dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the amended version of OCGA § 17-8-57 should be applied retroactively to the facts of this case. Under the version of the statute that governed during the *211trial in this case, defendant Quiller had no duty to object to the trial judge’s improper comment on the evidence and was automatically entitled to a new trial based on the judge’s violation of the statute. However, under the new version of the statute, which took effect six years after Quiller’s trial, a criminal defendant now has an affirmative duty to object when — and no longer has an automatic right to a new trial after — a judge improperly comments on the evidence in violation of the statute. Rather, under the new statute, a defendant who does not object to a trial judge’s improper comment upon the evidence is now deemed to have waived any such objection, is not entitled as a matter of law to a new trial, and instead must show that the improper comment rises to the level of plain error affecting substantive rights to obtain a new trial free of such impropriety.
As our Supreme Court explained in Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 747 (3), n. 9 (784 SE2d 759) (2016), the question of retroactivity has two subparts. About the first I agree with the majority: the subject rule is procedural, not substantive.
So the second subpart is dispositive. If the relevant activity that the rule regulates is selection of the standard of appellate review, the new rule applies and forecloses Quiller’s argument. But if the new rule is aimed at regulating conduct at trial and the relevant conduct is trial counsel’s objection or failure to object, then the new rule does not apply; and Quiller’s argument is due to be addressed. I would hold that the objection trial counsel has already failed to make is like testimony already taken and so is, for purposes of retroactivity, the relevant conduct. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 291 (III) (114 SCt 1483, 128 LE2d 229) (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) quoted in Pyatt, supra at 747 (3), n. 9.
This new rule should not be applied retroactively to impose a new duty on Quiller that was not required of him at the time of his trial and thereby impact our review of events that have already occurred at trial, as opposed to impacting the review of future occurrences arising from those past events. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1. Changes to OCGA § 17-8-57.
The former version of OCGA § 17-8-57, which was in effect at the time of Quiller’s 2009 trial, provided:
It is error for any judge in any criminal case, during its progress or in his charge to the jury, to express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused. Should any judge violate this Code section, the violation shall be held by the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals to be error and the decision in the case *212reversed, and a new trial granted in the court below with such directions as the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals may lawfully give.
Under this version of the statute, even without an objection at trial, it was “well established that [a] trial court’s compliance with the statutory language of OCGA § 17-8-57 [was] mandatory and that a violation of its mandate require[d] a new trial.” Chumley v. State, 282 Ga. 855, 858 (2) (655 SE2d 813) (2008) (citations and punctuation omitted). Accord Murphy v. State, 290 Ga. 459, 461 (2) (722 SE2d 51) (2012); see also Rouse v. State, 296 Ga. 213, 220 (765 SE2d 879) (2014) (Supreme Court of Georgia “has held that an error under OCGA § 17-8-57 mandates reversal of a conviction and a new trial even if the defendant did not object to the error at trial”) (Nahmias, J., dissenting). A defendant was not obligated to object and a new trial was mandated because, as a matter of law, a violation of former OCGA § 17-8-57 constituted “plain error” affecting substantive rights. Chumley, supra. As our Supreme Court has clarified, “a violation of [former] OCGA § 17-8-57 will always constitute ‘plain error,’ meaning that the failure to object at trial will not waive the issue on appeal.” State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634 (690 SE2d 164) (2010) (citation omitted; emphasis in original).
After Quiller’s jury trial, the denial of his motion for a new trial, and the filing of his notice of appeal, the General Assembly changed OCGA § 17-8-57, effective July 1, 2015, so that it now provides:
(a) (1) It is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the judge’s opinion as to whether a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.
(2) Any party who alleges a violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall make a timely objection and inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection, outside of the jury’s hearing and presence. After such objection has been made, and if it is sustained, it shall be the duty of the court to give a curative instruction to the jury or declare a mistrial, if appropriate.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, failure to make a timely objection to an alleged violation of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall preclude appellate review, unless such violation constitutes plain error which affects substantive rights of the parties. Plain error may be considered on appeal even when a timely objection informing the court of the specific *213objection was not made, so long as such error affects substantive rights of the parties.
(c) Should any judge express an opinion as to the guilt of the accused, the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals or the trial court in a motion for a new trial shall grant a new trial.
This new version of OCGA § 17-8-57, like the former version, still provides that it is error for a trial judge to express an opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused. OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1). The new statute also still provides, as did the former Code section, that a judge’s expression of opinion as to the guilt of the accused mandates a new trial. OCGA § 17-8-57 (c). However, the amended version of the statute has significantly changed the rights and duties of a criminal defendant in regard to a judge’s expression of opinion as to what has or has not been proved.
Under the new statute, a criminal defendant no longer is free of any duty to object to a judge’s improper comment on what has or has not been proved by the evidence, and the defendant is no longer automatically entitled to a new trial for such a comment. Rather, the new version of the statute now expressly requires a criminal defendant to make a timely objection at trial to a judge’s improper comment on the evidence, informing the court of the specific objection and the grounds for it outside the presence of the jury OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (2). If the trial judge finds that he or she did indeed make an improper comment on the evidence, the new statute does not mandate a new trial, and instead allows the judge to exercise his or her discretion and give a curative jury instruction or declare a mistrial. Id. Moreover, if a defendant fails to make the newly-required timely objection at trial, the new statute precludes appellate review of the improper comment, unless the comment constituted plain error affecting substantive rights of the accused. OCGA § 17-8-57 (b). Thus, the new version of the statute has eliminated the former statute’s mandate that a judge’s expression of an opinion as to what has or has not been proved constitutes plain error affecting the defendant’s substantive rights so that a new trial is automatically required.
