dissents, and votes to affirm the judgment, with the following memorandum: The appellant Town of Kent Zoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter the ZBA) has acted most unreasonably, arbitrarily, and capriciously in this matter and has abused its discretion in denying the petitioner a building permit to restore her home after it was destroyed by a fire. Accordingly, I dissent and vote to affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court, Putnam County.
Since the year 2000, the petitioner, Tisha Warner, has been the owner of the subject house located at 236 Lakeshore Drive East in the Town of Kent, Putnam County. The property lies in a residential zoning district in the hamlet of Lake Carmel and is situated along the shore of Lake Carmel. The single-family house, which was built in the 1940s, is a preexisting nonconforming (or “noncomplying”) building because the lot is smaller than is allowed under the current zoning ordinances.
The petitioner’s father, Robert Sprague, lived in the house before it was destroyed by a fire on February 3, 2010. The Lake Carmel Fire Department responded to the fire, but could not save the house. The Town Fire Inspector recommended that the house be condemned and removed because of significant structural damage. Thereafter, the petitioner relinquished all rights and responsibilities to the subject property to Sprague and granted him power of attorney, as reflected in a letter to the ZBA dated November 14, 2011.
The Zoning Code Provision
As stated by the majority, at the time of the fire, Code of the Town of Kent (hereinafter the Town Code) § 77-48 (A) permitted reconstruction of a noncomplying principal building in its noncomplying location after the building was damaged in excess of 75% of its bulk or square footage, if reconstruction was “completed within one year from the date of such destruction” (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the fire exceeded 75% of the bulk or square footage of the house.
But during the pendency of this matter, the Town amended Town Code § 77-48 (A) to expand the one-year limit into a more reasonable two-year limit on the right to rebuild a house substantially destroyed by fire in its noncomplying location.
The Homeowner’s Insurance Dispute
The Supreme Court took cognizance of the reasons for the delay in rebuilding the house destroyed by fire within the *823unreasonable one-year time limit. In June 2009, about seven months before the fire, the petitioner and Sprague obtained a one-year homeowner’s insurance policy through a local insurance agency located in the neighboring Town of Carmel. However, the policy was canceled prior to the fire due to alleged nonpayment. Sprague maintained that he made payments towards the policy in person at the insurance agency, but that an incorrect address was on file for him, and he never received a cancellation notice. Notably, the policy’s declaration page contains what appears to be an incorrect address for the subject property, 236 East Lake Dr., Kent Lakes, NY, 10512, instead of the correct address, 236 Lakeshore Drive East, Kent, NY, 10512. Although the street number and zip code are correct, the street name and town are wrong. Moreover, the locale, “Kent Lakes,” is ambiguous at best. The house is located in the hamlet of Lake Carmel in the Town of Kent. Kent Lakes appears to be a different neighborhood near the hamlet of Lake Carmel. Hence, the petitioner had a reasonable dispute with the insurance carrier, which she pursued as she did not have sufficient funds to rebuild the house without the insurance proceeds.
On March 2, 2010, less than one month after the fire, the petitioner contacted the New York State Insurance Department, which conducted an investigation. On June 25, 2010, after much correspondence with the petitioner, the Insurance Department advised the petitioner that the dispute “over the policy address gives rise to questions of fact which this Department is without authority to decide. Such issues, by their very nature, can only be decided by a court having jurisdiction.” However, the Insurance Department further advised that the investigation was still ongoing and the petitioner should not demolish the remainder of the house until the investigation was complete. In accordance with this advice, the petitioner did not proceed to demolish what was left of the house until the insurance investigation was complete. Unfortunately, this delay resulted in violations being placed on the premises due to complaints from neighbors.
The Petitioner’s Continued Efforts to Rebuild
In July 2010, while waiting for the completion of the Insurance Department’s investigation, the petitioner made inquiries about placing a modular home on the property. On November 4, 2010, after the insurance investigation was complete, the pro se petitioner applied for a demolition permit. The Town Building Inspector issued the demolition permit, and the remaining structure was demolished in December 2010. On *824January 21, 2011, the petitioner obtained the Putnam County Department of Health’s approval of her plans to rebuild a two-bedroom house where the former house had stood. That same day, she applied for a building permit. The Building Inspector denied the application because it was allegedly missing building plans and a survey, notwithstanding that the winter weather was an obstacle to completing a survey.
