(dissenting):
Appellant testified that in the early morning hours of June 4, he went to the victim’s room with the intention of pointing a loaded gun “up in front of [appellant],” so that when the victim opened his door, appellant could “cycle the bullets” from the magazine onto the floor. Mitchell testified:
Q: What the — could you please explain to the members exactly — all right, exactly what it is you planned on doing with that firearm in front of that door?
A: My plan was to walk up to the door, knock on the door, Petty Officer Johnson would answer the door, and I would cycle the bullets and tell him if he ever hit me again that was going to be him.
Q: When you just pointed down at the ground, what did you mean?
A: The bullets down on the ground. The visual effect for seeing the bullets pop out of the gun.
Q: You thought that would scare him?
A: Yes, sir, I did.
Appellant and Johnson, who were close friends, had been in a drunken brawl earlier that night, and appellant wanted Johnson to think that he should never hit appellant again because if he did, “he could be shot.” He claimed that he did not know that he had loaded a bullet into the chamber and that the gun discharged accidentally. Appellant also testified that after the gun discharged, he continued to shoot at the cipher lock on Johnson’s door to keep Johnson from coming out and trying to fight.
Testimony from the only other eyewitness to the shooting, Aviation Ordnanceman First Class Hill, appellant’s supervisor, paints a somewhat different picture of this incident, as follows:
Q: How did — how was the gun raised up?
A: Brought up to his side like this [witness raises arm in shooting motion].
TC: May the record reflect that the witness has indicated the weapon was tilted sideways — parallel to the deck.
MJ: Very well.
Q: Did you see the gun discharge?
A: I really can’t say on that. I heard it, but I can’t say I saw it discharge.
Q: Okay. After you saw the accused fire the weapon, what did you do then?
A: I looked at him and you know, I asked him what — what’s going on.
Q: Did he respond to you at all?
A: He turned on me and looked at me and he said, “I said you don’t know me.”
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Q: Now after he said that to you, what did you do in response to that?
A: Well, I started backing up down the hallway.
Q: Okay, by backing up where were you trying to go to?
A: Back up to the other passageway where I could go downstairs.
Q: What was the next thing that happened while you were backing up?
A: Well, as I got to the — the connecting passageway to head downstairs, just as I got through the double doors I heard some more gun shots.
This evidence alone easts enormous doubt on appellant’s defense of accident. In addition, Aviation Support Equipment Technician Third Class Scruggs, who was at the barracks on security duty that night, testified that when appellant came down to the security desk and laid the gun on the counter, “he said, ‘My boy did me bad’ or something like that.”
The Government also introduced evidence that appellant drove 29 miles from the bar where appellant and Johnson had scuffled to the house where appellant knew this gun was kept, then drove another 21 miles from that house to Johnson’s barracks. Though appellant testified that he was weaving as he drove, that he was able to drive those 50 *242miles without incident tends to dimmish his defense of voluntary intoxication. Furthermore, appellant himself brought out in his testimony that he had previously been to Level 3 alcohol treatment almost 2 years prior to this incident. Furthermore, the Government was able to counter his voluntary-intoxication defense with testimony from an expert in addiction psychology that though his blood alcohol content was high, he may have felt the effects of the alcohol to a lesser extent than would have been expected in someone with a less-developed tolerance.
In all, appellant shot seven bullets from the weapon. He had loaded all thirteen bullets that were kept with the gun. Appellant was in the service for 12 years and was “familiar with semi-automatic handguns.” In fact, he testified that though he had never fired this particular weapon, he had “fired similar types of weapons.”
Contrary to the majority’s recital, 51 MJ at 240, the panel found appellant guilty of attempted premeditated murder, willfully damaging military property, larceny of the gun, assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm1, and simple assault on the victim’s roommate2. Thus, the panel clearly did not believe appellant’s fantastic story of how this event occurred.
Given the overwhelming case the Government presented, I would hold that even if the military judge erred by allowing appellant’s statement to Chief Grabiel into evidence, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (harmless-error analysis for confession); United States v. Remai, 19 MJ 229 (1985) (Edwards violations are subject to harmless-error analysis).
WAS THERE AN EDWARDS VIOLATION?
However, I do not believe that the military judge’s denial of the defense motion to suppress appellant’s statement was clearly erroneous.
