On Motion for Rehearing.
The appellee asserts in his motion for rehearing that by our original opinion we have relieved the appellant of the necessity of proving that he was the “procuring cause” in the finding of a purchaser ready, able, and willing to purchase the land in question. Our opinion should not *211be so interpreted. It is, of course, incumbent upon the appellant as plaintiff to establish that he was the “procuring cause” in the instant transaction. Without expressing an opinion on the evidence, we believe this issue was raised by the evidence and should have been passed on by the jury under appropriate instructions.
Appellee asserts that we have failed to pass on the question of whether or not the appellee had the authority to authorize anyone to sell the land or enter into a purchase and sale contract for the sale of the land when the record shows that the land in controversy was owned by the Hancock heirs. The appellee was one of the heirs and, as such, owned an interest in the land. This suit is against one of the joint owners, and not against any of those for whom the appellant alleges the appellee purported to act as agent. It is a well settled rule of law that a joint owner employing a broker to sell land in which he has an interest may become liable for the payment of the entire amount of broker’s commissions. Priddy v. Childers, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W. 144; Clark v. Goldberg, Tex.Civ.App., 3 S.W.2d 920; Settegast v. Timmins, Tex.Civ.App., 6 S.W.2d 425. See 12 C.J.S., Brokers, p. 178, § 82; 9 C.J. 585, note 90.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.