Public Adm'r, as Adm'r of the Estate of Ronald Simpson v. Levine

Tom, J.P.,

dissents in a memorandum as follows: The Public Administrator’s failure to submit a physician’s affirmation of merit and failure to provide justification, other than law office failure, for its more than one-year delay in seeking substitution following the issuance of letters testamentary mandates the denial of its motion for substitution and the grant of defendant doctor’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 1021 {see Rose v Frankel, 83 AD3d 607, 608 [1st Dept 2011]; see also Terpis v Regal Hgts. Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 108 AD3d 618, 619 [2d Dept 2013]). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

*471This medical malpractice action arises from surgery performed by defendant William N. Levine, M.D. on Ronald Simpson’s right knee at defendant the New York and Presbyterian Hospital (sued here as New York Presbyterian Hospital-Columbia Presbyterian Center). On February 21, 2008, Simpson, and his wife, Walnisha Simpson, suing derivatively, commenced this action against defendants. However, on October 24, 2011, Ronald Simpson died, ánd the matter was automatically stayed.

Between May 2012 and August 2012, defendants sent at least three correspondences to Simpson’s counsel seeking to obtain the identity of the administrator of Simpson’s estate. On May 3, 2013, the Surrogate’s Court issued letters testamentary appointing the Public Administrator as the administrator of Simpson’s estate. However, the Public Administrator failed to seek leave to substitute itself for the Simpson.

Thus, on May 22, 2014, more than a year after Surrogate’s Court appointed the administrator of the estate, defendant Levine moved for an order, pursuant to CPLR 1021, dismissing the action, with prejudice, for failure to timely substitute an estate representative for Simpson. In response, the Public Adminstrator moved for leave to substitute itself for Simpson, pursuant to CPLR 1021, and to amend the caption and pleadings to reflect such substitution and remove Walnisha Simpson as a named plaintiff.

In support of the Public Administrator’s motion and in opposition to defendant’s motion, the Public Administrator asserted that subsequent to Simpson’s death, there was an ongoing dispute between his children as to who would represent the estate, and that numerous court appearances were held before the Surrogate’s Court for a determination of the matter. After its appointment, the Public Administrator retained Simpson’s counsel’s law firm as attorneys for Simpson’s estate; however due to errors with the contingent fee terms, the retainer agreement was not fully executed until January 9, 2014. Counsel averred that it was not until the motions to dismiss were made that she realized that the matter had not been addressed while she was on maternity leave from December 2013 to April 2014. Counsel argued that the five-month delay, following execution of the retainer agreement, was not “egregious or unreasonable” as to warrant dismissal of the action. Counsel further argued that since Simpson had testified at deposition prior to his death, there was no prejudice to defendants by substituting the Public Administrator as the administrator of the estate. Notably, the Public Administrator did not support its motion with a physician’s affirmation of merit.

*472Supreme Court nevertheless denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted the Public Administrator’s motion for substitution. This was an improvident exercise of discretion.

Pursuant to CPLR 1021, if a required substitution is not made within a “reasonable time,” the action is subject to dismissal for this reason alone as to the party for whom substitution should have been made. Although courts have shown relative liberality regarding the time of delay because of “the strong public policy” favoring disposition of cases on the merits (see e.g. Peters v City of N.Y. Health & Hasps. Corp., 48 AD3d 329, 329 [1st Dept 2008]), the failure to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay will warrant dismissal of the action (see Rose, 83 AD3d at 608). The 19-month delay in obtaining letters testamentary and the more than one-year delay in moving to substitute from the time the Surrogate’s Court appointed the administrator of the estate in May 2013 cannot be considered reasonable, and the Public Administrator offers only law office failure as an excuse, which is inadequate. Further, the approximately five-month delay attributable to counsel’s maternity leave does not explain the eight additional months of delay.

More significantly, it is well established that when faced with a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 1021, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must demonstrate the merit of his or her case through the introduction of a physician’s affirmation of merit (see Rose, 83 AD3d at 608 [“(P)laintiffs failed to submit a physician’s affirmation of merit and provided no justification, other than law office failure, for the almost five-year delay in making the motion”]; Peters, 48 AD3d at 329 [“By submitting its expert’s affidavit of merit and a reasonable explanation for the delay in seeking substitution, decedent’s estate showed adequate cause why this medical malpractice action should not have been dismissed for failure to timely move for substitution”]; Wynter v Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., 3 AD3d 376 [1st Dept 2004] [“(T)he merit of the underlying medical malpractice action is adequately established by the pleadings, including plaintiffs’ verified bills of particulars and supporting documents, and the physician’s affirmation”]). Here, the Public Administrator’s failure to submit a physician’s affirmation of merit is fatal to its opposition and requires dismissal of the action.

There is no merit to the Public Administrator’s contention that the merits of this action can be established by the pleadings. The Court of Appeals has ruled that “except as to matters within the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, in a *473medical malpractice action, expert medical opinion evidence is required to demonstrate merit” (Fiore v Galang, 64 NY2d 999, 1001 [1985]; see also Mosberg v Elahi, 80 NY2d 941, 942 [1992]). This Court has followed this precedent (see e.g. Navarro v Plus Endopothetik, 105 AD3d 586 [1st Dept 2013]). In Wynter, this Court found that the merit of the underlying medical malpractice action was established by the pleadings in conjunction with the physician’s affirmation (3 AD3d at 379); contrary to the majority’s claim, the pleadings alone would not have sufficed. Rather, the physician’s affirmation was a necessary submission to establish the merits of that medical malpractice action. Indeed, this is why our other precedents in medical malpractice actions have affirmed dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 1021 when a plaintiff fails to submit a physician’s affirmation of merit (see e.g. Rose, 83 AD3d 607).

In any event, even assuming the majority is correct that merit can be proved without a physician’s affirmation, this case cannot be proved without resorting to expert medical testimony. Indeed, the bill of particulars vaguely alleges, inter alia, that the defendants failed to properly repair Ronald Simpson’s knee and negligently placed hardware in his knee and failed to timely remove the hardware. These allegations are completely denied by defendants. Simpson’s pleadings fail to set forth evidentiary facts, and are thus, insufficient to demonstrate merit (see Celnick v Freitag, 242 AD2d 436, 437 [1st Dept 1997]). Expert testimony is thus necessary to establish specifically how defendants departed from the standard of care in performing the knee surgery.

Moreover, the pleadings and verified bill of particulars are insufficient to show that the action has merit because the complaint is verified “only by counsel, rather than a person with knowledge” (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Clancy, 117 AD3d 472, 472 [1st Dept 2014]; see also Beltre v Babu, 32 AD3d 722, 723 [1st Dept 2006] [noting that “a complaint verified by counsel is purely hearsay, devoid of evidentiary value”]).

Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the Supreme Court, grant defendant’s motion to dismiss, and deny the Public Administrator’s motion for substitution.