On Motion for Rehearing.
In the case of Carl v. Settegast, 237 S. W. 238, by the Commission of Appeals, cited by appellee in his motion for rehearing, there is a discussion of the rule as to quantum of proof necessary to engraft a parol trust upon a deed to realty. And in that case the following was quoted from the decision by the same court in Briscoe v. Bright, 231 S. W. 1082:
“The sufficiency of proof to meet the requirement that it should clearly and satisfactorily establish a contract which the courts can enforce is presented here only as a question of law. Conceding for the purposes of this ease that the contract sought to be enforced falls within the rule requiring that its terms be proved clearly and satisfactorily and treating the question as one of law only, the evidence must be viewed most strongly in support of the trial court’s judgment. The fact that the witnesses who testified may not have been disinterested, or may have made conflicting statements, or that their credibility may have been attacked, are matters with which it is not our province to deal. As we understand the rule contended for, it is not violated by objections to the evidence of this character. It only requires that the terms of the contract essential to recovery be supported by evidence sufficiently clear for the court to determine what those terms were without resorting to inference or conjecture. In this, as in every-other class of cases that we now recall, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are questions solely within the province of the jury, subject, however, to be revised by the trial judge apd the Court of Civil Appeals.”
But in that case the judgment of the trial court was reversed because the jury was instructed that in order to engraft such a pa-rol trust the burden was on the plaintiff to establish that contention by evidence “clearly and to the satisfaction of the jury.”
We do not believe that the doctrine announced in the quotation above. shown is different in any material respect from the conclusions we have reached on original hearing.
Appellee urgently insists that the testimony shown in the statement of facts by three different witnesses to admissions made by him to the effect that Mr. Addison owned a half interest in the land in controversy, and which testimony was not controverted by Ball, even when considered in connection with the written statement to the same effect made by Ball and delivered to Addison before the latter’s death, was insufficient to show either that Addison contributed one-half of the cash consideration of $2,000 paid for the land, or that the land was bought under a partnership agreement between Ball *883and Addison that each should own one-half interest in the land and should pay one-half of tile consideration therefor. While the admissions so proven were not specifically admissions of those facts, we think that they necessarily imply an admission of one dr the other of those facts.
It is a well-settled rule of law in this state that a trust in lands can be shown by parol evidence. A. M. & B. Ass’n v. Brewster, 51 Tex. 257; Clark v. Haney, 62 Tex. 511, 50 Am. Rep. 536; Hudson v. Wilkinson, 45 Tex. 444. And in determining that issue testimony as to the facts and declarations of all the parties to the deed in the transaction which led up to its execution, and also the subsequent acts and declarations of the grantee named in the deed, admissible. Smith v. McElyea, 613 Tex. 70, 3 S. W. 258; Johnson v. Deloney, 35 Tex. 42. In the case of Grace v. Hanks, 57 Tex. 14, Bumpass had conveyed land to John R. Woolfolk, who had died. The suit was instituted by the creditors of Bumpass to subject the property to the payment of his debts, upon allegations that the' conveyance to Woolfolk was without valuable consideration and made to defratid the creditors of Bumpass. The creditors recovered the land., The judgment was based upon the testimony of Han Hopper. His testimony was as follows:
“I lived near the land in controversy, and was well acquainted with James M. Bumpass and John R. Woolfolk; knew them ever since I was a little boy, and knew Woolfolk until the date of his death. Bumpass was broken up by the war., and at the date of the deed from him to Woolfolk was involved. Woolfolk at the time of the making of that said deed was, like myself, pretty bad off financially, and had no property or meansl After the conveyance from Bumpass to Woolfolk, I had a conversation with John R. Woolfolk, and he stated to me in that conversation that Bumpass conveyed the land to him to prevent it being sold for his debts; that Bumpass owed about $1,400' in New Orleans, and that he, Woolfolk, was to hold the land and sell it for Bumpass’ benefit; that Bum-pass was now living in Mississippi.”
And in the opinion rendered in the case the following was said:
“The testimony of Hopper was admissible as to the declarations of Woolfolk, and, if supported by testimony, of even' himself, as to other facts which corroborated sufficiently his testimony as to the declarations .of Woolfolk, then the verdict of the jury should not be disturbed. This witness testified that he had known both Bumpass and Woolfolk from his childhood; that at the time Bumpass made the deed ’ to Woolfolk he was heavily involved in debt, and that Woolfolk was then in poor financial condition, and had no property This was evidence not subject to such objections as is evidence of mere declarations of a deceased person; for it is subject to contradiction, and may easily be known to be untrue, if such be the ease. * * *
“While proof of the declarations of Woolfolk would not have been sufficient to sustain the verdict, yet we are of the opinion that the other facts testified to by Hopper, in connection with the entire failure upon the part of the appellant to brin^ any evidence to rebut that which was given, presents a case in which we cannot say that the evidence was insufficient. The question was fairly presented to the jury by the charge of the court, and cannot now be disturbed.”
In Bonner v. Ogilvie, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 237, 58 S. W. 1027, it was held that an admission by a husband on the trial of the case that his wife’s will devising all her property to him was duly probated was tantamount to an admission that everything necessary to vest title to her property in him had been done. It is a general rule that oral admissions of a party are competent evidence against him as to such facts as are provable by parol evidence. 22 C. J. 3001. See, also, 1 R. C. L. p. 490; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 97.
“An admission is defined'as ‘a statement, oral or written, suggesting any inference as to any fact in issue, or relevant fact unfavorable to the conclusion contended for by the person by whom or on, whose behalf the statement is made.’ ” Ogden v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, 78 Neb. 804, 113 N. W. 524, 525.
“Anything said by the party may be used as against him as an admission, provided it exhibits the quality of inconsistency with the facts now asserted by'him in pleadings or in testimony.” Castner v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., 126 Iowa, 581, 102 N. W. 499, 501, 2 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 1048, 1050.
Motion for rehearing is overruled.