Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lucy Billings, J.), entered March 19, 2014, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendant’s motion to compel to the extent of directing plaintiff to produce all photographs of plaintiff privately posted on Facebook prior to the accident at issue that she intends to introduce at trial, all photographs of plaintiff privately posted on Facebook after the accident that do not show nudity or romantic encounters, and authorizations for defendant to obtain records from Facebook showing each time plaintiff posted a private message after the accident and the number of characters or words in those messages, modified, on the law and the facts, to vacate those portions of the order directing plaintiff to produce photographs of herself posted to Facebook after the accident that she does not intend to introduce at trial, and authorizations related to plaintiff’s private Facebook messages, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
In this personal injury action, plaintiff alleges that while riding one of defendant’s horses, the stirrup leather attached to the saddle broke, causing her to lose her balance and fall to the ground. Plaintiff claims that defendant was negligent because, inter alia, he failed to properly prepare the horse for riding, and neglected to maintain and inspect the equipment. Plaintiff alleges that the accident resulted in cognitive and physical injuries that have limited her ability to participate in social and recreational activities. At her deposition, plaintiff testified that she maintained and posted to a Facebook account prior to the accident, but deactivated the account at some point after.
Defendant sought an order compelling plaintiff to provide an unlimited authorization to obtain records from her Facebook account, including all photographs, status updates and instant messages. The motion court granted the motion to the extent of directing plaintiff to produce: (a) all photographs of herself privately posted on Facebook prior to the accident that she *530intends to introduce at trial; (b) all photographs of herself privately posted on Facebook after the accident that do not show nudity or romantic encounters; and (c) authorizations for Facebook records showing each time plaintiff posted a private message after the accident and the number of characters or words in those messages. Plaintiff now appeals.
CPLR 3101 (a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In determining whether the information sought is subject to discovery, “[t]he test is one of usefulness and reason” (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]). “ ‘It is incumbent on the party seeking disclosure to demonstrate that the method of discovery sought will result in the disclosure of relevant evidence or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the claims’ ” (Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d 417, 418 [2d Dept 2004], quoting Crazytown Furniture v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 150 AD2d 420, 421 [2d Dept 1989]; see also GS Plasticos Limitada v Bureau Veritas Consumer Prods. Servs., Inc., 112 AD3d 539, 540 [1st Dept 2013] [sufficient factual predicate required for discovery demands]; Sexter v Kimmelman, Sexter, Warmflash & Leitner, 277 AD2d 186 [1st Dept 2000]). Discovery demands are improper if they are based upon “ ‘hypothetical speculations calculated to justify a fishing expedition’ ” (Budano v Gurdon, 97 AD3d 497, 499 [1st Dept 2012], quoting Manley v New York City Hous. Auth., 190 AD2d 600, 601 [1st Dept 1993]).
This Court has consistently applied these settled principles in the context of discovery requests seeking a party’s social media information. For example, in Tapp v New York State Urban Dev. Corp. (102 AD3d 620 [1st Dept 2013]), we denied the defendants’ request for an authorization for the plaintiff’s Facebook records, concluding that the mere fact that the plaintiff used Facebook was an insufficient basis to provide the defendant with access to the account. Likewise, in Pecile v Titan Capital Group, LLC (113 AD3d 526 [1st Dept 2014]), we concluded that vague and generalized assertions that information in the plaintiff’s social media sites might contradict the plaintiffs claims of emotional distress were not a proper basis for disclosure (see also Abrams v Pecile, 83 AD3d 527 [1st Dept 2011] [rejecting the defendant’s demand for access to the plaintiffs social networking sites because there was no showing that information in those accounts would lead to relevant evidence bearing on the plaintiffs claims]).
Other Departments of the Appellate Division, consistent with well-established case law governing disclosure, have required *531some threshold showing before allowing access to a party’s private social media information (see e.g. Richards v Hertz Corp., 100 AD3d 728, 730-731 [2d Dept 2012] [striking demand for Facebook information of one of the plaintiffs because there was no showing that the disclosure of that material would result in disclosure of relevant evidence or would be reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of information bearing on the claim]; McCann v Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 78 AD3d 1524, 1525 [4th Dept 2010] [denying authorization for the plaintiffs Facebook information where the defendant failed to establish a factual predicate of relevancy, and characterizing the request as “a fishing expedition . . . based on the mere hope of finding relevant evidence” (internal quotation marks omitted)]). Guided by these principles, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish entitlement to either plaintiff’s private Facebook photographs, or information about the times and length of plaintiff’s private Facebook messages. The fact that plaintiff had previously used Facebook to post pictures of herself or to send messages is insufficient to warrant discovery of this information (see Tapp, 102 AD3d at 620 [the plaintiff’s mere utilization of a Facebook account is not enough]). Likewise, defendant’s speculation that the requested information might be relevant to rebut plaintiffs claims of injury or disability is not a proper basis for requiring access to plaintiff’s Facebook account (see id. at 621 [the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs Facebook postings might reveal daily activities that contradict claims of disability is “nothing more than a request for permission to conduct a fishing expedition” (quotation marks omitted)]; Pecile, 113 AD3d at 527 [vague and generalized assertions that the information sought might conflict with the plaintiff’s claims of emotional distress insufficient]).*
However, in accordance with standard pretrial procedures, plaintiff must provide defendant with all photographs of herself posted on Facebook, either before or after the accident, that she intends to use at trial. Plaintiff concedes that she cannot use these photographs at trial without having first disclosed them to defendant.
