United States v. Rodriguez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
Criminal Action No. 19-224 (TJK)
LAZARO VITON RODRIGUEZ et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

A grand jury indicted Defendants in June 2019 for participating in an international drug-

importation conspiracy. But Defendant Cesar Gomez Almonte was not arrested until December

2020, and Defendant Lazaro Viton Rodriguez not until January 2022. Although they rely on dif-

ferent legal theories, they each now move to dismiss the indictment based on prearrest delay. The

Court has reviewed written and live testimony explaining those delays. Because the delays were

justified by legitimate law-enforcement objectives and constraints—and not caused by the govern-

ment’s negligence or bad faith—the Court will deny their motions.

I. Background

A. Procedural History

This is not Almonte’s first motion on the subject. About a year after his arrest, he moved

to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the 18-month prearrest delay violated his Sixth Amend-

ment right to a speedy trial. ECF No. 60. The Court denied that motion. It reasoned that, although

a delay of more than a year is presumptively prejudicial, the government had proffered a valid

basis for the delay and that Almonte had neither asserted his speedy-trial rights since his arrest nor

articulated specific prejudice.

After Rodriguez was arrested, he discussed the possibility of resolving the case by guilty

plea with the government for about eleven months. See ECF No. 113 at 2; ECF No. 117 at 3.
Ultimately, he decided to proceed to trial. ECF No. 117 at 3. In December 2022, he notified the

Court that he would move to dismiss the indictment because of the prearrest delay, and the Court

set a briefing schedule. See Min. Entry of Dec. 23, 2022. He now argues that the roughly 30-

month gap between the indictment and his arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy

trial. ECF No. 121.

Around the same time, Almonte again moved to dismiss the indictment. He claims that

the government’s proffered explanation in response to his first such motion was knowingly false.

ECF No. 135 at 5. Thus, he asks the Court to dismiss the indictment under its supervisory authority

to sanction prosecutorial misconduct. See id. at 5–6.

Defendants requested an evidentiary hearing. ECF Nos. 133, 144. The Court granted that

request because “motions to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds are typically resolved after an evi-

dentiary hearing” and Defendants’ motions “arise from overlapping facts.” Min. Entry of Apr.

26, 2023 (quotation omitted). It directed the government to explain the prearrest delays with evi-

dence, either written or live. Id. In response, the government submitted declarations by David

Warner, an Associate Director at the Office of International Affairs, ECF No. 148-3, and Miguel

Herrera, Jr., a Special Agent with Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”)—the lead case agent,

ECF No. 148-4. It also submitted emails contemporaneously sent to and by Special Agent Herrera

and other HSI agents, plus other various documents. See ECF No. 148-5–148-17.

The parties addressed those submissions at the evidentiary hearing. Defendants also called

Special Agent Herrera to testify. After the hearing, the parties submitted further briefing on the

evidence developed in the record. See ECF Nos. 152, 153, 158, 159, 164.

B. Findings of Fact

After considering all the evidence, including the content of Special Agent Herrera’s live

testimony and his demeanor while testifying, the Court finds these facts:

2
 Rodriguez is a citizen of Cuba. Almonte is a citizen of the Dominican Republic. In June

2019, both men lived in the Dominican Republic.

Special Agent Herrera has worked for HSI since 1998 investigating offenses including nar-

cotics smuggling and money laundering. In June 2019, he was investigating a drug-trafficking

organization allegedly operating out of the Dominican Republic. He had developed evidence that

Rodriguez and Almonte were members of that drug-trafficking organization. He also had evidence

that Luca Finocchiarrio, a citizen of Italy then residing in the Dominican Republic, was a member

of the same drug-trafficking organization. Finocchiarrio was the investigation’s main target. Spe-

cial Agent Herrera originally intended to seek the simultaneous arrests of Rodriguez, Almonte,

and Finocchiarrio. He preferred to do that because he believed, based on his investigation, that

they were co-conspirators, and, in his experience, when one co-conspirator is arrested, others are

likely to flee or attempt to destroy evidence.

A grand jury indicted Rodriguez and Almonte on June 28, 2019. But as for Finocchiarrio,

Special Agent Herrera decided to wait to seek an indictment until he had compiled more evidence

against him. At that time, Special Agent Herrera did not yet attempt to have Rodriguez or Almonte

arrested, extradited, or removed from the Dominican Republic. Besides the more generalized rea-

sons to think Finocchiarrio might flee if one of his associates was arrested, Special Agent Herrera

thought Finocchiarrio had strong ties to Italy (and other countries) and so he believed Finocchiarrio

could easily slip out of the Dominican Republic.

