The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Fraser.This is an action under th'e statute, to recover $33.54, alleged to be excess taxes paid by the plaintiff on his property located in the City of Columbia. The complaint alleges that the excess tax was levied under the act of 1919 (31 St. at Large, p. 273). It is alleged that this act violates section 17 of article 3, and section 3 of article 8, in 'that, first, the title does not conform to the body of the act, and, second, that there is no limitation on the power of cities to levy taxes.
1 I. Does the title conform to the body of the act? It does not. It would serve no good purpose to cite authorities for this holding. This unconstitutionality is too clear. A simple statement of case is sufficient. Section 2937, Code of Laws of South Carolina, Vol. 1, is a special act and applies only to the City of Anderson. That section was amended to- include the City of Greenville; again amended to exclude the City of Greenville; then amended to include the City of Spartanburg. The act in question in 1919 amended the Spartanburg act so as to make it general. The act reads as follows:
“An act to amend section 2937, volume 1, Code of Laws of South Carolina, as amended by an act entitled ‘An act to amend section 2937, volume 1, Code of Laws as amended by an act entitled “An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act to amend section 2937 of volume 1, Code of Laws of South Carolina 1912, relating to the right of municipalities to impose a tax for municipal purposes,’ so as to include the City of Greenville,” approved the 11th day of February, 1915, so as to exclude the City of Greenville' from the op*196eration of said act.’ Approved February 11, 1916, with reference to municipal tax levy of the City of Spartanburg. * * *
“Section 2937. All municipal corporations containing more than five thousand inhabitants shall have power to impose by ordinance an annual tax sufficient to méet all expenses of the municipality, including current expenses, any school tax provided by law, fixed charges in the way of interest and sinking fund on bond, and any other matter for which such municipality may be now or hereafter liable: Provided, that-ten days’ public notice thereof shall be given, setting forth the amount levied for the several purposes for which levy may be made: Provided, the levy in the City of Spartanburg shall not exceed fifteen (IS) mills, and out of the taxes so levied the City Council of Spartan-burg is authorized to appropriate such amount as may be necessary to pay the rents due by the said city under its contracts for rental of certain lands used by United States Government for camp purposes.”
2, 3 The title to the act and the title on the cover to the act are not the same, and the respondent seeks to sustain the act by showing that certain words, to wit: “by striking out certain provisions therein contained,” had, by a clerical error, been omitted from: the title. That does not cure the defect. There were three statutes amending Section 2937; all of them were special statutes, and even if omitted words could be supplied (it is elemental that they cannot), they gave no notice that the object of the act was to change a special law into a general law. It is true that the title to an act should contain all of the provisions of the act, but it must indicate the subject of the proposed legislation. The act to amend an act relating only to Anderson and Spartanburg by striking out certain provisions therein contained gives notice of a change that affects only Anderson and Spartanburg, and this act affected neither, but made a general law out of a special law.
*1974 II. The decree from which this appeal is taken says: “The last ground, however, was not relied upon by plaintiff.” There is nothing in the case to show that this statement is erroneous. The second ground cannot be considered. It is now academic any way.
•The judgment'is reversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Gary and Justices Watts and Cothran concur.