is that their testimony was consistent with the psychological report. Thus, an objection would have been pointless.
The dissent responds to this point by attempting to announce a new rule that it is “unacceptable for attorneys representing a child and a natural parent” to allow the State to present hearsay evidence at termination proceedings. 346 Ill. App. 3d at 472. The breadth of this rule, for which the dissent cites no authority whatsoever, is apparently wide. The dissent asserts that “all procedural safeguards must be adhered to,” a statement that sounds benign until the dissent makes clear that it considers objecting to hearsay evidence to be a “procedural safeguard.” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 472. Are all potentially meritorious objections “procedural safeguards”? Also, the stated reason for the rule is “the magnitude of the issues involved.” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 472. We wonder what other types of weighty cases the dissent would apply this rule to or, for that matter, what types of cases are not important enough that “all procedural safeguards must be adhered to.” Our supreme court has said that “[i]t is well established that when hearsay evidence is admitted without an objection, it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect.” Jackson v. Board of Review of the Department of Labor, 105 Ill. 2d 501, 508 (1985). Additionally, “Illinois courts have held that the rules of evidence to be applied in civil cases also apply to parental rights termination proceedings.” In re J.B., 346 Ill. App. 3d 77, 81 (2004). We observe that the dissent’s new rule that appellate courts must, without so much as a request by a party, reverse a trial court’s decision because of a lawyer’s failure to make a hearsay objection would truly revolutionize appellate standards of review.
The dissent also claims that our statement that the obvious reason for respondent’s counsel’s failure to object is that it would not have helped his client is “based on nothing more than conjecture and is clearly wrong.” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 475. In so claiming, the dissent ignores the “strong presumption” that an action or inaction on the part of an attorney is the product of a sound trial strategy. People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 411 (2000). The dissent also accuses us of speculating that the psychological evaluation “contained negative information about the respondent.” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 477. This is not speculation. Both Staggs and Peterson specifically testified about the negative content of the psychological evaluation. Rather, the dissent’s problems with the hearsay evidence are based on the double speculation that respondent’s caseworkers lied about the psychological report and that respondent’s counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the false testimony. The dissent engages in this double speculation in direct contravention of the manifest weight standard of review and the presumption that an action on the part of an attorney is the product of sound trial strategy. We think that the trial court could consider Staggs’ and Peterson’s hearsay testimony in determining that her psychological counseling was reasonably related to the condition that gave rise to KH.’s removal.
We also note that the dissent’s conclusion that mental health counseling was not reasonably related to the condition that gave rise to KH.’s removal (346 Ill. App. 3d at 470) provides yet another example of the dissent’s failure to abide by the manifest weight standard of review. Not only does the dissent fail to explain why it believes that it is “clearly evident” (C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208) that the trial court was mistaken in its implicit finding that respondent’s counseling met the “reasonably related” standard (C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 214), it does not even mention the manifest weight standard of review in this context.
Next, the dissent describes the facts in a manner that creates the impression that respondent took more initiative than she did in reporting Golden’s January 8, 2001, abuse of K.H. According to the dissent, following the January 8, 2001, incident where Golden left a handprintshaped bruise on K.H.’s face, “[t]he respondent met with her caseworker the following day and informed her of this abuse.” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 465. While it is true that respondent “met with her caseworker,” the reason for the meeting was that the caseworker, Peterson, went to respondent’s house the morning after the injury to take K.H. to day care. Also, respondent “informed” Peterson that Golden inflicted the injury only after Peterson questioned her about the bruise on KH.’s face. Peterson testified that, although respondent eventually cooperated, she defended Golden and “tried to rationalize that [Golden and K.H.] had been playing.” We think that these distinctions are significant, given that the issue with respondent’s fitness was related to her dependency on others and her inability to take initiative in protecting herself and her daughter from domestic violence.
Similarly, the dissent states that “[t]he record reveals that the only boyfriend of the respondent’s that abused K.H. or the respondent was Eddie Golden.” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 480. In truth, the record merely contains no evidence that respondent was abused by anyone but Golden.
