On Motion for Rehearing.
It is contended that the judgment rendered in this case is open to the construction that this court has undertaken to finally dispose of and adjudicate the-case on the merits. That contention is based on the language of the opinion stating the effect of the judgment dissolving the temporary injunction, namely, that such dissolution would operate to permit the execution of the writ of possession. We consider appellees’ fear that the judgment might be misconstrued, to be groundless; but, as that part of the opinion and judgment is surplusage, there can be no objection to the elimination thereof, and the judgment will be corrected so as to eliminate the words “and that appellant be permitted to proceed with the enforcement of the decree rendered on February 8, 1919, by the Seventy-Third judicial district court of Bexar county in No. B-19700, J. M. Lewright v. T. A. Reese et al.”
Appellees’ contention that the cause should be remanded seems to be based upon a theory that such a judgment would be necessary to enable them to have a trial of the case on its merits. This is erroneous. As we concluded that the court erred in refusing to dissolve the temporary injunction, it became our duty to render such judgment as he should have rendered, namely, one granting the motion to dissolve, and decreeing that the temporary injunction theretofore granted be in all things dissolved. The effect of such judgment is no greater than if it had been entered by the trial court. Upon its being certified below for observance, it becomes the judgment of the trial court. It does not in any way affect the trial of the ease wherein it is sought to set aside the judgment That case will proceed as if no temporary injunction had ever been •sought.
We find no reason to change our views on the merits of the questions raised, and overrule the motion.