OX MOTION EOB REHEARING.
In the opinion already filed reversing the judgment in this case, wepretermitted any expression of opinion on the question of the right of the appellees, the vendees >of Settle and wife, to maintain this suit. It is now insisted that this may be taken upon another trial as an intimartion by this court prejudicial to- the appellees, and we are therefore requested to determine this question upon the authorities cited in the motion for rehearing, the contention being that the qualifying clause, “so long as said lands shall be used by said district for schotil purposes,” was but a conditional limitation and not a condition subsequent.
The authority cited to support this proposition (3 Washburn on Real Propertjr, pages 25, 26, 27,) seem to sustain it. Amongst other cases cited in the footnotes is that of Ashley v. Warner, 11 Gray, 43, in which the court used the following language: “Goodale declined to give the plaintiff a lease, but told him That so long as he kept a good school he might have his share of the building.’ This agreement of. Goodale gave the plaintiff a tenancy at will, but a tenancy with a conditional limitation. It was not on the eonditon of keeping a good school, but so long as he kept a good school. The distinction is nice and technical, but yet quite familiar law. If the tenancy were upon a condition and there *605were a breach, the estate would not determine but upon the entry of the lessor after such breach. Being a conditional limitation, the estate determines upon the happening of the contingency, to wit, the ceasing or failure to keep a good school by the plaintiff.”
This view we are inclined to adopt. We are also of opinion that it to some extent fortifies the position taken in the original opinion in disposing of the cross-assignment of error.
The motion for rehearing will be overruled.
Overruled.