dissenting.
¶37 I disagree with the majority's application of the plain view doctrine to the "Faith Fallout" folder. Because I believe that the Faith Fallout text message folder was within the seope of the warrant, I would hold that the content of that folder-the text message conversation between Faith W. and Herrera-satisfies the plain view warrant exception and thus should not be suppressed. In my view, the warrant authorizing -the search of Herrera's cell phone for text messages sent between Herrera and Stazi necessarily authorized a search of all text conversations on Herrera's phone because Herrera easily could have disguised the conversation under an alternate name,
¶88 Whether Herrera actually hid text messages in the Faith Fallout folder is irrelevant. a lack of evidence-before the trial court suggesting that Herrera did not actually alter the file names has no bearing on whether it was reasonable for an officer to suspect that messages could be hidden in that folder. Because the Faith Fallout folder contained text messages, it was objectively reasonable to search the folder for text messages between Herrera and Stazi. Once the searching. officer lawfully opened the folder, the texts themselves between Herrera and Stazi satisfied the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.
¶39 In sum, because the warrant itself authorized the officer to search the Faith Fallout folder for texts between Herrera and Stazi, and because the messages that he discovered within that folder between Faith W. and Herrera satisfy the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, I would reverse the trial court's suppression order regarding the contents of the Faith Fallout folder. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I. The Scope of the Warrant
¶40 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects "against unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires that warrants issue only "upon probable cause ... and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." This search "is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). When a searching officer executes a valid warrant, he "may search closed containers [found within the authorized space] so long as the containers are of the type within which the items ... might reasonably be found." People in Interest of D.F.L., 931 P.2d 448, 452 (Colo.1997).
¶ 41 To meet this requirement, the container must be (1) "large enough to contain the contraband or evidence" that is the subject of *1235the warrant and (2) a place where that evidence "might reasonably [have been] expected to be secreted." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Evans, 92 F.3d 540, 543 (7th Cir.1996)). This reasonableness requirement does not depend on the subjective perceptions of the searching officer, nor does it depend on subsequent proof that the officers' expectations were correct. Rather, reasonableness "is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." People v. Mendoza-Balderama, 981 P.2d 150, 157 (Colo. 1999) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)). Moreover, although officers must operate generally within the bounds of the warrant, "when [the warrant's] limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between ... containers ... must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand." Ross, 456 U.S. at 821, 102 S.Ct. 2157, In the context of electronics, "ilt is unrealistic to expect a warrant to prospectively restrict the scope of a search by directory, filename or extension." United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1093 (10th Cir.2009).
¶42 In this case, Detective Dodd sought and obtained a warrant to search Herrera's seized cell phone for the following: (1) texts sent between Herrera and Stazi, (2) photographs sent between Herrera and Stazi that were attached to text messages, and (8) indi-cia of ownership to show the phone belonged to Herrera. Because Herrera's phone was not compatible with the police department's digital search tool, the officer had to search the phone's text messages manually and take pictures of relevant evidence. Civen the malleability of digital data and the real potential that Herrera disguised these texts: under another name or folder, however, it is unreasonable to restrict such manual searches to folders labeled "Stazi." 1 Rather, as the above caselaw indicates, a warrant: allowing an officer to search a digital device for text messages between two parties should be interpreted as authorizing the officer to search every text message folder because any of those folders could reasonably contain the evidence detailed in the warrant.
¶43 Because the Faith Fallout folder potentially could have been mislabeled to cover up Herrera's illegal communications with Stazi, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to open that folder, pursuant to the' warrant, to search for those communications. Therefore, opening the Faith Fallout folder did not implicate the plain view doctrine at all; it was simply an authorized search pursuant to the warrant. The plain view doc-, trine only came into play onee the officer had opened the Faith Fallout folder and observed the incriminating text messages between Herrera and Faith W. therein.
II. The Plain View Doctrine
¶44 In order to be admissible, evidence discovered pursuant to a search either must be obtained via a valid search warrant or must meet an exception to the warrant requirement. People v. Gothard, 185 P.3d 180, 183 (Colo.2008). The exception at issue here, the plain view doctrine, "allows police to seize, without a warrant, evidence that is plainly visible, so long as: (1) the initial intrusion onto the premises was legitimate; (2) the police had a reasonable belief that the evidence seized was incriminating; and (8) the police had a lawful right of access to the object." Id. __
¶45 Although this test was originally conceived in the context of physical, tangible space, it translates easily to the digital space of a smartphone. Here, the cell phone is the *1236premises, the Faith Fallout folder is the object, and the contents of the Faith Fallout folder-the messages between Herrera and Faith W.-are the evidence seized. The first clement is easily satisfied. The warrant authorized searching the phone for messages between Herrera and Stazi, so the initial intrusion into the phone was legitimate under the warrant. See id. at 188. The second element is satisfied because the incriminating nature of the texts between Herrera and Faith W. would have been immediately apparent to the searching officer. See id. at 184. The officer knew that Herrera allegedly had been inappropriately communicating with Faith W., a juvenile; Faith Fallout was almost certainly a pseudonym that shared the first name of the juvenile with whom Herrera allegedly had been communicating; and the inculpatory nature of the text messages would have been immediately apparent. See id. at 188-84.
¶46 Finally, the police had a lawful right of access to the Faith Fallout folder because it could have concealed the Stazi text messages, which were the subject of the warrant, thereby satisfying element three of the plain view doctrine. See id. A reasonable officer could conclude that a folder containing text messages could contain the text messages between Herrera and Stazi. File names are easily manipulated, so it is objectively reasonable to think that text messages within the scope of the warrant could be found in the Faith Fallout folder. The folder was, therefore, a closed container "of the type within which the items named in the warrant might reasonably be expected to be secreted." See People in Interest of D.F.L., 931 P.2d at 452. Whether Herrera actually hid messages from Stazi in the Faith Fallout folder is irrelevant. It only matters that it was objectively reasonable for an officer to search the folder for text messages between Herrera and Stazi.
¶47 Therefore, although the text messages within the Faith Fallout folder were themselves beyond the scope of the warrant, their seizure satisfied all three elements of the plain view doctrine. The texts fell within an exception to the warrant requirement and should not have been suppressed.
III. Conclusion
¶48 In the end, my disagreement with the majority turns on whether the Faith Fallout folder was within the scope of the warrant authorizing a search of Herrera's phone for text messages between Herrera and Stazi. I would hold that it was. The officer lawfully accessed both the phone and the Faith Fallout folder under the warrant, and the incriminating nature of the texts contained within that folder would have been immediately apparent to him in light of his previous knowledge. I would hold that the texts are admissible under the plain view doctrine. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE BOATRIGHT joins in this dissent.
, Indeed, as the Tenth Circuit observed in United . States v. Burgess, "a computer search may be as extensive as reasonably required to locate the items described in the warrant." 576 F.3d 1078, 1093 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006)) Thus, the court observed: >
It is unrealistic to expect a warrant to prospectively restrict the scope of a search by directory, filename or extension to attempt to stricture search methods-this process must remain dynamic. While file or directory names may sometimes alert one to the contents ... illegal activity may not be advertised even in the privacy of one's personal computer-it could well be coded or otherwise disguised.
Id. As any smartphone user is surely aware, a recipient of text messages or communications from another number may label that number however he pleases, and so the folder name under which'texts are cataloged deserves little weight, if any.