By March 2020, Special Agent Herrera was still working toward an indictment of Finoc-

chiarrio, but his investigation was impeded by the COVID-19 pandemic. In May 2020, he learned

for the first time that the Italian government was investigating Finocchiarrio and that Italian law-

enforcement agents intended to arrest him. That same month, Special Agent Herrera came to

3
understand that Italian law-enforcement agents intended to issue, at some point in the future, an

Interpol Red Notice for Finocchiarrio. 1 As it turned out, Italian law-enforcement agents had al-

ready issued an active Red Notice for Finocchiarrio at least as early as June 2019.

On June 3, 2020, Finocchiarrio was removed from the Dominican Republic to Italy and

arrested. The same day, Special Agent Herrera learned for the first time that Italian law-enforce-

ment agents had already issued an active Red Notice for Finocchiarrio and that he had been re-

moved to Italy. On June 5, 2020, another HSI agent confirmed for Special Agent Herrera that

Italian law-enforcement agents had arrested Finocchiarrio upon his arrival. The same day, Special

Agent Herrera began planning the arrests of Rodriguez and Almonte.

The United States and the Dominican Republic are parties to a bilateral extradition treaty.

Under that treaty, the United States must submit extradition requests through formal diplomatic

channels. From initiation to extradition, that process often takes longer than 13 months and can

take as long as two years. An alternative to the extradition process exists for noncitizens of the

Dominican Republic: The Dominican Republic may remove the noncitizen from the country via

the United States, which gives U.S. law-enforcement officers an opportunity to arrest the suspect.

U.S. law-enforcement officers decided to ask the Dominican Republic to remove Rodriguez from

the country via the United States. That procedure was unavailable for Almonte because he is a

citizen of the Dominican Republic. Because they expected extradition proceedings to take longer

than removal proceedings, U.S. law-enforcement officers decided to request Almonte’s extradition

before requesting Rodriguez’s removal.

By September 2020, Special Agent Herrera and others communicated those plans to U.S.

1
An Interpol Red Notice is a request to law enforcement worldwide to locate and provi-
sionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action.

4
officials working in the Dominican Republic. U.S. law-enforcement officers finalized an extradi-

tion package for Almonte on December 9, 2020. Before that request was transmitted to the Do-

minican Republic, Special Agent Herrera learned that Almonte planned to visit the Miami airport

on his way to another destination. Special Agent Herrera arrested Almonte in the Miami airport

on December 12, 2020.

Six days later, Special Agent Herrera notified an HSI agent working in the Dominican

Republic that he would ask the Dominican Republic to remove Rodriguez via the United States

after obtaining internal approval. Eleven days later, Special Agent Herrera told the same HSI

agent that the request had been approved internally. By January 27, 2021, the same HSI agent had

discussed the request with a representative of the U.S. Marshals Service and believed that the

request would likely be granted. Between January 27, 2021, and February 19, 2021, HSI agents,

including Special Agent Herrera, conferred internally and with the U.S. Marshals Service and Do-

minican Republic immigration officials to determine what information was needed to support Ro-

driguez’s removal.

By February 19, 2021, Dominican Republic immigration officials had agreed in principle

to remove Rodriguez from the Dominican Republic to Cuba via the United States. That approval

depended on HSI’s paying for the cost of transporting Rodriguez.

Between February 19, 2021, and mid-May 2021, U.S. law-enforcement officers located a

document establishing Rodriguez’s Cuban citizenship and formally requested a removal order. On

July 30, 2021, Dominican Republic immigration officers ordered Rodriguez removed. By August

26, 2021, Dominican Republic law-enforcement officers had located Rodriguez. On November 8,

2021, HSI requested funding for the cost of arresting Rodriguez and transporting him to Cuba via

the United States. That request included a plan to perform the operation between December 13–18,

5
2021. HSI approved that request on November 9, 2021. But Special Agent Herrera could not find

suitable flights between December 13–18, 2021.

By December 7, 2021, Special Agent Herrera had finalized travel plans to perform the

removal operation between January 10–15, 2022. Dominican Republic immigration officials re-

moved Rodriguez from that country on January 12, 2022. Special Agent Herrera and another HSI

agent traveled with Rodriguez on a plane from the Dominican Republic to Miami. Special Agent

Herrera arrested Rodriguez on January 12, 2022, in the Miami airport.