On February 1, 2011, the petitioner retained a surveyor. However, due to inclement winter weather, the survey was not completed until April 18, 2011.
On October 26, 2011, the petitioner again applied for a building permit with plans and the new survey. The Building Inspector denied this second application on the basis that, under Town Code § 77-48, the petitioner had only one year from the date of the fire to complete construction of a noncomplying house and, at that point, eight months had elapsed since the expiration of that one-year period.
The ZBA Hearings
On November 4, 2011, the petitioner, acting pro se, filed a “Request for Hearing/Application for Variance” with the ZBA to review the Building Inspector’s refusal to issue a building permit. Where the form stated “actual variance requested,” the petitioner wrote, “rebuild house where it burned down 2/3/2010, same foot print, going up second floor for back half of home, Chapter 77-48 Paragraph A.” A plain reading of the pro se petitioner’s completed ZBA form discloses that the petitioner was requesting either permission or a variance (extension) to build as of right under the one-year rule of the Town Code § 77-48, or an area variance to rebuild the house on the nonconforming parcel.
On December 16, 2011, Sprague, representing the petitioner, first appeared before the ZBA. Five concerned neighbors were also present. At the outset, Sprague explained that there was a delay in rebuilding the house because of the insurance problems, including the Insurance Department’s investigation, and inclement weather, which prevented a survey in the middle of winter. Sprague asserted that the new house would be in almost the same footprint as the old house, and the only difference was that the new house would be in a slightly different location in order to have the proper setbacks under the current zoning rules. Sprague fielded questions about the dimensions of the new house and agreed to provide the ZBA with correspondence regarding the insurance problems.
In the midst of Sprague’s presentation, the ZBA Chairman advised that, “according to the Zoning Code, you are grand*825fathered to rebuild [the house] for a year and [you] lost that right due to the delay in communications with the Town or any action on [your] part to notify the Town.” The ZBA Chairman later stated that the zoning code required the petitioner to rebuild the house within one year, but the petitioner was seeking “[t]his variance [because] the year has expired and the [petitioner] is requesting a grant for additional time to rebuild. The [ZBA] has the power to grant that extra time to the [petitioner] if they feel it is appropriate.” Sprague advised the ZBA that prompt notice to the Town about the intent to rebuild was demonstrated by site visits by the Fire Inspector and the Building Inspector at or near the time of the fire. Sprague also asserted that the first application for a building permit was made before the one-year limitations period had expired.
After hearing neighbors’ complaints about debris on the subject property, the ZBA Chairman stated that the petitioner’s application to rebuild the house would not be granted while there were existing zoning code violations on the property, such as debris and a preexisting trellis, and the ZBA voted to delay its decision until January 20, 2012, which would be almost two years after the fire. Due to similar zoning code violations that were subsequently reported, the ZBA postponed the petitioner’s application at least three more times. During that time, the petitioner and Sprague commenced an action against the insurance company seeking a judgment declaring the lapse of coverage invalid, as well as monetary damages.
On May 21, 2012, well over six months after the petitioner requested a hearing and more than two years after the fire, the ZBA announced that it had received a letter from the Town’s zoning enforcement officer stating that the property had been “cleaned up” and the application was thus “worthy of further consideration” on the merits. Sprague, representing the petitioner, explained the difficulties after the fire once more and asserted that, if the original building permit application filed on January 21, 2011, had been granted, the “foundation could have been dug and a modular house could have been put in place long before the year was up.”
However, at this point, contrary to his prior assertions, the ZBA Chairman said that, after doing (unspecified) research and consulting with (unspecified) counsel, the ZBA had concluded that the one-year limit was basically set in stone: “the law is what the law is,” and the ZBA could not overrule the Building Inspector’s determination because they would be impermissibly “re-writing the law.” The ZBA Chairman further stated that the mere filing of an application within one year of *826the fire was not sufficient to “grandfather” the request for a permit to rebuild. The ZBA Chairman rejected Sprague’s contention that there were extenuating circumstances justifying the delay.
