Appellee sought and obtained a temporary injunction against Giwer C. Cain, Carl Adolph, and Len Alderson, restraining them from operating a dance hall or from operating the same under the name of “an academy of dancing, or from using said premises for public dancing by whatever name it may be called”; also restraining the owner from “leasing or demising or delivering possession thereof to any person or persons, firm or corporation for the purpose of making such use thereof.” The court temporarily restrained the appellants from using the premises for public dances or an academy of dancing, but permitted “the conduct of a strictly dancing class in the day time only, and accompanied by a piano or victrola only.” Erom that order, this appeal has been perfected.
This case in its material features was twice decided on appeal to this court, once in 1922 and again in 1923. The case at those times' being prosecuted against a tenant alone, while in this ease the suit is against Grover O. Gain, the owner of the premises, and his two tenants, Adolph and Alderson. The decisions on the former appeals are reported as Parker v. Trueheart (Tex. Civ. App.) 246 S. W. 428, and Id. (Tex. Civ. App.) 257 S. W. 640. The first appeal was one from a judgment granting a temporary injunction, and it was affirmed; the second was from a judgment refusing a permanent injunction, and it was reversed, and judgment rendered for Trueheart The home of appellee in this case is the same that it was in the two previous appeals, and the dance hall is the same. However, on this appeal there is proof of the use of the hall during the day for the purpose of teaching dancing, while the use on the former appeals was for wild and boisterous night dancing. It is not claimed on this appeal that there was an improper use of the hall during the day, but after the hour when appellee sought his couch for sleep and rest, which seemed to be about 10 o’clock at night.
The evidence for appellee is not so strong or convincing as on the last appeal, but, while unsatisfactory, there was evidence, from which the trial judge could have educed his conclusions of fact, and the conclusion of law that the operation of the Texas Dancing Academy after the time for appellee to seek sleep and rest, in the north room of his house, was disturbing to him. Appellee seems to have spent the early hours of the night on his gallery, listening to the music in the far north end of the building belonging to appellant Cain, and watching the electric lights as they shot their beams across Josephine street. Appellee seemed to have been entranced with the music and the shift-, ing scenes across the street until about 10 o’clock, when he desired to sleep. The applauding of the dancers seemed to disturb him more than the music or the pattering feet of dancers, and this applause and sometimes singing seemed to gain fresh impetus about 10 o’clock, or thereafter, when appellee sought his couch and tried to woo the drowsy god of sleep. Then, and not till then, the trouble began. Before the hour of retiring appellee sat on his gallery as near the dance hall as he could get, without crossing over to it or going into the street. The music must have been entrancing on that north gallery, to entice not only appellee, but his brother John, to sit nightly on the north gallery in the summer time, when it was necessarily very warm, until 10 o’clock. He testified that there was a “little applauding” and occasionally a song. It took John over three weeks to ascertain whether the music and dancing was a nuisance. The evidence indicated that there were no residences on the north side of Josephine street, and even on the south side there were as many business places as residences; and until 10 o’clock at night the passage of automobiles was as great as at almost any point in San Antonio, for Josephine street is a great feeder for traffic from West End, Beacon Hill, Laurel Heights, and Tobin Hill, to that great traffic artery, Broadway. Appellee admitted that the music came from the extreme upstairs north end of Cain’s building, which was 200 feet or more from appellee’s gallery on the north side of his house. He gave no reason for seeking this warm spot for rest and recreation, nor for his sleeping in the north room, as near as possible to the music and dancing across the way.
The trial court concluded that he was disturbed, but, according to his own testimony, the disturbance must have arisen after 19 o’clock at night, after the automobiles had decreased in number and when appellee desired to sleep.' He could not have been disturbed up to that hour, for he sought a seat on his portico where he and his brother could obtain full benefit of the music, 290 feet away, and see the figures flitting in the mazes of voluptuous modern dances.
It is evident that the court did not think that the dancing disturbed appellee during the day, because it was not prohibited, although the judgment sought to prescribe piano music, poorly fitted for dancing, and the “canned” music of a victrola, an instru*241ment which, when adjusted for loud tones, can be heard for blocks, and is not considered a choice instrument for dancing. Ap-pellee made no complaint of the music during the day, and no action as to the volume or kind of music should have been directed in the judgment.
There are facts which tend to sustain the judgment of the court so far as it prohibited the music and dancing in the late hours of the evening, and while we deem them weak, and meager, as developed on this trial, still we do not feel disposed to wholly set aside the temporary injunction granted by the court, until the case is fully developed on its merits before a jury, if so desired.
The judgment granting the temporary writ of injunction will he reformed so as to permit appellants to conduct their music and dancing during the day and until 10 o’clock at night, and also permit the use of any of the musical instruments usually used for dancing purposes, and as reformed the judgment will be affirmed.