On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee complains that he did not in his pleadings ground his cause of action upon a written contract, but upon a parol agreement, based upon a written listing of the land with him. Appellee’s pleadings perhaps support either position, but the point is immaterial, and need not be definitely decided. The contract sued on was one in parol, and a claim for damages for its breach was barred in two years, as held in the original opinion.
Appellee contends that a second pa-rol agreement was made between him and appellant, whereby he was to be paid his commission upon the happening of a subsequent contingency, and that limitation did not begin to run until that contingency occurred, and appellee learned of it. Appel-lee’s pleadings do not support the contention. Appellee pleaded that when appellant made th,e original contract for the sale of the land, appellee’s right to his commission was thereby completed, and his claim became at once due, but that by a subsequent agreement appellee granted appellant further time, to be marked by the purchaser’s compliance with a supplemental agreement with appellant, in which to pay said commission, which appellant alleged had already been fully earned by him. This parol agreement did not affect limitation.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.