On Motion for Rehearing.
On motion for rehearing our attention has been called to the error in the description *939given of tibie land sued for on tlie first page of the opinion. That description is withdrawn and in lieu 'thereof the following should be inserted, to wit:
Situated in Wichita county, Texas. “Beginning at a stone, the northwest corner of the T. E. & L. Company survey No. 818; thence S. 64° W. with the N. line of the E. W. Huse-man survey to the E. line of the Lewis Powell survey, approximately 2,250 varas; thence N. with the E.- line of the said Powell surv.ey, being a distance of approximately 290 varas; thence following the S. line of the A. A. Dur-fee survey N. 71° E., with said line, approximately 2,138 varas to the place of beginning, and containing 52 acres more or less.”
We see no reason to change our views as stated in the opinion as to the law governing such locations. Most surveyors are well acquainted with those general rules of surveying laid down in the cases of Booth v. Up-shur, 26 Tex. 64, and Booth v. Strippleman, 26 Tex. 436, and Maddox v. Fenner, 79 Tex. 279, 15 S. W. 237, and the various cases that have been pressed upon us for consideration. We have followed, as we understand them, the rules laid down by our courts for locating this land, as our opinion demonstrates.
The appellees urge on us not to render judgment in this case, but to remand it for another trial. Two of the reasons given us are very cogent and persuasive; the first is that this opinion in regard to the true location of the Red river is involved in the suit of the state of Texas with the state of Oklahoma, where that state is seeking to place the south bank of Red river at the foot of the high bluff, thereby swallowing and eliminating from Texas all of the surveys that lie immediately north of and adjacent to the high bluffs. That a receivership was appointed by the Supreme Court of the United States to take charge of tire territory claimed by Oklahoma in Texas, which includes the Durfee survey, the Lucinda Meadow, and all those surveys lying on the river discussed by this court.
While we doubt if we can take judicial knowledge of such a suit, yet we must respect the solemn statement made in this case by the Attorney General of the state, engaged in this and in the suit of Oklahoma against Texas, when he says he fears this opinion may embarrass the state in the other case, though as between the litigants in this case we cannot see that it does here for a very obvious reason shown by the state’s contention, not necessary to state.
And the second consideration is that the state, through its able and worthy representatives, say that the entire facts involving the controversy have not been fully developed, and can be on another trial. We would not feel justified in reversing and rendering judgment in a case unless it appeared so completely developed that another trial would not change the result. Nor would we in such an imperfectly developed case render a judgment that would hazard the rights of the state and render it at some disadvantage in a controversy so important to it and her citizens as is made to appear to us by the representations of its honorable representatives.
We, therefore, withdraw our judgment in so far as it reversed, and rendered judgment for appellants, and now grant the motion for a rehearing, and reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.