Chief Grabiel’s testimony at trial was that a day and a half after the shooting, he asked appellant “if it was worth it,” and appellant replied, “He left me in an alley and where I come from it’s an eye for an eye.” Appellant explained at trial what he meant by that, as follows:
Petty Officer Johnson really scared me in the alley, and it was my intent to scare him just as bad as he had scared me. I wanted to also bring up the fact that what he had done in the alley, because they had also told me that I couldn’t say anything or ask any questions concerning the case.
The remainder of Chief Grabiel’s testimony was that appellant was an exemplary worker and a man of “flawless” military character. There is no dispute that appellant had been read his rights and invoked his right to counsel twice before Chief Grabiel spoke with him or that Chief Grabiel was aware of this fact and of the acts with which appellant was charged.
The Government used this statement in their closing argument and rebuttal as evidence of appellant’s motive and intent. The defense explained it away in its closing as meaning “reciprocal treatment. In Petty Officer Mitchell’s mind that was a scare for a scare. Not a shooting for a scare. In Petty Officer Mitchell’s mind if it had worked out as planned that would have been an equitable trade, ‘an eye for an eye.’ Evenness and not escalation was his intent but not by shooting — not by shooting.”
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the Supreme Court held
that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that *243an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
(Footnote omitted.)
The Supreme Court elucidated the definition of interrogation for Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and, hence for Edwards purposes in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). There it was stated:
The concern of the Court in Miranda was that the “interrogation environment” created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would “subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner” and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. [384 U.S.] at 457-458, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The police practices that evoked this concern included several that did not involve express questioning---- It is clear that these techniques of persuasion, no less than express questioning, were thought, in a custodial setting, to amount to interrogation.
This is not to say, however, that all statements obtained by ..the police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of interrogation____ It is clear ... that the special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation. “Interrogation,” as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.
446 U.S. at 299-300, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (footnote omitted). In this respect, the Court noted that those “words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect” are considered “interrogation.” Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682.
In a footnote, the Court noted that though the inquiry should focus on the suspect’s view, it should not entirely exclude consideration of the intent of the police. Id. at 301 and n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The intent of the police “may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.” Id. at n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 1682.
APPLICATION TO THE MILITARY
Applying the Edwards rule, the majority determines that because of the disparity in rank between Aviation Ordnance Chief Grabiel and Aviation Ordnanceman Second Class Mitchell, the “ ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of the initial interrogation continued to exist for this command meeting.” 51 MJ at 240, quoting United States v. Brabant, 29 MJ 259, 263 (CMA 1989).
Brabant, a security policeman who had exercised his rights to remain silent and to counsel when he became a suspect in a larceny, was ordered by his supervisor — that is, Captain Gathright, who was also the squadron operations officer and acting commander — to come into the Captain’s office at the police station just as Brabant’s shift was ending. There Brabant made “spontaneous” incriminating statements. Id. at 260-61. This Court determined that these circumstances constituted “the functional equivalent of’ an interrogation.3 We admonished that “care must be exercised to prevent the creation of situations where the subordinate’s sense of loyalty, trust, and confidence in his leader obscures his legal rights under the Constitution and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” Id. at 263.
As then-Judge Cox perceptively pointed out in his separate opinion, however, the Court’s decision went too far when it characterized the “conversation as an interroga*244tion.” Id. at 265 (concurring in part and dissenting in part) (If it is one, “it is the strangest one” he has ever seen as a judge.). His concerns are quite apropos here: Such an expansive and “inflexible application of’ the rule could “seriously undermine the important, if not vital, relationship between a company commander and a member of his unit____ This ease illustrates once again the traps, pitfalls, and obstacles placed in front of military officials trying — in good faith — to carry out the responsibilities incumbent upon them.” Id. at 265. Judge Cox concluded that “courts can examine the conduct of officials involved and rationally determine whether it constitutes interrogation or the ‘functional equivalent’ thereof.” Id. at 268.
The majority also cites United States v. Reeves, 20 MJ 234 (CMA 1985), in support of its holding. In that case, Reeves’ company commander, Captain Kozak, questioned him at the stockade where his confinement was being processed. Captain Kozak even borrowed a rights’ warning card and read Reeves his rights before questioning him. Id. at 235. Finding this to be clearly an interrogation, we sent the ease back to the lower court for their determination of whether Reeves “initiated” the conversation when Captain Kozak showed up for a regular command visit and whether admission of the evidence was harmless error. Id. at 236-37.