II. Legal Standard

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants “a speedy and public trial.” U.S.

Const. amend. VI. Four factors are relevant to deciding whether a defendant has been denied a

speedy trial: (1) the length of the delay; (2) its explanation; (3) whether the defendant has asserted

his speedy-trial right; and (4) whether he has suffered prejudice. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,

530 (1972). The first factor is both a threshold requirement and—if that requirement is satisfied—

a factor to be weighed in the overall analysis. United States v. Tchibassa, 452 F.3d 918, 922–23

(D.C. Cir. 2006). A delay of more than a year satisfies the threshold requirement. United States

v. Fernandes, 618 F. Supp. 2d 62, 68 (D.D.C. 2009). And the overall analysis requires a holistic

inquiry that considers the four factors alongside “such other circumstances as may be relevant,”

including the nature of the crime charged. See United States v. Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d

193, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). The most important factor, however, is “the second

factor, the reason for delay.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986).

III. Analysis

As the Court’s factual findings make clear, the government acted rationally and pursued

Defendants’ arrests with reasonable diligence. Thus, the “all-important second factor,” Fernandes,

618 F. Supp. 2d at 75, favors the government. The third and fourth factors tilt the same way. Only

6
the length of the delay conceivably justifies Rodriguez’s motion, and even that factor does not help

him much because some delay is understandable in a cross-border conspiracy case. Moreover,

Almonte’s claim that the government’s explanation is false (knowingly or otherwise) lacks any

support in the record. Thus, the Court will deny both motions.

A. The Court Will Deny Without Prejudice the Government’s Motion to File un-
der Seal Two Declarations

Before turning to the merits, the Court will address the government’s pending motion to

file under seal two of the exhibits it submitted in opposing these motions. ECF No. 148. Those

exhibits are the declarations of David Warner, ECF No. 148-3, and Special Agent Herrera, ECF

No. 148-4. Id. at 1. It explains that those exhibits “supplement prior sealed filings that include

sensitive information about an unindicted co-conspirator and other law enforcement techniques.”

Id. at 1. Those prior sealed filings are ECF Nos. 123 and 143, which reference material in earlier

sealed filings, such as the government’s opposition to Almonte’s first motion to dismiss, ECF

No. 61-1, and a transcript of the Court’s oral ruling denying that motion, ECF No. 67. For the

following reasons, the Court will deny the motion without prejudice and give the government an

opportunity to reassert the motion in light of later developments.

In deciding whether to require public disclosure of filings, the Court must consider the

factors established by United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 317–24 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Those

factors are

(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent of previous
public access to the documents; (3) the fact that someone has objected to disclosure,
and the identity of that person; (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests
asserted; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the
purposes for which the documents were introduced during the judicial proceedings.

Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quotation

omitted). Through those factors, the Court must “weigh[ ] the interests advanced by the parties in

7
light of the public interest and the duty of the courts,” and it can permit filings under seal only if

it then “concludes that justice so requires.” Id. at 665–66 (quotation omitted).

Here, the presumptions embedded in the first and sixth factors favor disclosure. Under the

first factor, there is a “general public interest in the openness of governmental processes.” See

Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1994). And under the

sixth factor, there is also a “strong presumption in favor of public access” because the two decla-

rations are an important part of the basis for this order. EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 98

F.3d 1406, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Am. Professional Agency, Inc. v. NASW Assurance Servs., Inc.,

121 F. Supp. 3d 21, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2013).

On the other hand, the Court acknowledges the privacy interests the government asserts

and the possibility that it will face prejudice from disclosure. The declarations explain in detail

the process for extraditing a suspect from the Dominican Republic and the considerations the gov-

ernment considers relevant to deciding whether, when, and how to attempt extradition. That in-

formation could be sensitive as applied here because Finocchiarrio, one of the alleged co-conspira-

tors, has not yet been indicted by the United States, and the government is still weighing whether

it will do so. Rough Hrg. Tr. at 112–13. Public disclosure of the declarations could thus impede

an ongoing criminal investigation. So it is at least possible that the “interrelated” “third, fourth,

and fifth Hubbard factors” weigh against disclosure. See Am. Professional Agency, 121 F. Supp.

3d at 25 (quotation omitted).