Sprague asked if he would be able to “obtain permission to build a new house with a different footprint and ask for a variance to build on the lot.” The ZBA Chairman advised that Sprague could do so, but he would face challenges. The ZBA Chairman effectively rejected Sprague’s attempt to address “the variance”—presumably an area variance to address the fact that the subject property is a substandard lot—in this proceeding, stating that “the Zoning Board would like to resolve the issues at hand at this meeting,” and that Sprague could reapply. Then three of the five ZBA members voted to uphold the Building Inspector’s denial of the building permit; the other two members were absent.
Thereafter, the ZBA issued a written decision finding that the Building Inspector reasonably denied the petitioner’s request for a building permit. Among other things, the ZBA noted that “the courts have upheld . . . strict time requirements, [and] in this case the [Town] Code requires complete restoration within the one year time period.” The ZBA did not cite any case law or other decisional authority. Additionally, the ZBA made a finding that “the alleged hardship that supposedly delayed the reconstruction was overwhelmingly self-created.”
It must be noted that contrary to the majority’s position, the petitioner did not withdraw the request for an “area variance” made in her November 2011 application as an alternative to the request for an extension (variance) of the one-year rule to rebuild as of right after the fire.
The CPLR Article 78 Proceeding and the Supreme Court’s Judgment
In June 2012, the petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding in the Supreme Court, Putnam County, to review the ZBA’s determination. The ZBA and the Town opposed the petition.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the ZBA’s determination, and directed the Building Inspector to issue the building permit. The court found that the petitioner made “diligent, continuous efforts to comply with every directive of the Building Inspector in moving forward with the permit application process,” and under the “unique circumstances” of this case, reversed the ZBA’s determination and remitted the matter for the issuance of the subject building permit. In reach*827ing this determination, the court rejected the ZBA’s finding that the petitioner’s “hardship was self-created,” because such finding lacked a rational basis.
Discussion
Contrary to the opinion of my colleagues in the majority, I believe that the Supreme Court’s determination was correct.
“Fair and intelligent land use planning tolerates nonconforming uses partly because property owners would otherwise suffer undue financial hardship if precipitously faced with discontinuance of an existing nonconforming use and loss of investment due to rezoning” (Matter of Pelham Esplanade v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Pelham Manor, 77 NY2d 66, 70 [1990]), and, in certain circumstances, this undue hardship “might be construed as confiscatory and unconstitutional” (Village of Valatie v Smith, 83 NY2d 396, 400 [1994]). Nonetheless, municipalities may enact laws limiting the perpetuation of nonconforming uses or structures if these laws are made “at an appropriate point in time and under reasonable regulatory circumstances” (Matter of Pelham Esplanade v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Pelham Manor, 77 NY2d at 71; see Village of Valatie v Smith, 83 NY2d at 399-400; Matter of Bobandal Realties v Worthington, 21 AD2d 784, 785 [1964], affd 15 NY2d 788 [1965]).
My colleagues in the majority endorse the ZBA’s strict interpretation of the then-existing zoning provision, which required the petitioner to rebuild the home within one year, notwithstanding numerous extenuating circumstances, the ZBA’s arbitrary and capricious handling of this matter, and the Town’s subsequent reasonable extension of that zoning provision to two years. I respectfully disagree with my colleagues and find that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the ZBA’s actions were unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and an abuse of its discretion.
Turning to the unique circumstances of this case, I first find that the ZBA’s delay in determining the petitioner’s application to rebuild a small house in a residential neighborhood was unreasonable. There can be no doubt that this was a time-sensitive matter. Nonetheless, the ZBA took more than six months to render a decision on the petitioner’s application. It would be one thing if this delay was caused by a backlog or some other circumstance beyond the ZBA’s control, but here the ZBA repeatedly pushed back the application on purpose because of reports of minor zoning code violations on the property. The ZBA went so far as to suggest that these violations—which, at worst, amounted to little more than an *828eyesore—rendered the petitioner’s application to rebuild the home unworthy of consideration. In my view, the petitioner’s time-sensitive application to rebuild the house should have been considered first. The removal of debris violations should have been viewed as a condition subsequent rather than a condition precedent to the ZBA’s review of the application to rebuild. This was most arbitrary and capricious, and an abuse of its discretion.
