Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Thor Templin

2016 WI 18

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2015AP284-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against
Thor Templin, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant,
v.
Thor Templin,
Respondent.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST TEMPLIN

OPINION FILED: March 29, 2016
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:

JUSTICES:
CONCURRED: ABRAHAMSON, J.
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:
2016 WI 18
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2015AP284-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Thor Templin, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation, FILED
Complainant,
MAR 29, 2016
v.
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court
Thor Templin,

Respondent.

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license

suspended.

¶1 PER CURIAM. We review the report and recommendation

of Referee Hannah C. Dugan that the license of Attorney Thor

Templin be suspended for a period of six months for professional

misconduct and that he pay the full costs of this proceeding,

which are $7,564.50 as of October 19, 2015. The referee also

recommends that Attorney Templin be required to make restitution

totaling $500 to two clients and that he be required to complete
six hours of continuing legal education (CLE), concentrating on
No. 2015AP284-D

civil procedure and/or appellate practice and approved by the

Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR), as a precondition to

reinstatement.

¶2 Upon careful review of the matter, we adopt the

referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. We agree

that a six-month suspension of Attorney Templin's license is an

appropriate sanction for his misconduct. We also conclude that

the full costs of the proceeding should be assessed against him,

and we also agree that he should be required to make restitution

totaling $500 to two clients and that he should be required to

complete six hours of CLE.

¶3 Attorney Templin was admitted to practice law in

Wisconsin in 2008 and practices in Milwaukee. His disciplinary

history consists of a consensual private reprimand for failing

to act diligently and failing to communicate appropriately in a

client matter, and for failing to return files. Private

Reprimand 2011-04.

¶4 On February 12, 2015, the OLR filed a complaint
alleging that Attorney Templin committed 12 counts of misconduct

involving four clients.

¶5 Attorney Templin filed an answer to the complaint on

March 13, 2015. Referee Dugan was appointed on March 31, 2015.

On July 2, 2015, the parties sent the referee a stipulation that

included a withdrawal of Attorney Templin's answer and his plea

of no contest to all counts of misconduct. The parties sent the

referee an amended stipulation on July 6, 2015. The amended
stipulation provided that the referee could use the factual
2
No. 2015AP284-D

allegations of the complaint as an adequate basis in the record

for a determination of misconduct as to all 12 counts.

¶6 The parties jointly recommended that the referee

determine that a recommended sanction in the matter be a four-

month suspension of Attorney Templin's Wisconsin law license.

The parties further stipulated that Attorney Templin should be

required to make restitution to two clients in the total amount

of $500 and that he be required to complete six hours of CLE

concentrating on civil procedure and/or appellate practice, with

the coursework to be approved by the OLR, as a precondition to

his reinstatement. Attorney Templin represented that he fully

understands the misconduct allegations; that he fully

understands his right to contest the matter; that he fully

understands the ramifications of his entry into the stipulation;

that he fully understands that he has the right to counsel and

has chosen to represent himself; and that his entry into the

stipulation is made knowingly and voluntarily and is not the

product of plea-bargaining.
¶7 The referee issued her report and recommendation on

September 29, 2015. The referee found that the OLR had met its

burden of proof with respect to all counts of misconduct alleged

in the complaint.

¶8 Counts 1-5 of the OLR's complaint arose out of

Attorney Templin's representation of J.S. J.S. was divorced

from M.S. in July 2008. Attorney Templin commenced his

representation of J.S. in December 2008. In August 2011,
approximately three years after the divorce judgment, Attorney
3
No. 2015AP284-D

Templin filed a notice of motion and motion for relief from the

judgment of divorce or, in the alternative, to set aside the

judgment of divorce for fraud on the court. Attorney Templin's

motion challenged M.S.'s financial disclosures.

¶9 On October 10, 2011, M.S.'s attorney sent a letter to

Attorney Templin, which included a motion for sanctions

requesting that Attorney Templin withdraw his frivolous

pleadings. The motion was based on legal grounds that included

Wis. Stat. § 806.07, requiring a motion for relief from judgment

to be filed within one year of the judgment.

¶10 On October 25, 2011, Attorney Templin filed an amended

notice of motion and motion for relief from the judgment of

divorce or to set aside the judgment of divorce for fraud on the

court or, in the alternative, to create a trust under Wis. Stat.