That leaves the second Hubbard factor, which ultimately persuades the Court to deny the

government’s motion without prejudice. When the government filed its motion, there was no rea-

son to think the public had prior access to the declarations’ contents, making the second factor

neutral. Am. Professional Agency, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 24. Now, however, Special Agent Herrera

8
has testified about the same subject matter and the parties have argued these motions in part based

on his testimony—both in open court. That subsequent public disclosure is material to the Court’s

decision whether to require disclosure. See In re L.A. Times Commc’ns LLC, 28 F.4th 292, 298

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (vacating and remanding a district court’s sealing decision “in light of . . . public

disclosures”). Thus, if the government wishes to reassert its motion for leave to file under seal, it

should explain why justice requires the declarations to remain sealed despite public access to some

of the information in the declarations.

In addition, because it contains information from those declarations, the Court will file this

order provisionally under seal. The Court will order the parties to file specific redactions to this

order that eliminate references to any material they wish to remain under seal, and the Court will

consider those requests for redaction when it prepares a version of this order for the public docket.

E.g. In re McCormick & Co., Inc., No. 15-MC-1825 (ESH), 2017 WL 2560911, at *1 (D.D.C.

June 13, 2017).

B. The Barker Factors Do Not Support Dismissal of the Indictment Against Ro-
driguez

Now for the merits. More than 30 months passed between Rodriguez’s indictment and his

arrest. That delay surpassed a year, so the “Court must conduct the Barker analysis to determine

whether [his] Sixth Amendment rights have been violated.” Fernandes, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 68.

1. The Length of the Delay

Throughout his briefing, Rodriguez emphasizes the length of the delay. E.g., ECF No. 158

at 1; id. at 7 n.4; ECF No. 130 at 2; ECF No. 121 at 2; id. at 9. No doubt, a 30-month delay can

support dismissal of an indictment. E.g., Fernandez, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (dismissing an indict-

ment after a prearrest delay of 23 months). But it is not enough simply to note the passage of time.

For one thing, “once the threshold of more than one year is exceeded, the length of the delay does

9
not strongly sway the ultimate outcome of the speedy trial issue.” Id. For another, the complexity

of the case matters. “[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably

less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d at 203 (quot-

ing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531).

This case, like Lopesierra-Gutierrez, involves allegations of “a complicated and far-reach-

ing conspiracy.” 708 F.3d at 203. Still, at least as charged, it is not as complicated or as far-

reaching as the conspiracy in that case. The current record specifically identifies only four partic-

ipants, while the conspiracy in Lopesierra-Gutierrez involved fifteen defendants and as many ex-

traditions. See id. On the other hand, the delay is shorter too—30 months compared to more than

42 months. See id. at 202. And the investigations share obstacles such as the need to extradite

defendants, “collect and decipher foreign evidence, and coordinate with foreign witnesses.” Id.

at 203. Under those circumstances, some delay is reasonable and expected.

Among other cases in which prearrest delay has been litigated, the delay here hardly stands

out. Besides Lopesierra-Gutierrez, the D.C. Circuit has permitted a far longer delay in Tchibassa,

452 F.3d at 924–27 (nearly 11 years). Other district courts have also rejected challenges based on

similar or longer delays. E.g., United States v. Taylor, No. 18-CR-198 (JEB), 2020 WL 7264070,

at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2020) (delay of “over two-and-a-half years”); United States v. Homaune,

898 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D.D.C. 2012) (delay of “almost two years”); United States v. Goss, 646

F. Supp. 2d 137, 141 (D.D.C. 2009) (delay of “four and a half years”); United States v. Brodie,

326 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88–89 (D.D.C. 2004) (delay of at least seven years).

In context, then, it is hard to find the delay here “uncommonly long.” Doggett v. United

States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). Even so, the first factor no doubt favors Rodriguez; it simply

10
carries limited weight. Thus, the Court “proceeds with skepticism to the remaining Barker fac-

tors.” United States v. Ford, 155 F. Supp. 3d 60, 69 (D.D.C. 2016).

2. The Reason for the Delay

The Court must evaluate the second and most-important factor, the reason for the delay,

“along a continuum.” United States v. Demirtas, 204 F. Supp. 3d 158, 172 (D.D.C. 2016). The

factor weighs heavily against the government if it deliberately delayed to “gain some tactical ad-

vantage.” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). Less culpable explanations “such as negli-

gence . . . weigh less heavily” against the government but still favor dismissal of the indictment.

See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009) (quotation omitted). On the other hand, “delay

caused by the defense weighs against the defendant.” Id.