Additionally, it appears that the ZBA had a woeful misunderstanding of its authority with respect to the one-year rule throughout the hearing process. On the first hearing date, the ZBA, through its Chairman, expressly asserted that it construed the petitioner’s application as a request for a “variance” to extend the one-year time limit set forth in the applicable version of Town Code § 77-48, and that the ZBA had “the power to grant that extra time ... if they feel it [was] appropriate.” Approximately five months later, after repeatedly pushing back the application, the ZBA finally decided that, based upon unspecified research and consultation with unspecified counsel, it actually did not have the power to grant extra time under the ordinance. The ZBA did not cite any authority for its newfound understanding that it lacked the discretion to grant extra time. Thus, the ZBA capriciously made a decision that it could have made six months earlier: that it was simply too late for the petitioner to rebuild, and the ZBA had no discretion to extend the time to rebuild.
The ZBA also failed to correctly and consistently apprehend the petitioner’s application, which, in my view, included an alternative request for an area variance. The petitioner was simply seeking to rebuild the house; it did not matter what kind of variance she received in order to obtain the building permit. Local zoning boards are, of course, “vested with broad discretion in considering applications for area variances” (Matter of Roberts v Wright, 70 AD3d 1041, 1042 [2010]). In my view, the ZBA took an unreasonably myopic view of the pro se petitioner’s request to rebuild the home when it cavalierly rejected the notion that it may consider an area variance or similar variance to allow the petitioner to build the proposed house, which was in almost the same footprint as the prior house and in conformance with the current setback rules. The ZBA unreasonably narrowed its focus in this protracted proceeding and told the petitioner that she would have to come back to apply for a different type of variance.
My colleagues in the majority believe that the petitioner was not truly harmed by the ZBA’s determination in this matter *829because she can go back and apply for appropriate area variances. However, it appears to me that any future application for area variances would face considerable opposition from the petitioner’s neighbors, who may be motivated in part by their own self-interest.
Additionally, I agree with the Supreme Court that this record demonstrates that the pro se petitioner’s particular hardship was not solely self-created. She struggled to address everything that accompanies a devastating home fire within a one-year period, such as relocating to a new residence, applying for a demolition permit, getting a contractor to demolish and cart away the structure, applying for a building permit, getting a survey in the snowy season, getting an architect to submit a building plan, getting Department of Health approval, and then getting a contractor to build the new house. Notwithstanding the petitioner’s difficulties, the ZBA delayed its decision on her application for six months, and ultimately decided to strictly interpret the applicable one-year rule so as to deny her request to rebuild her house. This strikes me as grossly unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
Potential Unconstitutional Taking
Although I tend to agree with my colleagues that the petitioner’s contention that she was subjected to an unconstitutional taking without compensation may not yet be ripe for review, I believe that this may very well become such a case if the ZBA ultimately thwarts all of her efforts to rebuild a home on the property.
A zoning ordinance may be an invalid exercise of a municipality’s police power where “even though reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose, it renders the property affected by it so unsuitable for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted as effectively to destroy its economic value” (Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 500 [1983]). Although the property owner bears a heavy burden of showing that no reasonable return may be obtained from the property under the challenged zoning classification (see e.g. Putnam County Natl. Bank v City of New York, 37 AD3d 575, 577 [2007]; Cohen v Vecchio, 197 AD2d 499, 501 [1993, Balletta, J., dissenting]), a court addressing the issue may consider such factors as the property’s topography and the zoning and use of nearby properties (see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d at 502-503). Here, it is hard to imagine an economically viable use for this substandard residential lot if the ZBA ultimately determines that no house can be built on it.
*830Lastly, appellate counsel for the ZBA and the Town represented to this Court that he did not believe that the petitioner’s application for an area variance would be denied under the circumstances of this case. I hope that is true, especially since the ZBA could have granted that almost five years ago.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I agree with the Supreme Court that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the ZBA’s conduct and final determination were unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, I dissent and vote to affirm the Supreme Court’s judgment, which granted the petition, annulled the ZBA’s determination, and directed the Building Inspector to issue a building permit.