On Motion for Rehearing.
In their motion for rehearing, appellees request additional conclusions of fact and law, calling our attention to Art. 1873, R.C. S., providing that, within thirty days after a decision, the Court of Civil Appeals shall make and file a conclusion of fact and law upon each material point assigned as error.
We have heretofore filed our conclusions of law (the opinion) on all material questions of law brought up for review, 'but did not file conclusions of fact, and must decline to do so, for the reason that, in our opinion, this is not a fact- but altogether a law case.
In Hurt v. Cooper, Tex.Civ.App., 113 S.W.2d 929, 942, quoting from and citing pertinent authorities, we said: “ ‘Whether a seeming Act of a legislature is or is not a law is a judicial question to be determined by the court and not a question of fact to be tried by a jury, even though a determination of the question may involve a finding of fact.’ 59 C.J. 621, § 181. ‘The right and duty of the judiciary to take jurisdiction and decide cases when constitutional questions are presented, are both imperative and inescapable * * *.’ 12 C.J. 699 § 40. Also see Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641, 660; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U.S. 683, 26 L.Ed. 526; South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260, 24 L.Ed. 154.”
In 6 R.C.L. sec. 112, pp. 112, 113, the same doctrine is announced, in the following language: “Judicial Determination of Facts. — The constitutionality .of a. law is not to be determined on a question of fact to be ascertained by the court. If under, any possible state of facts an act would be constitutional, the courts are bound to presume that such facts exist; and therefore the courts will not make a separate investigation of the facts, or attempt to decide whether the legislature has reached a correct conclusion with respect to them. Accordingly the validity of an enactment cannot be made to depend on the facts found on the trial of the first case involving the validity of such statute. If the rule were otherwise, the trial of the main issue would necessarily be delayed until the preliminary fact on which the validity of the contested legislative act depended should be first tried and determined on testimony; and, since this testimony might be different in different cases, there would be involved an absurdity of declaring the law constitutional one day and unconstitutional the next. * * ” We therefore deny the request of appellees for additional conclusions.
As stated in our original opinion, we think that, in a general sense, the purposes for which the Act under consideration grants money to the counties (mentioned in Sec. 3) are governmental in nature and affected with a public interest. We are also of opinion that, the Legislature is not forbidden to use counties as agencies for the discharge of state obligations, provided, of course, the legislation otherwise is free from constitutional objections. For these reasons, we did not deem it necessary to comment upon the numerous authorities cited by appellees in support of these propositions.
However, a few cases cited by appellees, not heretofore commented upon, doubtless are sufficiently in point to warrant comment and differentiation. The acts of the Legislature involved in Bexar County v. Linden, 110 Tex. 339, 220 S.W. 761, and in Road Dist. No. 4, etc. v. Allred, 123 Tex. 77, 68 S.W.2d 164, dealt with statutory, as distinguished from constitutional, funds. As the funds were created by statute, the Legislature could direct their expenditure for any governmental purpose, without reference to the particular limitations and restrictions applicable to the Act *984under consideration." The Act involved in Highway Commission v. Vaughn, Tex.Civ. App., 288 S.W. 875, being authorized by Art. 3-, Sec. 56, Subd. 6, oí the Constitution, for the erection of an interstate bridge, was an exception to the general rule, and belongs in same category with Aransas Pass v. Keeling, and Brazos River etc. Dist. v. McCraw, commented upon in the original opinion. We do. not think the case of Lower Colorado etc. v. Mc-Craw, 125 Tex. 268, 83 S.W.2d 629, is even remotely in point, as the Act under consideration there, provided for the payment of the bonds of the reclamation district solely from its own revenues, — hence not analogous to the provisions of Senate Bill 224, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 7294a, that attempts to divert a constitutional fund, created for, and necessarily limited to, certain state purposes.
After due consideration, we overrule ap-pellees’ motion for rehearing.
*985lips Petroleum ' Company.” Mo.St.Ann. § 4048, p. 2849.