with whom WINCHESTER and TAYLOR, JJ., join dissenting:
¶ 1 I must respectfully dissent to the majority opinibn in the above-styled matter. The present case concerns only three Kansas insurance policies—no Oklahoma policy is involved, Today’s opinion effectively reverses *994established precedent without expressly doing so; namely our prior decision in Bernal v. Charter County Mutual Ins. Co., 2009 OK 28, 209 P.3d 309.
Bernal v. Charter County Mutual Ins. Co., 2009 OK 28
¶ 2 The majority decision is in direct conflict with our holding in Bernal v. Charter County Mutual Ins. Co., where we determined Oklahoma’s UM statute could not be applied to an insurance policy with zero connection to this state:
The Oklahoma legislature has directed a specific choice-of-law provision to govern under the UM statute. By its own terms, § 3636(A) applies solely to a policy ‘issued, delivered, renewed, or extended in this state with respect to a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state_’ Whenever the legislature commands us to apply the law of another state, we must abide by its directive. The parties do not dispute the automobile in this single-vehicle accident was registered and principally garaged in Shallowater, Texas. That state’s law must hence govern the terms of liability under that state’s insurance policy.
Id. ¶ 14, 209 P.3d at 316. In rejecting the plaintiffs claim for UM benefits by application of Oklahoma law, we further noted:
That Texas law permits nonpayment of UM benefits under the terms of the Charter policy does not implicate any insurance benefits under an existing Oklahoma policy. Neither JJM benefits contracted and paid for pursuant to Oklahoma law are implicated here nor were any benefits due under our law either denied or diminished.
Id. ¶ 17, 209 P.3d at 317 (emphasis added).
¶3 Here too, there are no UM benefits contracted or paid for pursuant to Oklahoma law. Additionally, there are no Oklahoma insurance benefits diminished in any way through application of Kansas law. Unless the majority of this Court chooses to overrule Bernal, we are bound to follow the decision by reason of stare decisis. It should be noted that Leritz conceded in a “Suggestion the Court Should Rule,” filed in this Court on October 17, 2013, and directed to’ COCA, “[p]laintiff/[a]ppellant states in the briefs below that, under present Oklahoma law, the Motion for Summary Judgment appealed was properly sustained but seeks to change the law.”
¶ 4 Oklahoma has no connection with the present dispute other than being the location of Leritz’ accident and the residence of the uninsured tortfeasor. Leritz has acknowledged throughout proceedings that Oklahoma jurisprudence (i.e., Bernal) requires this case to be decided in accordance with Kansas law. Unless Oklahoma UM benefits are involved, there is simply no reason to apply our UM law to settle this disagreement.
¶ 5 It is undisputed that Kansas law precludes the stacking of UM/UIM policy benefits. Under Kansas law, Leritz is entitled to payment of $100,000 UM due under one policy insuring his motorcycle. Consequently, COCA reached the correct result in this case.