I concur in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Gary, except as to the seventh and eighth exceptions. These exceptions are as follows:
“7. Because he erred in charging the jury, ‘when a party delivers bagg'age to a railroad company in contemplation of becoming a passenger, and the baggage is. so accepted, then that establishes the relation of passenger to' the railway;’ the error being there was no evidence whatever that the plaintiff, P. C. Battle, ever intended becoming a passenger.
“8. Because he erred in charging' the jury, ‘when a party delivers baggage to¡ a railroad company with intention of becoming a passenger, and the road so accepts it, the corm ‘pany will be liable;’ the error being there was no' testimony whatever going to show that the defendant had accepted the trunk or had any notice that the said Battle intended to* become a passenger over its particular line.”
Whether the trunk was delivered to the railroad company •ancb accepted by it as bagg'age, was a question of fact for the jury. It was also a question of fact whether the contents were the property of the husband, who was the plaintiff, or *343of his wife. The charge of the Circuit Judge on these two points, as Mr. Justice Gary has shown, was free from error. If the trunk and its contents were the property of the husband, received by the carrier as baggage carried by the wife, and the contents were of such character as should be regarded baggage, then the carrier should be held liable to. the husband just as if he himself had delivered the trunk as a passenger. The ordinary baggage of a wife and of children, consisting of wearing apparel and other articles convenient for personal use, are usually furnished by the husband, and the title is in him while the use is. enjoyed by the several members of the family upon whom it may be bestowed. When the railroad company received such property to transport it as baggage for the wife as a passenger, it received it as a common carrier, and became liable to the owner as a common carrier, and it is not incumbent on the husband, suing as the owner for its loss, to prove negligence as a condition of recovery. In Sonneborn v. Ry. Co., 65 S. C., 502, 44 S. E., 77, and Harzburg v. Ry. Co., 65 S. C., 539, 44 S. E., 75, the owners were not passengers, but the trunks were filled with samples and checked by traveling salesmen, who were merely the agents of plaintiffs. The actions were brought by the owners, and the railroad company was held in both cases to. the full liability of common carriers. As the defendant’s, liability was the same as if the plaintiff himself had been a passenger, there was no error in charging the propositions of law,’ quoted in the seventh and eighth exceptions. This seems the reasonable and just view.' It is supported by Curtis v. R. R. Co., 30 Am. Rep., 271 (N. Y.), and Richardson v. R. R. Co., 5 Southern Rep., 308 (Ala.), and we have not been able to' find any authority to the contrary.
Associate Justice Jones concurs in this opinion that all the exceptions should be overruled; the Chief Justice holds in his opinion that all the exceptions should be overruled except the ninth, and Associate Justice Gary holds in his opinion *344that all the exceptions should be overruled except the seventh and eighth. The result is that all the exceptions are overruled by a majority of this Court, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Jones, concurs.