(By:
McKENNA, J.,with whom POLLACK and WILSON, JJ., join)
The second question in Abregano’s application for certiorari asks:
Whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the [family court] did not assume the role of an advocate for the prosecution and did not exhibit bias when [the family court] improperly commented on the evidence.
The dissent states that it is not necessary to reach the second question because we have remanded for a new trial on the first question. The right to an impartial judge is a due process right under article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution, however, and a judge should not express opinions as to the merits of a case in front of a jury, State v. Silva, 78 Hawai'i 115, 117, 118, 890 P.2d 702, 704, 705 (App.1995) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawai'i 226, 900 P.2d 1293 (1995). In addition, it is not unusual for our appellate courts to provide guidance on remand. See, e.g., State v. Basham, 132 Hawai'i 97, 112, 319 P.3d 1105, 1120 (2014) (providing guidance on remand regarding claims of prosecu-torial misconduct); Nelson v. Univ. of Haw., 97 Hawai'i 376, 385 n. 6, 38 P.3d 95, 104 n. 6 (2001) (addressing evidentiary issues to provide guidance to the court on remand); State v. Pacheco, 96 Hawai'i 83, 88, 26 P.3d 572, 577 (2001) (vacating conviction and remanding for new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and addressing additional issues on erroneously admitted evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and choice of evils defense “[i]n order to provide guidance to the circuit court and the parties on remand. ...”); State v. Davia, 87 Hawai'i 249, 252, 953 P.2d 1347, 1350 (1998) (vacating conviction and remanding for new change of plea hearing based on district court’s failure to establish that defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary, but addressing defendant’s remaining points of error “in order to provide guidance to the district court and the parties on remand”).
We therefore address the second question. The trial transcript passage in Section 1(B) provides the background:
[STATE]: Okay. Um, what did [Judge Ku-pau]—what did he tell you and the defendant about contact between parties?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Hearsay. This is hearsay.
THE COURT: Mr. Prosecutor, does the document not speak for itself? It is in evidence.
[STATE]: All right. Um, then let’s specifically address Points 3 and Points 4 in Section 3B—
THE COURT. All right.
[STATE]:—‘cause that deals with contact between parties.
[STATE]: [KA], um Section 3 says[,] “The respondent is prohibited from coming or passing within 100 yards of any residence or place of employment or school of the petitioner. The respondent must not violate this order even if the petitioner invites the respondent over.”
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Is that a question?
THE COURT: I think that is part of the question. So overruled at this time.
[STATE]: Do you remember Judge Kupau going over that portion of Point 3B3 with you in open court and the defendant in open court?
[KA]: Yes.
[STATE]: Okay. Now does 3—did he tell you 3B3, that section that I just read to you, does that apply—did he tell the defendant and you that that applies only to you or to—I mean—or to you and the other people covered under the order of protection?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Hearsay.
THE COURT: Okay. Sustained.
*502[STATE]: Okay. For the contact between parties section, did Judge Kupau say that it went over—that it covers both—just you or you and the other people on the order for protection?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[STATE]: Okay.
THE COURT. Mr. Prosecutor, isn’t this covered on Page 1 of Exhibit 1?
[STATE]: Okay.
THE COURT: No, I’m just asking. I don’t mean to preempt your questioning, but isn’t it covered on Page 1?
[STATE]: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. You are correct.
THE COURT: Well, it’s in evidence. If you want to ask her who’s covered, I think you can publish that portion of the exhibit which is in evidence if you desire.
[STATE]: Okay. So just to be clear, um, [KA], in addition to yourself as the petitioner that’s covered under this order for protection, um, again, there’s three other people covered under this order; right?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Leading.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[KA]: Yes.
[STATE]: Okay. So then who are those three people in addition to yourself covered under this order?
[KA]: Uh, my daughter [HP], uh, my son ... and our youngest daughter....
[STATE]: Okay. Thank you, [KA].
In front of the jury, in the passage quoted above, the family court suggested that the State was correct in arguing that Abregano could be found to have violated Sections III(B)(3) and III(B)(4) of the protective order because “isn’t this covered on Page 1 of Exhibit 1.”
