On Motion for Rehearing.
Among other things, it is now insisted, in effect, that we erred in rendering judgment herein rather than remanding the case because of a want of necessary parties. While it is asserted in the briefs, supported by an ex parte affidavit of the clerk, that all but one of the bonds validated by the judgment below have been sold, yet it does not so appear from the record proper in this case. It does not appear that on the trial below the defendants by a plea in abatement, or otherwise, suggested the fact that bonds had been sold .and that the purchasers should be made parties; on the contrary, it is inferable, we think, from the record proper that at the time of the institution of the suit, and even at the time of the lower court’s judgment, there had been no sale of the bonds. But, if so, our judgment, of course, is only binding upon the parties and privies to this suit, and we think it will he time enough to consider and determine the rights of the purchaser or purchasers, if any, when their rights are invoked and presented to us in a proper proceeding.
It is further urged that we are without jurisdiction, in that by an Act of the Thirty-Ninth Legislature (Acts 39th Leg. [1925], c. 18), article 2078, Rev. Civ. Statutes, 1911, was so amended as to* take away the right of an appeal by writ of error. But we think this contention is sufficiently answered by the following decisions in which the question is discussed and which we approve, to wit, Chapman v. Morrison (Tex. Civ. App.) 278 S. W. 236; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Andrews (Tex. Civ. App.) 279 S. W. 300; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Barnes (Tex. Civ. App.) 280 S. W. 275.
On the issue of estoppel we think the cases cited in behalf of defendants in error are distinguishable from the one before us, and we conclude that we should adhere to what we said on that subject in our original opinion.
The motion for rehearing is accordingly overruled.