The litigation is between Terry, holder of a donation deed, and the Drainage District. The District claims through foreclosure for 1931 and 1932 tax delinquencies. Its purchase was confirmed in November, 1934.
State and County taxes were assessed for 1935. Payment not having been made in 1936, the State, prima facie, became purchaser and procured confirmation in September, 1939. Act 119 of 1935.
In January, 1939, Terry secured a donation certificate, and in June, 1941, he was given a deed. His suit to quiet title was filed July 25,1942, against Elmer E. Scott et al. — Scott being record owner. The District intervened in August, alleging invalidity of the State’s title for want of power of the Collector to sell while -title was in the District. Robinson v. Indiana & Arkansas Lumber & Manufacturing Co., 128 Ark. 530, 194 S. W. 870.1 Terry pleaded two years adverse possession under his donation certificate. The District offered to quitclaim for $2,059.80, covering taxes, penalty, interest, and costs for 1931-’41 and intervening years.
The Court correctly found that the Collector’s sale to the State was void for want of power. But for acquisition by the District in 1934, the State’s lien for 1935 taxes would have attached the first Monday in June. Pope’s Digest, § 13770. However, it does not follow that Terry is empty handed, though the State acquired nothing. He had, when suit was filed, held adversely to Scott and the District for more than two years under the donation certificate. Pope’s Digest, § 8925. Adverse possession under a donation certificate is given the same effect as possession under a donation deed, Act 7 of 1937.2
The certificate set in motion the two-year statute of limitation because the Legislature has so directed. Wilson v. Triplett, Trustee, 204 Ark. 902, 165 S. W. 2d 943. Construction given the Act of January 10,1857,3 is that actual adverse possession of land taken and held continuously for two years under a donation deed bars an action for recovery, and this is true even though sale by a Collector through which the State claims title is void on account of jurisdictional defects. Ross v. Royal, 11 Ark. 324, 91 S. W. 178.4* A deed which correctly describes the land it purports to convey is color of title, though based on a void sale. Bradbury v. Dumond, 80 Ark. 82, 96 S. W. 390, 11 L. R. A., N. S. 772.
If the District had delayed foreclosure until sale to the State, confirmation of its purchase and lapse of the period of redemption would have vested title in the District, subject to the State’s paramount title. Act 329 of 1939. The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company v. Wilson, Receiver, 199 Ark. 732, 135 S. W. 2d 846. But the land, while State-owned, was not relieved of District taxes; only the right of enforcement was suspended until return to private'ownership. Expressed differently, the State was not required to discharge improvement district tax liens, but the fact of State-ownership did not extinguish statutory obligations to the District.
The donation certificate was only the State’s conditional offer to quitclaim. The subsequent deed, under which Terry had held for thirteen and a half months, conveyed such title as the State had when the deed was issued. St. Louis Refrigerator & Wooden Gutter Co. v. Langley, 66 Ark. 48, 51 S. W. 68. When the deed was issued possession related back to the certificate in so far as rights under § 8925 are conferred. It follows that the interest Terry acquired was no greater than the State’s.
No decisions construing the limitation Act of 1857 implies that one who has held for two years under a clerk’s deed or by donation will be protected to such an extent that betterment assessments, good while title is in the State, and capable of being asserted against a'private purchaser and foreclosed, are nevertheless wiped out by a donee’s possession for two years. The cbntrary seems to be true. Miller v. Cache River Drainage District No. 2, 205 Ark. 618, 170 S. W. 2d 371. The Act of 1857 denies a right of action for recovery or possession of land held adversely [as in the instant ease] under a donation deed unless the plaintiff be seized or possessed within two years.
The District’s intervention should be treated as a proceeding to preserve for its benefit assessments which would (but for the foreclosure) have become liens subsequent to 1932. It was held in Crowe v. Wells River Savings Bank, 182 Ark. 672, 32 S. W. 2d 617, that where a road district, through foreclosure, acquired title to lands delinquent for betterment assessments, it could not maintain an action for later liens, since title was in the district. So, here, title passed to appellee in 1934. Under the Crowe decision appellee was powerless to foreclose for 1933 and subsequent assessments unless the rule affecting a road district and that affecting a drainage district organized under the general law of 1909 is different. The District’s liens for 1931 and 1932 merged with the purchase, and since title by adverse possession under § 8925 is such that Terry’s possession cannot be assailed, result is that the District loses its taxes for those years.
The decree is reversed with directions to quiet title in Terry if within a reasonable time to be determined by the lower court appellant elects to pay assessments that matured subsequent to 1932.
Crowe v. Wells River Savings Bank, 182 Ark. 672, 32 S. W. 2d 617; Lyle v. Sternberg, 204 Ark. 466, 163 S. W. 2d 147; Little Red River Levee District No. 2 v. Moore, 197 Ark. 945, 126 S. W. 2d 605.
But see limitation in favor of the State mentioned in Ware v. Dazey, 201 Ark. 116, 144 S. W. 2d 443.
The Act appeared as 5061 of Kirby’s Digest, and § 5061 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest. Act 7 of 1937 amended § 6947 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest adding the words, “. . . or who shall have held two years actual adverse possession under a donation certificate from the state. ...”
Townson v. Denson, 74 Ark. 302, 86 S. W. 661; Carpenter v. Smith, 76 Ark. 447, 88 S. W. 976; Ross v. Royal, 77 Ark. 324, 91 S. W. 178; Wade v. Goza, 78 Ark. 7, 96 S. W. 388; Dickinson v. Hardie, 79 Ark. 364, 96 S. W, 355; Bradbury v. Dumond, 80 Ark. 82, 96 S. W. 390, 11 L. R. A., N. S. 772; Gannon v. Moore, 83 Ark. 196, 104 S. W. 139; Chicot Lumber Company v. Darnell, 84 Ark. 140, 104 S. W. 1100; Wagner v. Head, 94 Ark. 490, 127 S. W. 706; Brinneman v. Scholem, 95 Ark. 65, 128 S. W. 584; Brandon v. Harper, 124 Ark. 379, 187 S. W. 312; Black v. Brown, 129 Ark. 270, 195 S. W. 673; Halliburton v. Brinkley, 135 Ark. 592, 204 S. W. 213; Norwood v. Mayo, 153 Ark. 620, 241 S. W. 7; Champion v. Williams, 165 Ark. 328, 264 S. W. 972; Hutton v. Pease, 190 Ark. 815, 81 S. W. 2d 21; Sharpp v. Stodghill, 191 Ark. 500, 87 S. W. 2d 577; 86 S. W. 2d 934; Miller v. Watkins, 194 Ark. 863, 110 S. W. 2d 531, 111 S. W. 2d 466; McMillen v. East Arkansas Investment Company, 196 Ark. 367, 117 S. W. 2d 724; Fuller v. Wilkinson, 198 Ark. 102, 128 S. W. 2d 251; Ware v. Dazey, 201 Ark. 116, 144 S. W. 2d 463; Patterson v. McKay, 202 Ark. 241, 150 S. W. 2d 196; Schuman v. Kerby, 203 Ark. 653, 158 S. W. 2d 35; Rodgers v. Massey, 204 Ark. 225, 161 S. W. 2d 378; Wilson v. Triplett, Trustee, 204 Ark. 902, 165 S. W. 2d 943; Chavis v. Henry, 205 Ark. 163, 168 S. W. 2d 610; Miller v. Cache River Drainage District No. 2, 205 Ark. 618, 170 S. W. 2d 371.