§ 767.125(5). On November 1, 2011, a hearing was held before

Calumet County Family Court Commissioner James Fitzgerald. The

court commissioner determined that Attorney Templin's motion was

not timely filed; that at least one of Attorney Templin's
arguments involved "great leaps of reasoning that did not make

sense;" and that there was no basis in fact for most of the

allegations made by J.S. and that such allegations were

frivolous. Accordingly, Attorney Templin's amended motion was

dismissed with prejudice.

¶11 Attorney Templin filed a request for a de novo

hearing. A hearing was conducted before Judge Wilber Warren III

on March 27, 2012. Judge Warren issued a decision in August
2012 denying the motion to reopen the judgment and also denying
4
No. 2015AP284-D

the imposition of a constructive trust. Judge Warren found the

claims for relief to be frivolous. In a September 10, 2012

order, Judge Warren ordered J.S. and/or Attorney Templin to pay

$6,526.22 in attorneys fees to M.S.

¶12 J.S. filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in April

2014, attempting to discharge the "attorneys fees" sanction.

Attorney Templin's firm represented J.S. M.S.'s new attorney

advised that the attorneys fees obligation was not a

dischargeable debt under bankruptcy laws.

¶13 M.S. filed a grievance against Attorney Templin with

the OLR. Attorney Templin repeatedly failed to respond to the

OLR's requests for a response to the grievance. Attorney

Templin did finally respond on September 12, 2013.

¶14 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of

misconduct with respect to Attorney Templin's representation of

J.S.:

[Count 1] By filing a motion (and amended
motion) for relief from a divorce judgment years after
the applicable time limits had passed and advancing
arguments devoid of factual or legal support, Templin
violated SCR 20:1.1.1

[Count 2] By knowingly filing a motion (and
amended motion) for relief from a divorce judgment
years after the applicable time limits had passed and
advancing arguments unwarranted under existing law,
with no good faith argument existing for an extension,

1
SCR 20:1.1 provides that "[a] lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."

5
No. 2015AP284-D

modification, or reversal of existing law, Templin
violated SCR 20:3.1(a)(1).2

[Count 3] By filing a motion (and amended
motion) for relief from a divorce judgment years after
the applicable time limits had passed and advancing
arguments devoid of factual or legal support, by later
filing a bankruptcy action on behalf of the client
seeking to discharge his own sanction obligations
imposed by the trial court, and by filing the
bankruptcy action one day prior to a scheduling
hearing on a Contempt/Show Cause proceeding on the
underlying sanction order, Templin took multiple
actions on behalf of his client when he knew or when
it was obvious that such action would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injure another, in violation of
SCR 20:3.1(a)(3).3

[Count 4] By failing to comply with the
September 10, 2012 trial court sanction order
requiring Templin and his client (jointly and
severally) to pay $6,526.22 to the client's former
husband within 30 days of the order, Templin knowingly
disobeyed an obligation of a tribunal, in violation of
SCR 20:3.4(c).4

2
SCR 20:3.1(a)(1) provides that, in representing a client,
a lawyer shall not "knowingly advance a claim or defense that is
unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may
advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law."
3
SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) provides that, in representing a client,
a lawyer shall not "file a suit, assert a position, conduct a
defense, delay a trial or take other action on behalf of the
client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such an
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another."
4
SCR 20:3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists."

6
No. 2015AP284-D

[Count 5] By failing to provide relevant
information to OLR in a timely fashion, Templin
violated SCR 22.03(2),5 which is enforceable under the
Rules of Professional Conduct through SCR 20:8.4(h).6
¶15 Counts 6-8 of the OLR's complaint arose out of

Attorney Templin's representation of A.H. In 2009, the State of

Wisconsin filed a petition to terminate A.H.'s parental rights

to his son. Following a dispositional hearing in February 2011,

A.H. involuntarily lost his parental rights to his son.

Following an appeal and a subsequent trial on remand, the trial

court entered an order terminating A.H.'s parental rights to his

son. A.H. appealed this order. His appointed appellate counsel

filed a no-merit brief on A.H.'s behalf.

5
SCR 22.03(2) provides:

Upon commencing an investigation, the director
shall notify the respondent of the matter being
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the
investigation of the matter requires otherwise. The
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a
request for a written response. The director may allow
additional time to respond. Following receipt of the
response, the director may conduct further
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer
questions, furnish documents, and present any
information deemed relevant to the investigation.
6
SCR 20:8.4(h) provides that it is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6),
or SCR 22.04(1)."

7
No. 2015AP284-D

¶16 On December 5, 2012, the court of appeals entered an

order summarily affirming the trial court's order terminating

A.H.'s parental rights.