In the context of a prearrest delay, the Court must also assess whether the government

“pursued [Defendant] with reasonable diligence from his indictment to his arrest.” Doggett, 505

U.S. at 656. Normally, when a defendant lives outside the United States, “the hallmark of govern-

ment diligence is extradition.” Fernandes, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 69. That is, the government fulfills

its obligation by formally seeking extradition. Id. But it may alternatively “present[ ] substantial

evidence that extradition would be futile.” Id. Or it can “show[ ] that it attempted extradition

informally.” Id. Ultimately, there is no single formula for reasonable diligence—the Court should

consider all the facts and circumstances and decide whether the government “put forth ‘serious

effort’ to find and arrest [Defendant].” See, e.g., United States v. Boone, 706 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76

(D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531).

Rodriguez attributes the delay to the government’s “negligence.” See ECF No. 158 at 4.

That characterization has two facets. Between the indictment and Finocchiarrio’s arrest in Italy,

Rodriguez says the government’s explanation is facially unreasonable and “not supported by any

11
specific evidence.” Id. at 3. After Finocchiarrio’s arrest, Rodriguez says the government’s expla-

nation is “nonsensical” and that the evidence shows “a total of 4 short, maybe 5 minute or less,

exchanges by email,” which he considers inadequate effort. See id. at 4–5.

Much of that argument is answered by the Court’s factfindings. The Court has concluded

that the first part of the prearrest delay was motivated by a fear of alerting Finocchiarrio to the

investigation and prompting him to flee. Contrary to Rodriguez’s argument, that finding is “sup-

ported by . . . facts in evidence.” ECF No. 158 at 3. For one thing, Special Agent Herrera’s sworn

testimony—both live and written—is evidence, and the Court finds him credible. But more im-

portantly, Special Agent Herrera supported that testimony with evidence of contemporaneous con-

versations discussing his motivations for not immediately pursuing Rodriguez’s arrest. For exam-

ple, he told a colleague in December 2019 that he would pursue arrests “once the final target is

indicted.” ECF No. 148-5 at 3. And the day he confirmed Finocchiarrio had been arrested, he

announced that he would “start to coordinate” Rodriguez’s arrest. ECF No. 148-17 at 2. That

evidence, among other similar conversations, buttresses Special Agent Herrera’s testimony, which

in turn confirms what the government has always told the Court: It “prudentially refrained from

initiating extradition proceedings” against Rodriguez and Almonte until the risk that its main in-

vestigatory target would flee had dissipated. ECF No. 66 at 10. 2

2
Special Agent Herrera also testified that at some point, he believed he had enough evi-
dence to seek Finocchiarrio’s indictment, but that he held off to develop more evidence. Defend-
ants do not argue that he should have pursued an indictment and that impermissible delay resulted
from any such failure. To the contrary, they argue that “there was never sufficient evidence con-
necting [Finocchiarrio] to [a] drug conspiracy [with Rodriguez and Almonte].” See ECF No. 153
at 3 (Almonte’s argument); ECF No. 164 at 1 (Rodriguez’s motion to join that argument). As the
Court explains further below, that argument lacks merit. But in any event, there are many legiti-
mate reasons for the government to wait to indict a suspect until it has gathered evidence that it
believes is sufficient to convict, even if it has enough evidence to obtain an indictment. And the
government still has not indicted Finocchiarrio, so there is no basis to conclude that it delayed
pursuing an indictment against him for strategic reasons.

12
 The explanation is also reasonable, as the Court already held in rejecting Almonte’s similar

motion. The desire to protect the integrity of its investigation—into the investigation’s main target,

no less—is a “valid reason” for some delay, Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, because it furthers the legit-

imate law-enforcement objective of bringing more offenders to justice. As the Second Circuit

once put it, “the need to capture [co-conspirators] is as justifiable a basis for delay as the need to

capture [the defendant] himself.” United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980).

Moreover, to rely on this explanation, the government need not, as Almonte has demanded,

“prove that had [the other defendants] been arrested prior to June 2020, Mr. Finocchiarrio would

have destroyed evidence and fled.” ECF No. 135 at 4. Because the inquiry is ultimately about the

government’s diligence, not the accuracy of its predictive judgment, it is enough to “present[ ]

substantial evidence” that supports the reasonableness of the government’s fears. Cf. Fernandes,