On remand, the lower court found that the Government had failed to show that Reeves initiated the conversation or that admission of the statement was harmless error. 21 MJ 768, 769, 770 (ACMR 1985). However, the court expressly rejected the Government’s request to determine that Edwards does not apply to military commanders, stating that “such a determination is beyond the scope of the remand in this case.” Id. at 768. Furthermore, the court found itself “not persuaded by the facts in this case that [Reeves’] company commander was not engaged in a law enforcement function when he interrogated” Reeves. Id. at 769. Given this factual and procedural posture, I do not share the majority’s opinion that this case is supportive of its holding.
Furthermore, we have previously found that disparity in rank or supervisory status is not dispositive on this issue. For instance, in United States v. Loukas, 29 MJ 385, 389 n. * (1990), we noted in a footnote: “This Court has implicitly held that a superior in the immediate chain of command of the suspect subordinate will normally be presumed to be acting in a command disciplinary function. However, this presumption is not so broad or inflexible as to preclude a limited exception where clearly justified.” (Citations omitted.) Thus, it was not the rank per se which we considered important but the role which the supervisor was in when talking with the suspect or accused, and even that was not dis-positive. Additionally, the Court there looked to the “circumstances of the case to determine if what occurred was an interrogation or a request for a statement.” Id. at 390 (Cox, J., concurring).
ARTICLE 31(b) CHALLENGES
Also, our case law on challenges based in Article 31(b) is illustrative of the inquiry we should follow here. Though one is rooted in statute and the other in constitutional proscriptions, the purposes served by Article 31 and the Edwards prophylactic rule are the same, and their inquiries should be as well. The distinguishing feature is that in an Edwards scenario, the questioning is in a custodial setting, but that can easily be accounted for in the inquiry. It should be remembered that Article 31 gave servicemembers protection that their civilian counterparts did not have until the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, supra. See United States v. Gibson, 3 USCMA 746, 14 CMR 164 (1954). The Edwards rule is merely a “corollary” to that established by the Court in Miranda. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988).
In United States v. Dugo, 10 MJ 206 (1981), we found that the test for applicability of Article 31 is “whether (1) a questioner subject to the Code was acting in an official capacity in his inquiry or only had a personal motivation; and (2) whether the person questioned perceived that the inquiry involved more than a casual conversation. Unless *245both prerequisites are met, Article 31(b) does not apply.” Id. at 210 (citing United States v. Gibson, supra). In that case, the Court determined that though the questioner was on security police duty when he questioned Duga, his motivation was purely personal. Id. at 211. Also, in that case, the Court noted that the questioner had not been tasked with questioning Duga by the investigative team, just as the military judge found here with regard to Chief Grabiel.
The Court in Gibson, 3 USCMA at 752, 14 CMR at 170, referred to this as the “restrictive element of officiality.” To interpret the language of Article 31(b) without such a limitation would make communications within the military structure unwieldy and rigid. The Court also noted in United States v. Dandaneau, 5 USCMA 462, 464, 18 CMR 86, 88 (1955):
Not every inculpatory statement made by an accused in conversation with another is inadmissible because of a failure to warn him of his rights under Article 31. The prohibition of the Article extends only to statements elicited in the course of official interrogation. It is essential, therefore, to determine whether the question asked by Captain Lucas, when he first met the accused in the squadron office, is, as a matter of law, so clearly official or so demanding of an answer by virtue of his superior rank as to fall within the interdiction of the Uniform Code.
(Citation omitted.) Because Captain Lucas had testified in that case that his motivation in conversing with Dandaneau in the squadron office was purely personal, the Court focused on Dandaneau’s perception of the conversation. The Court drew an inference from “the informality of the conversation and the place it occurred” that Dandaneau “regarded the encounter as a casual meeting.” Id. at 464-65, 18 CMR at 88-89.