¶17 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.24(1), a motion for

reconsideration of a court of appeals' decision must be filed

within 20 days of the court of appeals' order. Pursuant to

Wis. Stat. § 808.10(1), a petition for review must be filed with

this court within 30 days of the court of appeals' decision. A

failure to comply with the 30-day deadline for filing a petition

for review deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction.

¶18 On January 4, 2013, A.H. met with Attorney Templin and

paid him $300 in cash to review his case file for purposes of

possibly filing a petition for review. A.H. believed he had

until January 7, 2013, to file a petition for review. In fact,

the filing deadline was January 4, 2013. Attorney Templin

failed to advise A.H. that, subsequent to January 4, 2013,

nothing further could be done on the case.

¶19 A.H. attempted to reach Attorney Templin in January
and February of 2013 without success. In March 2013, A.H.

submitted documents to Attorney Templin in an attempt to show

his continued efforts to see his son. In April 2013, Attorney

Templin met with A.H., returned his files, and stated there was

nothing further to be done in the matter.

¶20 A.H. filed a grievance with the OLR against Attorney

Templin. Attorney Templin failed to respond to the OLR's

requests for a response to the grievance.

8
No. 2015AP284-D

¶21 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of

misconduct with respect to Attorney Templin's representation of

A.H.:

[Count 6] By failing to respond promptly to
[A.H.'s] multiple requests for information regarding
his case, Templin failed to comply with reasonable
requests by [A.H.] for information, in violation of
SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).7

[Count 7] By failing to explain to [A.H.] that
the deadline for filing a Petition for Review with the
Supreme Court, or that all other applicable appellate
deadlines, had expired on or before January 4, 2013,
Templin failed to explain matters to [A.H.] in a way
that would permit him to make informed decisions about
his representation, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(b).8

[Count 8] By accepting a $300 fee to review
[A.H.'s] file for purposes of a potential appeal to
the Supreme Court, on the same day as the deadline for
filing any kind of appeal or petition for review
expired, thereby precluding any meaningful action in
the case, Templin charged an unreasonable fee, in
violation of SCR 20:1.5(a).9

7
SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides that a lawyer shall "promptly
comply with reasonable requests by the client for information."
8
SCR 20:1.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client
to make informed decisions regarding the representation."
9
SCR 20:1.5(a) provides:

A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge,
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the
following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(continued)
9
No. 2015AP284-D

¶22 Count 9 of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney

Templin's representation of V.K., who retained Attorney Templin

in May 2013 to commence a divorce action. Attorney Templin

prepared legal papers purportedly for the purpose of commencing

the divorce action and mailed them to the Racine County Clerk of

Court for filing. The clerk of court returned the divorce

pleadings, unfiled, to Attorney Templin with a note indicating

that the family court commissioner would not accept the

documents for filing because Attorney Templin also needed to

file an order to show cause and affidavit for temporary relief.

¶23 Attorney Templin prepared an order to show cause and

affidavit for temporary relief and mailed the documents to the

clerk of court. The documents were again returned with a

statement that Attorney Templin had failed to properly follow

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

10
No. 2015AP284-D

local Racine County court rules. Thereafter, Attorney Templin

downloaded the court documents that are accessible online for

pro se litigants and filled out the information necessary to

initiate the divorce action on behalf of V.K. Those documents

were submitted to the clerk of court and were once again

rejected. V.K. fired Attorney Templin via email on or about

July 22, 2013.

¶24 The OLR's complaint alleged the following count of

misconduct with respect to Attorney Templin's representation of

V.K.:

[Count 9] By failing to properly prepare and file
[V.K.'s] Petition for Divorce in Racine County Circuit
Court, Templin failed to provide competent
representation to his client, in violation of SCR
20:1.1.
¶25 Counts 10-12 of the OLR's complaint arose out of

Attorney Templin's representation of C.B., a veteran who had a

history of receiving medical care from the Veterans

Administration (VA). In June 2008, C.B. was involved in a

serious auto accident which resulted in him being flown to

Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital (Froedtert) where he

remained for approximately three months. After payment of

certain amounts by the VA, the amount owing from C.B. to

Froedtert was $79,442.07.

¶26 On August 28, 2012, Froedtert filed a summons and

complaint against C.B. in Milwaukee County circuit court. C.B.

met with Attorney Templin on September 21, 2012, and discussed

11
No. 2015AP284-D

the need to file an answer and a third party summons and

complaint against the VA.

