On Motion for Rehearing.
Upon the trial of this case, appellee introduced in evidence, a stipulation agreed to by all the parties involved, which in part reads as follows: “The merchandise arrived at Brownsville, Texas, on August 22nd, 1938, and possession thereof could have been obtained by Riona Products'Company at any time thereafter upon payment of the draft and transportation charges^ but Riona Products Company never received any part of it from the common carrier, for the reason that neither the transportation charges no.r the amount of the draft was ever paid.”-
Appellee contends that we were in error in using the following language in our original opinion: “It will be seen that if the cartons were forwarded with sight draft and bill of lading attached they could not be ‘received’ by Riona until the sight draft was paid.”
And, for the first time, it is asserted that the delivery of the cartons to a common carrier was a delivery to Riona, and consequently a “receipt” by the common carrier amounted to a “receipt” by Riona, within the meaning of the letter of guaranty. Cases applicable to the law of sales are cited in support of this contention, such as Alexander v. Heidenheimer, Tex.Com. App., 221 S.W. 942, and Walker-Smith Co. v. Jackson Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 993.
We are here confronted with the question of the proper construction of a letter of guaranty and our opinion in no way conflicts with the holdings in the cases relied upon by appellee. It may be conceded that the construction urged by appellee on rehearing is a possible interpretation, although the juxtaposition of the words “arrival” and “receipt” militates against this position. However, in the case of North Texas National Bank v. Thompson, Tex.Civ.App., 23 S.W.2d 494, 498, affirmed, Tex.Com.App., 37 S.W.2d 735, Mr. Justice Looney, while adopting a rather restricted view of the rule .of strictissimi juris *835as applied to guaranty contracts, held that “where doubt and uncertainty exists as to the meaning of a contract [of guaranty], rendering it susceptible to two interpretations, one favorable to the * * * guarantor, the other unfavorable, the former interpretation will be adopted.” See, also, 21 Tex.Jur. 169, sec. 39.
The application of the above rule to the facts of this case precludes a recovery for appellee upon its theory advanced upon rehearing. The motion is accordingly overruled.