In finding that this amended version of the statute applies retroactively to the instant case, rather than applying the version of the statute as it existed at the time of trial, the majority relies on a footnote from the Supreme Court of Georgia’s recent opinion in Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. at 747 (3), n. 9. In that footnote, the Supreme Court discussed law concerning statutes that govern only court procedure being applied retroactively, absent an express contrary legislative intent; but the Supreme Court did not conclude that the amended *214version of OCGA § 17-8-57 applies retroactively. Rather, in the footnote, the Supreme Court stated that it did not need to decide the issue and instead “assume[d] — without deciding — that former OCGA § 17-8-57 applie[d].” Id. Thus, that footnote does not resolve the question of whether the new version of OCGA § 17-8-57 should be applied retroactively in the instant case.
“Generally speaking, the retroactive application of statutes has long been disfavored in the law, even if it is not always forbidden. For that reason, courts usually insist upon some clear indication in the statutory text that a statute is to be applied retroactively before so applying it.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 174 (1) (b) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citations, punctuation and footnote omitted). However, our Supreme Court has also held that “where a statute governs only procedure of the courts, including the rules of evidence, it is to be given retroactive effect absent an expressed contrary intention.” Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54, 55 (2) (365 SE2d 273) (1988) (citations omitted). But “laws that affect substantive rights may operate prospectively only.” Nathans v. Diamond, 282 Ga. 804, 808 (2) (654 SE2d 121) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Substantive law is that law which creates rights, duties, and obligations. Procedural law is that law which prescribes the methods of enforcement of rights, duties, and obligations.” DaimlerChrysler v. Ferrante, 281 Ga. 273, 274 (1) (637 SE2d 659) (2006) (citations and punctuation omitted).
The substantive aspects of OCGA § 17-8-57, prohibiting trial judges from expressing an opinion as to what the evidence has proved or as to the guilt of the accused, have not changed in the new statute. However, the changes noted above — the new requirement of a timely and specific objection by a criminal defendant to a trial judge’s improper comment on the evidence, the fact that such a violation of the statute no longer automatically mandates a new trial for a defendant, and the express requirement of plain error review in the absence of an objection — are procedural changes.
However, those procedural changes should not be applied retroactively to events that have already occurred at the trial in this case. The footnote in Pyatt, supra, upon which the majority relies, includes the following quoted language in a parenthetical cite:
The critical issue is the relevant activity that the rule regulates. Absent clear statement otherwise, only such relevant activity which occurs after the effective date of the statute is covered. Most statutes are meant to regulate primary conduct, and hence will not be applied in trials involving conduct that occurred before their effective date. But other statutes have a different purpose and therefore a *215different relevant retroactivity event. A new rule of evidence governing expert testimony, for example, is aimed at regulating the conduct of trial, and the event relevant to retro-activity of the rule is introduction of the testimony. Even though it is a procedural rule, it would unquestionably not be applied to testimony already taken.
Pyatt, supra at 747 (3), n. 9, quoting Landgraf, supra at 291 (III) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).
Here, the new version of OCGA § 17-8-57 regulates the conduct at trial of the trial judge by prohibiting comments on the evidence, and it also regulates the conduct of criminal defendants at trial by imposing a new duty on them to object to such improper comments in order to avoid waiver of appellate review of the issue, other than plain error review. In this regard, it is important to note that
[t]he “plain error” rule does not establish a different standard for determining the reversibility of an error, but instead allows a criminal defendant to avoid the penalty of waiver, by permitting appellate review of assertions of error raised for the first time on appeal where the asserted error affects substantive rights.
Chumley, supra at 858 (2) (citations and punctuation omitted). Thus, the events relevant to the retroactivity of amended OCGA § 17-8-57 are an improper statement by the judge during trial and the defendant’s timely and specific objection to it, or lack thereof. Such a new procedural rule “would unquestionably not be applied to [a judge’s statement] already [made and any objection, or lack thereof, to it] Pyatt, supra (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted).
As our Supreme Court has explained, “to apply a procedural statute retroactively generally does not mean that it applies with respect to prior filings, proceedings, and occurrences, but rather that the procedural change affects future court filings, proceedings, and judgments that arise from prior occurrences.” Murphy v. Murphy, 295 Ga. 376, 378 (761 SE2d 53) (2014). Thus, the amended version of OCGA § 17-8-57, should not be applied to the prior proceedings in this case in order to deny Quiller of the new trial that the judge’s improper comments mandated at that time, even absent an objection by Quiller. Rather, the amended version should affect only future court proceedings that arise from those prior occurrences, such as a *216new trial required by those prior events.
Decided July 15, 2016. Swindle Law Group, Jason W. Swindle, Sr., Dane M. Garland, for appellant. Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Tracy R. Reeves, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.[I]n the present case all salient dates, i.e., [the improper comment at trial and the lack of an objection thereto], issuance of the order [denying a new trial] sought to be appealed, and filing of the notice of appeal, occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment to OCGA § [17-8-57], Therefore, a proper retroactivity analysis and its application in this case do not provide a basis for [applying the new law].
Id. at 379. Accordingly, in my opinion, the former version of the statute, not the amended version, governs the events that have already occurred in the instant case.
2. Application of former OCGA § 17-8-57 to the instant case.
As the majority correctly finds, the trial court erred in expressly informing the jury of its opinion of fact as to the state’s fingerprint evidence. Because the judge improperly commented on the evidence in violation of former OCGA § 17-8-57, a new trial is mandated even though Quiller did not object to the comment at trial. “Given the mandatory nature of [that version of] OCGA § 17-8-57 and the case law interpreting it, we must reverse [Quiller’s] conviction and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.” Murphy, supra at 461 (2) (citation omitted).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Barnes, Presiding Judge Miller and Presiding Judge Phipps join in this dissent.