¶27 Attorney Templin filed an answer and affirmative

defenses on September 24, 2012. A pretrial conference was held

on November 5, 2012. The scheduling order issued that day

imposed a December 5, 2012 deadline for filing amendments to the

pleadings, including the naming of any additional parties. The

scheduling order imposed a deadline of March 5, 2013, for the

parties to file all dispositive motions, imposed deadlines to

identify witnesses and damage claims, and imposed a deadline for

discovery, as well as a deadline to complete mediation.

¶28 On December 5, 2012, Attorney Templin filed a third

party summons and complaint against the VA. Despite apparent

efforts to obtain service on the VA, service was never obtained.

Attorney Templin never filed a witness list on behalf of C.B.

¶29 On March 5, 2013, Froedtert filed a motion for summary

judgment with supporting memorandum and affidavit. Attorney

Templin did not file any responsive pleadings. On April 22,
2013, Attorney Templin sent an email to Froedtert's counsel

indicating he never received the summary judgment motion.

Another copy of the motion was sent to Attorney Templin.

¶30 On April 22, 2013, Attorney Templin sent a letter

asking the judge for an adjournment of the April 24, 2013

summary judgment motion hearing. Attorney Templin's request was

denied.

12
No. 2015AP284-D

¶31 The scheduling order had also required the parties to

complete mediation before April 4, 2013. The attorneys never

communicated over the subject of mediation.

¶32 On April 24, 2013, the circuit court granted

Froedtert's motion for summary judgment. Attorney Templin never

adequately advised C.B. about the pending summary judgment

motion or various legal options available to him concerning the

motion. C.B. received no communication or contact from Attorney

Templin after April 24, 2013. Ultimately, C.B. filed bankruptcy

in 2014 and the judgment in favor of Froedtert was discharged.

¶33 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of

misconduct with respect to Attorney Templin's representation of

C.B.:

[Count 10] By failing to properly serve the VA;
by failing to submit a witness list or detailed damage
claims; and/or by failing to respond to the Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by the plaintiff in the case,
Templin failed to provide competent representation to
his client, in violation of SCR 20:1.1.

[Count 11] By failing to secure service on a
third-party defendant, file a witness list as required
in the Scheduling Order, pursue mediation, or file any
dispositive motions, Templin failed to provide
diligent representation to his client, in violation of
SCR 20:1.3.10

[Count 12] By failing to advise [C.B.] of the
pending Motion for Summary Judgment, or the subsequent
entry of a judgment against him, as well as failing to
discuss the options available to him regarding his
case, Templin failed to explain matters to [C.B.]

10
SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."

13
No. 2015AP284-D

sufficiently to enable him to make informed decisions
regarding his representation, in violation of SCR
20:1.4(b), and failed to keep his client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter, in violation
of SCR 20:1.4(a)(3).11
¶34 By entering into the amended stipulation, Attorney

Templin admitted the facts underlying all 12 counts of the OLR's

complaint. The referee concluded that the OLR met its burden of

proof as to all 12 counts. The referee further agreed with the

parties' amended stipulation that Attorney Templin be required

to make restitution in the amount of $300 to A.H. and $200 to
V.K. The referee further agreed with the parties' amended

stipulation that Attorney Templin be required to complete six

hours of CLE, concentrating on civil procedure and/or appellate

practice and approved by the OLR, as a precondition to

reinstatement.

¶35 Turning to the appropriate sanction, while the

parties' amended stipulation jointly recommended a four-month

suspension, the referee concluded that a six-month suspension

was appropriate. The referee commented that the one mitigating

factor in the case was Attorney Templin's lack of an extensive

disciplinary history. The referee identified a number of

aggravating factors, including multiple offenses, a pattern of

misconduct, an intentional failure to comply with rules or

orders of the disciplinary agency, and vulnerability of the

victims.

11
SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) provides that a lawyer shall "keep the
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter."

14
No. 2015AP284-D

¶36 The referee noted that Attorney Templin is a staff

attorney employed at a nonprofit law firm directing services for

economically disadvantaged clients who have few or no lawyer

retention options. The referee also found a lack of remorse or

acceptance of responsibility for Attorney Templin's actions, as

well as a significant number of violations occurring in a

relatively short period of time since he was licensed to

practice law. The referee also expressed concern about Attorney

Templin's understanding of his violation of supreme court rules,

the seriousness of the violations, the inappropriateness of his

conduct, and the effect of his violations of the rules. The

referee noted that, while the disciplinary proceeding was

pending, Attorney Templin attempted to voluntarily resign from

the State Bar. His resignation request was held in abeyance

pending the outcome of this disciplinary proceeding. The

referee also commented that she was concerned about Attorney

Templin's understanding and attitude towards meeting the

professional standards imposed on a member of the bar, and said
his "conduct during these proceedings raises substantial

concerns about [his] understanding of and attitude toward court

proceedings and toward future clients' needs and expectations."

