This suit was instituted in the district court of Jefferson County by W. M. Morrow, receiver of Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Association, praying for judgment against appellant, Marrs McLean, for $1,652.60,' with interest, on allegations that appellant was due that amount under an assessment made against him as a policyholder in Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Association, by one of the district courts of Travis County. Pendente lite, the receiver executed to ap-pellee C. P. Bordages, on the recited consideration “of the premises and the sum of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable considerations to me in hand paid by C. P. Bordages,” a written, assignment of his claim against appellant McLean, authorizing him “in his own name and right and at his own cost, to prosecute said suit to judgment, to collect and receive, or to sell, transfer, settle and discharge the said account, debt, suit and cause of action aforesaid.” In the written contract of assignment, the receiver made the following description of his claim against Marrs McLean : “That certain account and debt due and owing to the undersigned as Receiver aforesaid by Marrs McLean of Beaumont, Jefferson County, Texas, in the sum of $1,652.60, pltts interest thereon at six per cent from May 1, 1933, being the amount of the assessment levied in cause No. 51,-867 styled Wright Morrow, Receiver for Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Association, v. Trinity Portland Cement Company, et al., in the 126th Judicial District Court of Texas, together with the cause of action and suit on said account filed on behalf of the undersigned by John H. Land, Attorney of Beaumont, Texas, in the District Court of Jefferson County, Texas, and being cause No. 48003 now pending on the docket of said court, together with the court costs deposited in said suit.”
It was recited further in the written contract of assignment: “It is understood and agreed, however, that this transfer and assignment is made subject to the agreement of the undersigned as Receiver heretofore made with the said John IT. Land, Attorney, to pay the said attorney one-half of any amount collected on said account and debt or- in said suit.”
*115After receiving the assignment from the receiver, appellee, with permission of the court, filed an amended pleading, whereby h& was substituted as plaintiff, and in his own name prosecuted the suit to judgment. Appellant answered only by general demurrer, general denial, and by pleas of the two and four years’ statutes of limitations. Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. arts. 5526, 5527. On trial to the court without a jury, judgment was in favor of appellee against appellant for the relief prayed for, from which appellant has duly prosecuted his appeal to this court. We shall discuss only the proposition that appellee was without title to the cause of action.
The assignment was executed by the receiver without authority from the court which appointed him receiver, and without authority from any other court. The order appointing him authorized him only to collect and adjust the claim, and in no way to sell and assign it. On this statement, the written assignment by the receiver to appellee was void and vested him with no justiciable interest in the claim asserted by the receiver against appellant. 53 C.J. — Receivers, Secs. 175, 315, 316, 321. As we understand appellee’s brief, he concedes this point; we quote from his counter proposition: “Wright Morrow, Receiver, acting under direction of the court which appointed him and deriving f^om said court' all of his power and authority, could not divest himself of title to a debt, claim or chose in action by an act of transfer or assignment done without direction or order of the court.”
But in support of his judgment, appellee advances the following counter propositions:
(1) It is insisted that appellant’s general demurrer and general denial did not put in issue the alleged assignment of the claim by the receiver to appellee. On the issue of the execution and delivery of the written assignment, appellee advances a sound legal proposition. 5 Tex.Jur. 53; McCormick v. Rainey, 101 Tex. 320, 107 S.W. 45. But the proposition does not control the facts of this case. Appellant does not controvert the due execution and delivery of the written assignment -plead by appellee and. offered by him in evidence; his proposition simply invokes a legal construction of the written contract of assignment. His contention is that the assignment did not vest appellee with title to the cause of action originally asserted against him by the receiver, and that contention must be sustained. Aulanier v. Governor, 1 Tex. 653, does not hold contrary to this conclusion; it was there said: “It is, however, a well settled rule, that when a good cause of action is shown, and exception only to the person of the plaintiff, it can only be sustained by a plea showing who is the person really entitled to be plaintiff.”
The amended petition disclosed all the facts of the cause of action; the basis of its assertion by the receiver against appellant and the nature of appellee’s claim; that, on the facts alleged, appellee had no justiciable right in the cause of action; and that the receiver, and not appellee, was “the person really entitled to be plaintiff.” A plea by appellant, denying appellee’s right to prosecute the suit, and naming the “person entitled to be plaintiff,” would not have given any fact not ¡disclosed on the face of appellee’s amended pleading.
