On Motion for Rehearing.
[3] While admitting the correctness of the rule requiring bills of exception to set forth *451the objection made to the introduction of testimony by the adverse party, appellant insists that this defect in his bill of exceptions is cured by the statement in appellee’s brief showing what objections were in fact made by him as a basis for the exclusion of the proffered testimony. This contention is only correct with reference to the exclusion of the several executions and return of the officer offered in evidence; but there is no statement whatever in his brief relating to the objections made by him to the introduction on the part of appellant of the deed upon which plaintiff relied to show title to the land in controversy. This being true, appellant’s motion for rehearing presents no reason for a change in our opinion so far as the introduction of the deed is concerned; and, upon investigation of the objection made to the introduction of the sheriff’s return showing the levy, we believe that the objection made, as shown by statements in the brief, is well taken, based upon the following authorities: Article 2344, R. S. 1895; Sanger v. Trammell, 66 Tex. 361, 1 S. W. 378; Pfeiffer et al. v. Lindsay, 66 Tex. 123, 1 S. W. 264; Allday v. Whittaker et al., 66 Tex. 669, 1 S. W. 794; Freeman on Executions, art. 281; Tatum v. Croom, 60 Ark. 487, 30 S. W. 885; Waters v. Duvall, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 37, 33 Am. Dec. 695; Berry v. Griffith, 2 Harris & G. (Md.) 337, 18 Am. Dec. 312.
In this case the return in our judgment is not sufficiently definite to describe the property levied upon, and therefore the objection on this score was well taken.
For the reasons heretofore stated in the written opinion, as well as those herein mentioned, the motion for rehearing is in all things overruled.