¶37 The referee concluded that a six-month suspension was

necessary for Attorney Templin to understand and accept the

responsibilities of the legal profession and the ethical

constraints placed upon its practice. She said the resultant

full reinstatement proceeding, pursuant to SCRs 22.29-22.33, is
necessary for the court to be certain that Attorney Templin has
15
No. 2015AP284-D

complied with the supreme court rules during the term of his

suspension and that he is prepared to comply with the standards

of professional practice and the expectations of clients served

under a Wisconsin law license.

¶38 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless

clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg,

2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. The court may

impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the

referee's recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings

Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

¶39 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings

of fact are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we adopt them. We

also agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney

Templin violated the supreme court rules set forth above.

¶40 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline,

upon careful review of the matter, we agree with the referee's

recommendation for a six-month suspension of Attorney Templin's
license to practice law in Wisconsin. Although no two

disciplinary proceedings are identical, a six-month suspension

is generally consistent with the sanction imposed in In re

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hartigan, 2005 WI 3,

277 Wis. 2d 341, 690 N.W.2d 831 (attorney's license suspended

for six months for six counts of misconduct involving two client

matters) and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd,

2009 WI 59, 318 Wis. 2d 281, 767 N.W.2d 226 (attorney's license

16
No. 2015AP284-D

suspended for six months for 13 counts of misconduct arising out

of five client matters).

¶41 We agree with the referee's recommendation, based upon

the parties' stipulation, that Attorney Templin be required to

make restitution to A.H. in the amount of $300 and to V.K. in

the amount of $200. We further agree that, as a precondition of

license reinstatement, Attorney Templin be required to complete

six hours of CLE, concentrating on civil procedure and/or

appellate practice, as approved by the OLR. We also find it

appropriate to impose the full costs of this disciplinary

proceeding on Attorney Templin.

¶42 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Thor Templin to

practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six

months, effective May 3, 2016.

¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a condition of the

reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, Thor

Templin shall successfully complete six hours of continuing

legal education, concentrating on civil procedure and/or
appellate practice, as approved by the Office of Lawyer

Regulation.

¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date

of this order, Thor Templin shall pay to the Office of Lawyer

Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $7,564.50.

¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date

of this order, Thor Templin shall make restitution in the amount

of $300 to A.H. and in the amount of $200 to V.K.

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No. 2015AP284-D

¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified

above is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of

Lawyer Regulation.

¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Thor Templin shall comply

with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an

attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended.

¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all

conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See

SCR 22.29(4)(c).

18
No. 2015AP284-D.ssa

¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (concurring). I join the

per curiam. I write separately, however, to discuss a

procedural issue posed in the instant case relating to current

OLR practice: How should the OLR address multiple

investigations of a lawyer during substantially the same time

period? Should the OLR propose disciplining an attorney in one

disciplinary proceeding only to support a different discipline

or suspension of the license in the near future in another

proceeding?

¶50 To understand the procedural issue, I state key dates

relating to OLR's case against Attorney Thor Templin.

¶51 OLR's complaint in the instant matter was filed on

February 15, 2015. OLR and Attorney Templin entered into a

stipulation on July 6, 2015. The referee issued her report on

September 29, 2015.

¶52 While the court was considering the instant OLR matter

against Attorney Templin, on December 16, 2015, the OLR advised
the court that it was investigating Attorney Templin on another

matter. Notice of this other investigation is an open, public

record.

¶53 This kind of issue arose in In re Disciplinary

Proceedings Against Osicka, 2014 WI 33, ¶36, 353 Wis. 2d 656,

847 N.W.2d 343. There the referee commented critically about

the OLR's filing two complaints within about a year of each

other complaining about conduct in which the attorney engaged
during approximately the same period. The referee explained:

1
No. 2015AP284-D.ssa

It is unclear why the matters involving [Attorney
Osicka] resulted in the filing of two separate
cases. . . . [E]verything else charged in the present
Complaint . . . pre-dated the filing, on January 11,
2012, of the earlier complaint in 2012AP60–D, and the
OLR had knowledge of all the violations at least
several months before January 11, 2012 when the
earlier Complaint was filed. . . . The point is, there
should have been only one Complaint.
¶54 The instant case raises an anomaly similar to one the

referee raised in the Osicka case. This anomaly and other

issues in the OLR's procedures have been brought to the

attention of the court. Several issues to be addressed have

been described.1

¶55 In this regard, I suggested that the court should

institute a review of the OLR system, which is about 15 years

old.2 Others have joined me in this suggestion. Since October

1
In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winkel, 2015 WI
68, ¶55, 363 Wis. 2d 786, 866 N.W.2d 642 (Abrahamson, J.,
concurring), I wrote that Attorney Winkel's suggestion that
bifurcating the hearing to address the merits of the charged
violation and then determine the discipline should be part of
the proposed OLR study.

