USCA11 Case: 22-13491 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 09/01/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13491
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SHELTON MICHAEL ANDREWS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cr-14045-DLG-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13491
Before JILL PRYOR, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Shelton Michael Andrews appeals his 240-month total im-
prisonment sentence for possession with intent to distribute
50 grams or more of methamphetamine and possession of a fire-
arm and ammunition by a convicted felon, arguing that his sen-
tence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The govern-
ment argues that Andrews’s appeal should be dismissed based on
the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. After carefully examining
the record, we agree with the government. Accordingly, we dis-
miss this appeal.
I.
Andrews pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distrib-
ute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), and possession of a firearm and
ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Andrews pleaded guilty subject to the terms of a writ-
ten plea agreement.
In his written plea agreement, Andrews acknowledged his
right to appeal and agreed to waive his appellate rights under cer-
tain conditions. The plea agreement states that, in exchange for cer-
tain government actions, Andrews “waive[d] all rights conferred by
[] [18 U.S.C. §] 3742 and [28 U.S.C. §] 1291 to appeal any sentence
imposed, including any restitution order, or to appeal the manner
in which the sentence was imposed.” Doc. 27 at 5. There are two
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22-13491 Opinion of the Court 3
exceptions to this appellate waiver listed in the agreement. First,
the agreement states that the waiver would not apply if “the sen-
tence exceeds the maximum [sentence] permitted by statute or is
the result of an upward departure and/or upward variance from
the advisory guideline range that the Court establishes at sentenc-
ing.” Id. Second, the agreement states that if the United States ap-
peals Andrews’s sentence, then he will be released from the waiver.
Moreover, the plea agreement states that Andrews had discussed
the agreement with his attorney and agreed to request a finding
that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights.
Andrews, his counsel, and counsel for the government signed the
plea agreement.
Andrews then affirmed that he understood the agreement at
a change of plea hearing. Andrews was subsequently sentenced to
a term of 240 months of imprisonment—240 months for the meth-
amphetamine charge and 120 months for the felon-in-possession
charge, to run concurrently—which was below the applicable
guideline range and the statutory maximum. Andrews appeals that
sentence.
II.
The government argues that Andrews’s appeal waiver pre-
cludes this appeal. If the government is correct, we may not address
the arguments Andrews has raised about his sentence’s alleged pro-
cedural and substantive unreasonableness. As we will discuss be-
low, the appeal waiver applies in this case, and our inquiry starts
and ends with the appeal waiver.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13491
We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo. See
United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). An ap-
peal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly and volun-
tarily. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir.
1993). To establish that the waiver was made knowingly and vol-
untarily, the government must show either that (1) the district
court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver dur-
ing the plea colloquy, or (2) the record makes clear that the defend-
ant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. See id.
The government cannot show that an appeal waiver was knowing
and voluntary from an examination of the agreement’s text alone.
See id. at 1352. There is a strong presumption that statements made
during the Rule 11 colloquy are true. See United States v. Medlock, 12
F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994).
In United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2020), we
held that an appeal waiver was enforceable even when the district
court did not completely discuss the exceptions to the waiver. See
id. at 1192. We held that the “touchstone” for determining a
waiver’s enforceability “is whether it was clearly conveyed to the
defendant that he was giving up his right to appeal under most cir-
cumstances.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the appeal waiver applies on its own terms because
Andrews was sentenced to a term below the calculated guideline
range and the statutory maximum, and the government has not
appealed. Therefore, neither textual exception to the waiver ap-
plies. Furthermore, the appeal waiver is enforceable because the
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22-13491 Opinion of the Court 5
district court questioned Andrews about the waiver and its excep-
tions and conveyed to him that he was waiving his right to appeal
his sentence in most circumstances. See id. The appeal waiver was
clear and unequivocal, it was explained to Andrews in court, and
Andrews orally affirmed in court that he understood the appeal
waiver and its exceptions. Thus, the appeal waiver is enforceable.
As a result, Andrews’s claims of unreasonableness are barred by the
appeal waiver; and we do not consider them. Accordingly, we dis-
miss this appeal pursuant to the appeal waiver in Andrews’s plea
agreement.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we DISMISS Andrews’s appeal.