(2) By his amended petition, ap-pellee insists that he made his appearance only as “a” plaintiff, and not as “the sole” plaintiff. The facts deny that contention. We give the following quotation from his amended petition:
“Now comes C. P. Bordages, a resident of Jefferson County,. Texas and suggests to the Court that since the institution of this suit he has become the successor in interest to Wright Morrow, Receiver and Trustee of the Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Association, Plaintiff in the above style and numbered cause, to and in the chose of action made the basis of this suit against Marrs McLean, hereinafter referred to as the defendant and/or subscriber and for cause of 'action respectfully shows the Court the following:
“I. That the said C. P. Bordages did on the 16th- day of July,. 1937, for a valuable consideration, purchase of and from Wright Morrow, the duly appointed, qualified and acting Receiver and Trustee of the Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Association, a reciprocal insurance association created under and by virtue of Chapter 20 of Title 78 of the Revised Civil Statutes for 1925, all of his right, title and interest as such Receiver and' Trustee in and to the account, claim, debt and chose in action of the said Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Association against the said Marrs McLean, as evidenced by an instrument in writing dat*116ed the 16th day of July, A.D., 1937, being the identical and same claim, account, debt and chose in action sued upon the instant case and the said C. P. Bordages being now the legal owner and holder thereof, begs leave of the Court to be substituted as party plaintiff to this suit and now by leave of Court having become a party plaintiff to this suit adopts the pleadings of the original plaintiff as filed in this cause and leave of Court first having been had and obtained, files this his First Amendment to the Original Petition as filed herein, alleging as follows:
“II. That Wright Morrow was appointed Receiver and Trustee of the Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Association in suit No. 48596, entitled The State of Texas, et al. v. Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Association, filed in the 98 District Court of Travis County, Texas, by an order of said Court dated July 31st, 1930 and by virtue of the said appointment and qualification and the further orders of said Court, the said Wright Morrow, Receiver and Trustee of the Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Association, became entitled to bring and maintain this suit and to collect the assessments owing to said Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Association.
“Defendant is an individual, operating under the name of Marrs McLean, who was, at the time of the institution of this suit and prior thereto, a resident of Beaumont, Jefferson County, Texas, where service of process was had.”
His prayer was: “Wherefore, premises considered, C. P. Bordages prays that the defendant having, been cited in terms of law to appear and answer herein, that upon a trial hereof he have judgment against the defendant for said sum .of $1,652.60, together with interest thereon from May 1, 1933, at 6% per annum, and for all costs of court, and for such other and further relief, special and general, at law and in equity, as to which he may show himself entitled.”
Appellee Bordages filed his amended petition under authority of the following docket order by the trial court:
“10 27 38 C. P. Bordages substituted as party plaintiff and has leave to amend.
“R. L. Murray Judge.”
After appellee filed his amended petition, the receiver made no further appearance in the case; no judgment-was entered for or against him; the issues were tried between appellee, as the sole plaintiff, and appellant. While there is no order in the record dismissing the receiver from the case, the effect of the orders made by the court, on his docket and as recited by ap-pellee in his amended pleading and in the judgment, was to dismiss him by implication. The clear intent of the assignment by the receiver to appellee was that appel-lee should be the sole plaintiff in the amended pleading.
(3) Appellee contends that “his place in the proceedings was as substitute for Wright Morrow) Receiver, and going to Vol. 3 of Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawle’s Third Revision, we find that a ‘substitute’ is ‘One placed under another to transact business for him.’ ” This contention must be overruled. Appellee was “substituted” as sole plaintiff, and not simply to prosecute the suit in his name for the benefit of the receiver. As 'stated above, on the filing of the amended petition, the receiver was dropped from the litigation, and after the filing of the amended pleading, no longer asserted any interest in the cause of action.
(4) We quote the following argument from appellee’s brief: “The Appellant does not even contend that the whole beneficial interest in this cause of action was assigned, therefore it goes without saying that there could be no complete elimination of Wright Morrow from the suit ‘without an actual transfer or devolution of his interest.’ ”
Appellant’s point is that the contract of assignment was absolutely void, but holding the assignment, appellee had himself “substituted” as sole plaintiff, .thereby dismissing the receiver as a party plaintiff. We sustain that contention.
(5) As sound law, we concede appellee’s proposition that the assignment of the claim by the receiver did not divest him of the right to remain in the suit. Williamson v. Pulliam, Tex.Civ.App., 89 S.W.2d 799. It is also the law that appel-lee, claiming under the written assignment, had the right to have the cause prosecuted to judgment in the name of the receiver, and that the assignment alone did not ipso facto displace the .receiver as plaintiff. Duke v. Trabue, Tex.Civ.App., 180 S.W. 910. Under the facts of a particular case it may happen that the original plaintiff should be retained in the suit. Ford v. Oliphant, Tex.Civ.App., 32 S.W. 437; *117Hearne v. Erhard, 33 Tex. 60, 67. But these authorities, cited by appellee, do not support his judgment. The simple fact is that the receiver did not remain in the suit. He was dismissed without exception by him, and at the request of appellee. Since the receiver was dropped from the litigation at the request of appellee, appel-lee cannot now complain.
(6) Appellee’s last contention is that the receiver, by the void assignment, did not “prejudice the rights of the receivership to recover or collect a debt of the receivership.” In the event it should be held that appellee has no justiciable interest in the cause of action, under this proposition he prays that we reform the judgment of the lower court and enter judgment in favor of the receiver against appellant. Answering this contention it is sufficient to say that the receiver was not a party to this suit when it was tried, nor is he a party to this appeal. He has made no appearance, in person or by attorney, and has no prayer for any character of relief. Since appellee has no justiciable interest in'the cause of action, we could not, even if the receiver was still a party to the record, enter judgment in his name for appellee’s benefit. If the receiver were a party to the record, the judgment would he interlocutory, and would not support the appeal. It is immaterial on this point that the contract of assignment was void; appellee accepted it and had the court make the order substituting him as sole plaintiff.
From what we have said, it follows that the judgment of the -lower court must be reversed and judgment here rendered in favor of appellant.
Reversed and rendered.