We disagree with the dissent’s position that we should reconsider the well-settled body of case law, from both this Court and other Departments, governing the disclosure of *532social media information. Both parties here agree with the general legal principles set forth in the existing case law and differ only as to the application of those principles to the specific facts of this case. Neither party asks us to revisit our controlling precedent, and the doctrine of stare decisis requires us to adhere to our prior decisions (see People v Aarons, 305 AD2d 45, 56 [1st Dept 2003] [“stare decisis stands as a check on a court’s temptation to overrule recent precedent. Only compelling circumstances should require us to depart from this doctrine”], affd 2 NY3d 547 [2004]). Although we agree with the dissent that social media is constantly evolving, there is no reason to alter the existing legal framework simply because the potential exists that new social network practices may surface. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the features of Facebook at issue here (i.e., the ability to post photographs and send messages) have been around for many years.
Contrary to the dissent’s view, this Court’s prior decisions do not stand for the proposition that different discovery rules exist for social media information. The discovery standard we have applied in the social media context is the same as in all other situations — a party must be able to demonstrate that the information sought is likely to result in the disclosure of relevant information bearing on the claims (see e.g. GS Plasticos Limitada, 112 AD3d at 540; Budano, 97 AD3d at 499; Sexier, 277 AD2d at 187; Manley, 190 AD2d at 601). This threshold factual predicate, or “reasoned basis” in the words of the dissent, stands as a check against parties conducting “fishing expeditions” based on mere speculation (see Devore v Pfizer Inc., 58 AD3d 138, 144 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 703 [2009] [parties cannot use discovery “as a fishing expedition when they cannot set forth a reliable factual basis for what amounts to, at best, mere suspicions”]).
Although we agree with the dissent that the discovery standard is the same regardless of whether the information requested is contained in social media accounts or elsewhere, we disagree with the dissent’s analysis as to how that standard should work in the personal injury context. According to the dissent, “[i]f a plaintiff claims to be physically unable to engage in activities due to the defendant’s alleged negligence, posted information, including photographs and the various forms of communications (such as status updates and messages) that establish or illustrate the plaintiff’s former or current activities or abilities will be discoverable.” This view, however, is contrary to our established precedent holding otherwise (see Pecile v Titan, 113 AD3d at 526; Tapp, 102 AD3d at 620; *533Abrams, 83 AD3d at 527). We are bound by principles of stare decisis to follow this prior precedent, particularly here where no party asks us to revisit it, and we believe that this precedent results in the correct outcome here.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the dissent’s position would allow for discovery of all photographs of a personal injury plaintiff after the accident, whether stored on social media, a cell phone or a camera, or located in a photo album or file cabinet. Likewise, it would require production of all communications about the plaintiff’s activities that exist not only on social media, but in diaries, letters, text messages and emails. Allowing the unbridled disclosure of such information, based merely on speculation that some relevant information might be found, is the very type of “fishing expedition” that cannot be countenanced. Contrary to the dissent’s view, there is no analogy between the defense litigation tool of surveillance video and the wholesale discovery of private social media information. The surveillance of a personal injury plaintiff in public places is a far cry from trying to uncover a person’s private social media postings in the absence of any factual predicate.
The question of whether a court should conduct an in camera review of social media information is not presented on this appeal. The court below did not order an in camera review, nor do the parties on appeal request any such relief. Further, the dissent is mistaken that our prior decisions in this area require a court to conduct an in camera review in all circumstances where a sufficient factual predicate is established. The decision whether to order an in camera review rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, or in this Court’s discretion if we choose to exercise it (see Gottlieb v Northriver Trading Co. LLC, 106 AD3d 580 [1st Dept 2013]; Horizon Asset Mgt., Inc. v Duffy, 82 AD3d 442, 443 [1st Dept 2011]). The cases cited by the dissent in which an in camera review was directed stand simply for the proposition that those courts, in their discretion, believed that such review was appropriate.
Finally, plaintiff’s claim that the motion court erred in sua sponte ordering a physical and psychological examination of her is based on a misreading of the court’s decision. As defendant acknowledges, the court did not grant such relief, but merely referenced the previously scheduled examination discussed at oral argument. Concur — Moskowitz, Richter and Kapnick, JJ.
The fact that plaintiff deactivated her Facebook account is not a basis to conclude that relevant information is contained therein. In any event, in the motion papers below, defendant’s counsel conceded that he conducted a search of plaintiff’s public Facebook profile before she deactivated it and found nothing but an old picture of her.