The dissent also argues that respondent’s caseworkers included tasks not related to the issue of domestic violence in respondent’s service plans and evaluated respondent as unsatisfactory in her completion of these superfluous tasks. This argument ignores the fact that respondent repeatedly did not complete the tasks related to domestic violence that all can agree were not superfluous. The trial court specifically noted that its decision was based on its finding that issues of domestic violence “prevail throughout [respondent’s] life” and “creep into [KH.’s] life.” There is nothing in the record that suggests that the court relied on respondent’s failure to complete superfluous tasks in reaching its conclusion that respondent was unfit.
Next, the dissent argues that the trial court improperly based its conclusions on an erroneous conception that there was evidence that K.H. had been abused by multiple paramours because the trial court, while making its findings at the best interest phase of the proceedings, used the plural word “paramours” a single time. However, we note that respondent testified at trial that she had been involved in “violent relationships,” also plural. Thus, at the very least, there was evidence that respondent, as opposed to K.H., had been abused by multiple paramours.1 Moreover, we are not convinced that the trial court’s isolated comment demonstrates any kind of misconception. The comment referred to by the dissent that K.H. was “[a]bused by paramours” came in the context of the trial court’s discussion of the strength of the bond between respondent and K.H. The trial court stated:
“[Tjhere’s no doubt that there’s a bond between you and [K.H.] And you must have done something right in those early years to raise such a little girl who can still love and still find attachment in a family and still love you at the same time and her grandma and grandpa and J.J. And she’s been in and out of grandma’s house, in and out of foster care, in and out of your house. Abused by paramours. She knows that — I believe she probably knows that you’ve made mistakes, and yet she adores you.”
In our view, the use of the word “paramours” in this context is too isolated to support the conclusion that the trial court misunderstood the evidence.
Finally, according to the dissent, we conclude that respondent “suffered from overwhelming psychological problems that impeded her ability to protect her child.” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 472-73. What we have actually concluded is that the trial court had adequate basis to find that respondent’s counseling tasks were reasonably related to remedying the condition that was the basis for K.H.’s removal and that respondent failed to substantially complete these tasks. Our supreme court has stated that “where a service plan has been established to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent, the failure to make reasonable progress *** includes the failure to ‘substantially’ fulfill the terms of that service plan.” C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 217. The trial court’s conclusion that respondent failed to adequately address her problems with domestic violence through her service plan tasks was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Next, we address respondent’s contention that the trial court erred in its determination that it was in K.H.’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Respondent specifically points to the testimony regarding the bond and love between respondent and K.H. as a sufficient reason not to terminate her parental rights. While we recognize that bond, we disagree.
A trial court’s decision on the best interests of a child will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d 766, 772 (2002).2 Respondent argues that the strength of the mother-child bond trumps any other considerations in this matter. We note, however, that the existence of a mother-child bond “does not automatically insure that the parent will be fit or that the child’s best interests will be served by that parent.” In re J.B., 198 Ill. App. 3d 495, 499 (1990).
Here, the testimony demonstrated that K.H. has settled into her foster home and is adjusting well to it. Staggs testified that K.H. stated that she feels well-loved by her foster parents, and has told respondent how much they love her. In addition, K.H. refers to her foster parents as “Mommy” and “Daddy,” and speaks less often of respondent, whom she now regards as an “aunt.” Indeed, the testimony taken during the hearing indicated that the necessities of permanency, security, and stability are of great importance in this case. So much so that K.H. became extremely upset merely because a caseworker did not drive the same route to day care as her foster parents did, leading K.H. to believe that she was, once again, being taken to a new home. Based on this testimony, we hold that the trial court’s decision that it was in K.H.’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GROMETER, J., concurs.
The dissent mischaracterizes our use of this evidence when it states, “the majority seeks to bolster its affirmation of the trial court’s decision by relying on ‘evidence’ that respondent was abused by multiple ‘paramours.’ ” 346 Ill. App. 3d at 477. We have raised this point only in response to the dissent’s argument that the trial court’s use of the plural word “paramours” demonstrates that it became confused.
While some cases have analyzed a trial court’s decision on the best interests of a child under an abuse of discretion standard (see, e.g., In re Jeffrey S., 329 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1101 (2002)), we agree with the D.M. court that the manifest weight standard of review is proper where the challenge is to the sufficiency of evidence rather than the admission of evidence. See D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 773.