On Motion for a Rehearing.
We have reached the conclusion that this judgment should be reversed on the ground to which attention is called for the first time in the motion for a rehearing. It appears from the plaintiff’s original petition that the taxes sued for were assessed against six different.tracts of land, each bearing a separate abstract number. The description set out in the petition is as follows:
The judgment rendered is in part as follows: .
“It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the Saltillo Independent School District should have and recover of and from J. T. Sparks the sum of Eighty-eight and %oo ($88.07) Dollars, with interest thereon from this date until paid at the rate of six per cent, per annum, together with all costs in this behalf incurred, and for a foreclosure of the tax lien against the following described real estate: (Then follows a, description of four distinct tracts of land, including a lot in the town of Saltillo.)
“It is further ordered,' adjudged and decreed by the Court that order of sale issue directed to the Sheriff or any constable of Hopkins County, Texas, directing him to seize and sell the. above described real estate in satisfaction of plaintiff’s debt, penalty interest and costs of suit, apportioning to each tract its prorata share of the entire tax, penalty, interest and costs of suit, and in addition thereto interest on this judgment from this date until paid at the rate of six per cent, per annum, together with all costs, and for which execution may issue.
“It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that a lien exists against each of the above described tracts of land for the amount, interest and cost adjudged to be due on the same, and that the officers executing the order of sale make a deed or deeds thereof to the purchaser of said sale upon the compliance with the terms thereof, and that the defendant or any person or persons having legal or equitable interest in the land shall have the right to redeem the same within two years from the date of said sale by paying to.the purchaser double the. amount of money paid by the purchaser for said land,” etc.
The manner in which the land is described in the judgment may be sufficient, but it is not entirely free from confusion.
It is now well settled by the decisions of this state that the lien on real property attaches to each particular tract for the portion of the taxes assessed against it. Richey v. Moor, 112 Tex. 493, 249 S. W. 172; Jodon v. City of Brenham, 57 Tex. 655; Edmonson v. City of Galveston, 53 Tex. 157; Clegg v. State, 42 Tex. 605; McPhaul v. Byrd (Tex. Civ. App.) 174 S. W. 644. The enforcement of that rule of law is necessary in order to-enable a property owner to exercise his right to redeem one tract of land without at the-*921same time redeeming other tracts where more than one has been sold. While the judgment in this case provides that each tract shall be sold to satisfy its proportion of the total amount of the judgment rendered, the record contains no data for ascertaining what portion of the taxes should be charged against any particular tract. The evidence does not show whether all of the property was assessed and valued in bulk, or in separate tracts; neither is there any evidence to show how much per acre the farm land was valued at, or what valuation was placed by the assessor or hoard of equalization on the town lot. In the absence of such evidence or some appropriate provision in the judgment, an,.important detail is committed to the judgment of a ministerial officer whose duty it is to execute the writ, without furnishing the officer any guide by which to make a proper apportionment of the amount of the judgment. Appellant pleaded specially that his land was appraised by' the board of equalization at $14 per acre, but the evidence leaves that matter very uncertain. However, valuation of the farm land by the acre would hardly apply to the town lot. The judgment rendered is, we think, fundamentally wrong, and requires a reversal of the case.
In view of another trial, we suggest that, unless the plaintiff in the suit furnishes better evidence of the levy and assessment of the district taxes and their nonpayment, the court should instruct a verdict for the defendant. In the trial from which this appeal is prosecuted, the weakness of the evidence in that respect was in a measure supplied by the admission of the defendant in his testimony. He stated that his taxes for that year had not been paid, and that he had tendered to the collector what he (defendant) considered was the amount due upon a fair valuation of his property. The evidence of a levy and assessment of school district taxes should be a matter of record in the office of the collector, and those records, or certified copies, should be produced on the trial. It was not proper to permit the collector to testify as to the contents of a purported tax roll which was itself inadmissible because of a lack of certification as required by law.
It does not appear from the pleadings in this case that appellant’s taxes due on his personal property were included in this suit, and for that reason the court did not err in refusing to submit the special interrogatory relative to the 45 head of cattle which he testified were not in the school district at the time his property was assessed.
For the reasons stated, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for another trial.