In United States v. Jones, 24 MJ 367, 369 (1987), this Court found that “neither the fact that the sergeant previously had served as [Jones’] platoon sergeant nor that he and [Jones] were serving in the same company at the time of trial caused the sergeant’s questions to be ‘so “clearly official or so demanding of an answer by virtue of his superior rank” as to transform his personal curiosity into an official inquiry.’” Similarly, in the case at bar, Chief Grabiel’s supervisory position should not be enough to transform his personal curiosity into officiality. Furthermore, Jones was in handcuffs and in the presence of his escort when he conversed with the sergeant. Id. at 368. Here, Mitchell was in arguably less custodial circumstances as he does not appear to have been in restraints.
Finally, in United States v. Pittman, 36 MJ 404 (1993), where Pittman had been questioned by his section leader who had been “detailed” as his escort, id. at 406, we held that the application of Article 31(b) depends upon the “nature and circumstances of the conversation. Not all communications by persons ‘subject to’ the Code constitute an interrogation or amount to requesting a statement from an accused or suspect.” Id. at 407. We determined that the military judge’s admission of the statement was correct based on an inquiry into whether, given the questioner’s “superior rank” and “official position,” the “mere” act of questioning was “equivalent to a command.” Id., citing Duga, supra at 209.
With this case law as guidance, I would look at the following factors to support a determination that there was no custodial interrogation in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, supra, here:
1. Chief Grabiel was Mitchell’s supervisor, but so was Petty Officer Hill, whose rating is Aviation Ordnanceman First Class. Mitchell (Aviation Ordnanceman Second Class) made similarly incriminating statements to both of them, which were similarly used by the Government in their case. Both supervisors otherwise spoke highly of Mitchell. There is not a significant disparity between their ranks and appellant’s, such that appellant would feel compelled to respond to either of them against his better judgment merely because of loyalty or trust. In fact, appellant testified that he had been told not to say anything and that this was an opportunity to tell his side of the story.
*2462. Chief Grabiel had no extraordinary investigative or disciplinary role here. The military judge — in what I consider an excessive abundance of caution — excluded another statement made to Chief Grabiel about appellant’s possession of the gun on base because Chief Grabiel had previously warned his crew against bringing weapons on base. Thus, the military judge ruled that on that point the questioning served something of a professional purpose. Otherwise, Chief Grabiel’s limited disciplinary functions were not implicated.
3. Along those same lines, the military judge, who had the opportunity to consider his demeanor on the witness stand, found that Chief Grabiel’s question, “Was it worth it?” was “motivated solely out of personal curiosity.” In fact, it may even be said that the question was in many respects rhetorical. He was speaking to appellant as a man for whom, given his testimony at trial, he clearly had great respect, and asking him what could have caused this unexpected variance in his exemplary conduct was a matter of personal interest.
4. Chief Grabiel was there fulfilling his command responsibilities. He had gotten appellant his cigarettes from his personal belongings; he bought appellant a Mc-Donalds milkshake because his bruised jaw made eating difficult; he ensured that appellant had been read his pretrial confinement rights; and he checked on appellant’s transportation back to Jacksonville. Under these circumstances, I find it hard to believe that appellant perceived this to be a custodial interrogation.
5. Chief Grabiel spoke to appellant on June 5; but he did not sign the statement regarding his conversation until June 9. The fact that Chief Grabiel testified on the motion to suppress that he did not approach the agent with this information makes it crystal clear that Chief Grabiel did not intend to gather evidence against appellant. This is also relevant in the analysis of whether he could have reasonably expected an incriminating response to his question.
6. That Chief Grabiel knew what charges might be brought against appellant is not relevant here. The majority cites this as one similar factor in its analogy to United States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382, 389 (5th Cir.1985). However, there the court cited it as evidence that the prison classification officer’s question was not part of his administrative duties. Here, Chief Grabiel’s question could not have elicited any information not already in his possession.
Thus, I part company with the majority and would hold that the military judge did not err in admitting appellant’s statement to Chief Grabiel; and that even reluctantly assuming error, I am confident it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
. This charge was subsequently dismissed as being multiplicious for findings. R. 431.
. The panel substituted this as a lesser-included offense for the charge of assault with a means likely to inflict grievous bodily harm.
. As then-Judge Cox observed, "It is interesting to note that appellee has never testified that he felt ‘compelled’ to incriminate himself.” 29 MJ at 265 n. 2 (Cox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).