This suggestion by the family court was an improper comment on the evidence under Hawaii Rules of Evidence (“HRE”) Rule 1102 (1993), which provides that “[t]he court shall instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the facts of the case, but shall not comment upon the evidence.” We have observed that “the Commentary on Rule 1102 unequivocally states that the present rule precludes comment on the evidence in all cases, without limitation.” State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38, 59, 79 P.3d 131, 152 (2003) (internal brackets, quotation marks, and emphasis deleted). Thus, the prohibition against judicial comment on the evidence applies throughout the proceedings and is not limited to jury instructions.10 Id. The rationale for HRE Rule 1102 is that judicial comment on the evidence risks placing the judge in the role of an advocate, and that analysis of the evidence is an advocate’s function, Addison Bowman, Hawai‘% Rules of Evidence Manual § 1102-1 (2014); State v. Nomura, 79 Hawai'i 413, 417, 903 P.2d 718, 722 (App.1995).
The record does not support Abregano’s assertion, however, that the family court’s improper comment was based on the court assuming the role of an advocate for the prosecution or that it constituted an exhibition of bias; rather the record suggests that the family court’s improper comment was based on a misunderstanding of what was prohibited by the protective order. For example, in denying Abregano’s motion for judgment of acquittal, the family court stated its belief that “other protected persons stand in the same shoes as the petitioner[.]” Contrary to the family court’s commentary before the jury and its statement during its ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal, under the protective order, other protected persons do not stand in the same shoes as the petitioner, and Sections 111(B)(3) and 111(B)(4) do not apply to conduct between Abregano and HP.
A redacted copy of the protective order is attached to this concurring opinion as “Attachment 1,” with redactions noted in brackets. The protective order identifies Abrega-no as the “Respondent.” In and below the caption, it refers to KA as the “Petitioner,” giving the ‘Tear of Birth” of the “Petitioner.” *503Below the “PETITIONER IDENTIFIERS” on the first page, HP is included as an “Other Protected Person” with a “YOB” or “Year of Birth.” Below the “Other Protected Person” information, the protective order identifies “Respondent’s Relationship to Petitioner” as “MARRIED.” Obviously, this cannot be HP.
The protective order is replete with additional references to the “Petitioner” that make it clear that the only “Petitioner” is KA. For example, persons present at the court hearing on the protective order are identified at the top of page 2, and notes that “Petitioner” was present. HP was not at the hearing. Section 111(D)(1) regarding “Temporary Custody and Visitation” provides that the “Petitioner” shall have temporary legal and physical custody of the parties’ minor children.
The State asserts that Abregano violated Sections 111(B)(3) and (4) of the protective order by contacting HP, and before the jury, the family court suggested that the State’s assertion was correct. These sections, however, only prohibit conduct by Respondent as to the “Petitioner,” or KA. A review of the protective order makes clear that the “Petitioner” is KA, and HP is an “Other Protected Person.” The protective order’s only prohibition on conduct between Abregano and HP appears in Section 111(B)(8), which prohibits Abregano from “contacting” HP.
As this court recently reiterated in State v. Guyton, 135 Hawai'i 372, 351 P.3d 1138 (2015), a ease alleging a violation of a district court restraining order:
[A] prerequisite to punishing a person for violating an injunction order ... is a court order that is “clear and unambiguous,” so as to allow a person of ordinary intelligence to “ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden[.]” This requirement is no more than a rule of reason because, as it is for statutes, fairness and due process dictate that a court order must be sufficiently particular and definite so as to clearly identify the conduct that it prohibits.
135 Hawai'i at 377-78, 351 P.3d at 1143-44 (citations omitted).
Thus, in addition to making an improper comment on the evidence, the family court erred in suggesting before the jury that the State correctly asserted that Abregano could be found to have violated Sections 111(B)(3) and 111(B)(4) of the protective order and in stating during its ruling on Abregano’s motion for judgment of acquittal that “other protected persons stand in the same shoes as the petitioner in this case.” The record indicates, however, that the family court’s improper comment before the jury was based on a mistaken understanding of what was prohibited by the protective order. As a remand has already been ordered for the Rule 48 violation, we need not address whether any remedy is necessary for the improper comment.11
. The family court later explained that "the court was commenting on a document that was already received into evidence,” and that, "[t]he court was facilitating the use of this document for a witness who was on the stand.”
. We therefore do not consider the extent of the prejudice by the improper comment on the evidence, although we note that Communication No. 1 from the jury inquired as follows: "Does the term 'Petitioner’ include the 'Petitioner Identifiers’ on page 1 of Exhibit 1? We also do not address the sufficiency of the evidence as this issue was not raised on appeal. See State v. Davis, 133 Hawai'i 102, 120, 324 P.3d 912, 930 (2014) ("[A] reviewing court is required under article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution to address a defendant's express claim of insufficiency of the evidence prior to remanding for a new trial based on a defective charge.”).