*366On Motion for Rehearing.
In our original opinion we made the following statement:
“Learned counsel for appellant, in making the above contention, must not be understood by us as contending that a consideration wholly paid for land upon a parol contract of sale and purchase, prior to the actual execution and delivery of the deed of conveyance by' the vendor, would not support a plea of bona fide purchaser for value by the purchaser, as against the holder of an unrecorded deed conveying the same land to him by the common vendor, prior in date to the last deed, of which said prior unrecorded deed the last purchaser had no actual knowledge, although the language used might be so construed; but we do understand that his contention is that the consideration which passed from appellee, Mrs. Ritchie, to her vendor, J. B. Chew, wholly passed to said vendor before the execution and delivery of the deed from said Chew to Towles and before the execution and delivery of deed from Towles to appellant of date April 15, 1913, and that therefore such consideration paid by Mrs. Ritchie does not support her plea of bona fide innocent purchaser for value, as against appellant’s said deed.”
We also in said opinion made the following statement:
“Wherefore it is apparent that counsel is mistaken in his statement that the petition alleges that the consideration passing from Mrs. Ritchie to J. B. Chew had wholly passed prior to the execution and delivery of the deeds from Chew to Towles and from Towles to appefiant.”
Appellant has filed his motion for rehearing, and therein calls our attention to the clauses above quoted, and insists that we have thereby misstated the contention made by its counsel.
After further consideration upon said motion, we conclude that the complaint made in said motion is correct, and we therefore withdraw said statements from the opinion; but, after withdrawing such statements, we think the original opinion correctly decides the issues presented, and we therefore overrule the motion.
Overruled.