On Motion for Rehearing.
Defendants in error, in their motion for rehearing, earnestly insist, amongst other things, that we erred in the conclusion reached in this case for the following particular reasons: (1) Because Bailey was entitled to receive actual notice from his employer that compensation insurance was carried for his benefit, citing Producers’ Oil Co. v. Daniels, 112 Tex. 45, 244 S. W. 117; and (2) because section 3e, art. 8306, Revised Statutes 1925, providing that notice by the employer to the Industrial Accident Board that the employer is a subscriber -under the Compensation law shall be conclusively deemed to be notice of that fact to his employees, was an amendment to the Compensation Law passed in 1923 (Laws 1923, c. 177), which became effective June 14, 1923, nine days after Bailey’s injury occurred, and was therefore not applicable to him.
We do not consider that the rule laid down in the Producers’ Oil Co. v. Daniels is conclusive in this case, if applicable at all. In that case the act of 1913 was under considera*1045tion. That act provided, on the question of notice, as follows:
“Every subscriber shall, as soon as he secures a policy, give notice, in writing or print, to all persons under contract of hire with him that he has provided for payment of compensation for injuries with the association.” Acts 1913, p. 434, pt. 3, § 19.
The same provision was contained in section 20 of said act with reference to employees with whom the employer was about to enter into a contract of hire. In the Daniels Case, construing the above language, it was held that to “give notice in writing or print” the employer was required to serve personal notice in writing on the employee. However, in 1917, the legislature amended said act on the question of notice by'adding to the language above quoted the following: “Or in such manner or way as may be directed or approved by the board.” See Act March 28, 1917, chapter 103, pt. 3, §§ 19 and 20. The same language was carried forward in article 8308, §§ 19 and 20, Revised Statutes 1925.
We think it was clearly the intent of the Legislature, in adding a provision that the Industrial Accident Board, through regulations authorized to be made by it, could afford an additional method of notice to the employee that his employer carried insurance for his benefit; and that an employer, by compliance with the rules made by the board, could so notify his employees that he carried insurance for their benefit as effectively as by giving personal notice in writing or print to them individually. If this be true, it is immaterial that section 3e, art. 8306, referred to by us in our original opinion, on the question of notice, was not in effect at the time of Bailey’s injury.
The only remaining question is whether or not the proof shows clearly that the employer in the instant case had complied with the rules as to posting notices prescribed by the Industrial Accident Board. The trial court made no finding .on this question. We quote all the testimony shown in the statement of facts on this point:
Randolph Bailey testified:
“I did not know that Wattinger Bros, carried compensation insurance.”
J. J. Wattinger, senior member of the contracting firm, testified:
“It is a fact that I have kept the usual and customary notices, showing that we carried compensation insurance, posted on the work at Georgetown where Randolph Bailey claims that he was employed.”
Ollie G. Moore, foreman on that job, testified :
“Statutory notices were posted on and about the buildings under construction during June, 1923, and prior thereto, showing that Wattinger Bros, carried compensation insurance.”
M. P. Wattinger, timekeeper on said job, testified:
“Statutory notices were posted on and about the buildings under construction during June, 1923, and prior thereto, showing that Wat-tinger Bros, carried compensation insurance.”
No objection was made by defendant in error to any of said testimony, nor was any effort made to show how or in what manner said employer had complied with the provisions of the statute. In the absence thereof, we think it must be accepted as true that the employer did comply with the requirements of the statute as to posting notices.
Nor does the statement of Randolph Bailey, in our opinion, contradict the testimony of these witnesses that proper notices were posted. Under these circumstan'ces, we are still of the opinion that Bailey was given constructive notice that insurance was carried for his benefit and is bound thereby, and that he did not excuse his delay in filing his claim before the Industrial Accident Board. The motion is therefore overruled.
Motion overruled.