Juan Castillo-Rivera, convicted of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, appeals his sentence. The question presented is whether Texas Penal Code §46:04 prohibiting possession of a firearm by a felon qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Under our precedent, it does. Therefore, we affirm.
In Nieto Hernandez v. Holder, we squarely held that “TPC § 46.04(a) fits within 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii)’s definition of ‘aggravated felony.’ ”1 Castillo-Rivera urges that this holding does not foreclose his overbreadth arguments because they were not considered in Nieto Hernandez.2 We rejected an identical position *465in United States v. Herrold.3 In Herrold, the question under review was whether a Texas statute qualified as generic “burglary” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Although we had already concluded in United States v. Silva4 that the statute qualified as generic burglary, the defendant insisted that this holding did not foreclose a novel argument that the Silva panel “never considered.” We disagreed, explaining that the failure of the Silva panel to “consider the argument that Herrold now advance[d] d[id] not make the holding any less binding.”5 The same reasoning applies here. We are bound by the holding in Nieto Hernandez, and Castillo-Rivera’s new arguments provide no basis to depart from precedent.6 The judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.
. 592 F.3d 681, 686 (5th Cir. 2009). Under § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii), an aggravated felony includes an offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute prohibiting possession of a firearm by a felon.
. Castillo-Rivera argues that Texas Penal Code § 46.04 is substantively broader than 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because Texas's definition of a felony offense differs from the U.S. Code, and because Texas's definition of a firearm differs from the U.S. Code.
. 813 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2016).
. 957 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1992).
. Herrold., 813 F.3d at 598-99; see also Sykes v. Tex. Air Corp., 834 F.2d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The fact that in [the prior decision] no litigant made and no judge considered the ■ fancy argument advanced in this case does not authorize us to disregard our Court’s strong rule that we cannot overrule the prior decision.”).
. Castillo-Rivera also argues on appeal that Texas Penal Code § 46.04 cannot be described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because the federal statute contains a unique interstate commerce element. This argument is now foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Torres v. Lynch, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1619, 1634, 194 L.Ed.2d 737 (2016).