See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Johns,
2014 WI 32, ¶69, 353 Wis. 2d 746, 866 N.W.2d 642 (Abrahamson,
C.J., dissenting). See also In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Hicks, 2016 WI 9, ¶13, 366 Wis. 2d 512, ___ N.W.2d ___
(issue that has arisen with temporary suspensions).
2
See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka,
2014 WI 33, ¶37, 353 Wis. 2d 656, 847 N.W.2d 343 (Abrahamson,
C.J., concurring); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Osicka, 2014 WI 34, ¶38, 353 Wis. 2d 675, 847 N.W.2d 333
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Johns, 2014 WI 32, ¶71-76, 353 Wis. 2d 746, 847
N.W.2d 179 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Kratz, 2014 WI 31, ¶¶73-75, 353 Wis. 2d 696,
851 N.W.2d 219 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

(continued)
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2013, Keith Sellen, Director of the OLR, and Justices Ann Walsh

Bradley, N. Patrick Crooks, and David Prosser expressed interest

in such a proposal.3 Justice Prosser commented at an open rules

conference on January 20, 2015, that he favored a "top down"

review of the OLR.

¶56 To put this suggestion before the court, I filed Rule

Petition 15-01 on February 6, 2015, asking the court to create

supreme court rules establishing a Lawyer Regulation Review

Committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the Rules of

Professional Conduct for Attorneys and the organization,

operation, and procedures of the lawyer discipline system.4

See also In re the Petition for Reinstatement of Attorney
Jeffrey P. Neterval, unpublished order, ¶¶3-7 (Abrahamson, J.,
concurring) (Mar. 22, 2016); In re the Petition for Reactivation
of David W. Klaudt's License to Practice Law in Wisconsin,
unpublished order, ¶¶6-10 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (Mar. 22,
2016).
3
Johns, 353 Wis. 2d 746, ¶¶71-76 (Abrahamson, C.J.,
dissenting). See also Kratz, 353 Wis. 2d 696, ¶73-75
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

Justice Prosser wrote in Kratz as follows in supporting an
impartial, objective review of OLR's practices and procedures:

From time to time every government agency would
benefit from an impartial, objective review of the
agency's practices and procedures. There is increasing
evidence of the need for such an evaluation of the
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR). This case
highlights some of the problems facing the agency and
why an objective review would be desirable.

Kratz, 353 Wis. 2d 696, ¶76 (Prosser, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
4
S. Ct. Order 15-01 (issued Dec. 21, 2015), ¶37
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).

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No. 2015AP284-D.ssa

¶57 All commentators were supportive of the petition.

Nevertheless, after treating the petition as a valid rule

petition for almost a year, on November 16, 2015, five justices

voted to dismiss the petition on the ploy that it was an

improper subject matter for a rule petition: David T. Prosser,

Patience Roggensack, Annette K. Ziegler, Michael J. Gableman,

and Rebecca G. Bradley.5

¶58 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and I dissented from the

dismissal.

¶59 The order dismissing the petition states that the

dismissal does not necessarily end prospects for the appointment

of a committee. Unfortunately, however, decisions about whether

a committee will be established, the composition of the

committee, the mission of the committee, and how the committee

will function will be made behind closed doors. Yet lawyer

discipline is of great importance to the court, to the lawyers

of the state, and to the public.

¶60 I write separately to address an anomaly that was
revealed in Osicka and to repeat my commitment to try to keep

the bench, the bar, and the public generally informed as best I

can about what progress (or lack thereof) is made in the

appointment of the committee. As of this date, no progress has

been made to create the committee.

5
For a fuller explanation, please read the order of
dismissal of Rule Petition 15-01 and my dissent, available at
http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=p
df&seqNo=158416.

4
No. 2015AP284-D.ssa

¶61 For the reasons set forth, I concur but write

separately.

5
No. 2015AP284-D.ssa