On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant on motion for rehearing contends that the effect of the decree of the trial court is to render appellant liable to supply to ap-pellee a 70 horse power connected load during the peak hours of the load required for lighting houses and supplying other current required by private contracts, even though the city should neglect or refuse to take the current at other times when tendered by appellant for the purpose of filling the reservoir. Appellant suggests that the decree is construed by both parties to this effect. The language of the decree might justify such construction. To give it this effect, however, would be to abrogate and nullify section 6 of the contract, under which section appellant is given the right to designate the hours when pumping is to be done.
The decree, as we have already construed it, does not have such effect, and it cannot be given a valid effect at variance with that expressed in our construction of it. But, since the parties have interpreted it as abrogating section 6 of the contract, we think it proper to give a more exhaustive interpretation and effect to the decree in its relation to that particular provision of the contract.
The motion for a rehearing is therefore granted, and the decree of the trial court is explicitly modified so as to give it only the following effect in relation to section 6 of the contract:
Appellant is required to keep a 70 horse power connected load available at all times during the period of the contract’s existence. Appellant may select the time and hours during which all pumping shall be done, provided such hours do not interfere with maintaining a proper water supply. Should the water pumped at such times become exhausted from the reservoir through ordinary use or other necessity so as to require further pumping, then, whenever such requirement may arise, appellant, immediately upon ap-pellee’s request, shall supply a minimum 70 horse power current to the current consuming devices of appellee used for pumping water into its reservoir until the supply of water is replenished.
All costs which have accrued since the judgment of this court was originally entered are taxed against appellee. The other costs of appeal are taxed against appellant.