618 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (requiring only substantial evidence to explain why the government did not

pursue extradition) (quotation omitted). Besides the inherent, common-sense reasonableness of

fearing that a suspected criminal facing substantial prison time might flee rather than face prose-

cution, Special Agent Herrera testified credibly that Finocchiarrio had ties to other countries, in-

cluding Italy, and could leave the Dominican Republic at will. 3 See Rough Hrg. Tr. at 123. The

government has also proffered (and supported that proffer with evidence in sealed, ex parte filings)

that cooperating witnesses have identified Rodriguez and Almonte “as associates and members of

3
Cf. United States v. Nguyen, 313 F. Supp. 2d 579, 590 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“[I]t is reasonable
for the government to conclude that arraigning [a co-conspirator] prior to the arrest of the indicted
co-conspirators would create a risk that others would flee.”); United States v. Timoteo, 353 F.
App’x 968, 972 (5th Cir. 2009) (“It was reasonable for the agents to believe that this man, alarmed
when [a co-conspirator] did not return, would . . . attempt to destroy evidence[ ] or attempt to flee
the scene.”); United States v. Rico, No. 18-CR-661 (PGG), 2019 WL 4014826, at *19 n.17
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2019) (“[I]t would have been reasonable to infer that [a suspect] might . . . at-
tempt to destroy the evidence, flee, or alert co-conspirators . . . to the presence of law enforce-
ment.”).

13
the drug trafficking organization led by . . . Finocchiarrio.” ECF No. 154 at 2.

All that is substantial evidence that the government’s fears were reasonable. As a result,

the time between Rodriguez’s indictment and Finocchiarrio’s arrest is not attributable to the gov-

ernment’s bad faith or negligence.

As for the remaining 18 months of delay, Rodriguez mischaracterizes the evidence of the

government’s efforts to pursue him and his codefendant. The government did far more than send

“4 short . . . exchanges by email.” ECF No. 158 at 5. Most saliently, between June and September

2020, the government prepared a request to extradite Almonte. See ECF No. 148-6 at 3. During

that period, it also notified officials at the U.S. Embassy in the Dominican Republic that it would

ask the Dominican Republic to expel Rodriguez under its immigration law. Id. Then, within a

few weeks of Almonte’s unexpected arrest, it got preliminary approval of Rodriguez’s removal

from the Dominican Republic. See ECF No. 148-6 at 3; ECF No. 148-8 at 3–8. Less than three

months later, it had tracked down the necessary documents and formally requested removal. ECF

No. 148-9 at 2–3. The next two months of delay were caused by the Dominican Republic’s pro-

cessing of that request. See ECF No. 148-13 at 6. Another month of delay arose from the need to

locate Rodriguez and confirm his identity. See ECF No. 148-14 at 2–3. After that, the government

arranged the removal operation internally and with a foreign government and carried it out within

about 18 weeks. See ECF No. 148-15 at 3–5; ECF No. 148-16 at 2; ECF No. 148-4 ¶ 29.

The Court has little difficulty characterizing that sequence of events as reasonable dili-

gence. That is not to say it was perfect. For instance, Special Agent Herrera might have learned

much earlier that the Italian government was investigating Finocchiarrio by checking for an active

Red Notice. And the government has not explained why it waited nearly six weeks after learning

that the Dominican Republic had located Rodriguez to request funding for the removal operation.

14
See ECF No. 148-14 at 2–3; ECF No. 148-15 at 3–5. Those hiccups, however, do not rise to the

level of negligence. The Red Notice could have told Special Agent Herrera only that the Italian

government wished to arrest Finocchiarrio, not that his deportation was imminent, so that infor-

mation was not indispensable. And a six-week lull in otherwise essentially continuous efforts to

arrest Almonte and Rodriguez does not even approach the circumstances other courts have found

negligent—such as a “fifteen-month gap during which the government took no steps whatever.”

Fernandes, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 70.

Fernandes provides a useful contrast on this point. There, the government did not seek

extradition and had only one internal conversation about the possibility of extraditing the defend-

ant. Fernandes 618 F. Supp. 2d at 69. As the court there put it, the government took only “two

affirmative steps” over 23 months to apprehend the defendant—entering the defendant’s name into

a database and attempting to lure the defendant via an e-mail ploy. Id. at 70. Here, after Finoc-

chiarrio’s arrest, the government sought extradition of Almonte and, after that request became

unnecessary, promptly shifted its attention to having Rodriguez removed from the country, persis-

tently pursued that objective—and succeeded. That last point especially distinguishes this case

from Fernandes, where the defendant “ultimately returned of his own volition.” Id. at 71.

Nor is it significant that the government pursued extradition of Almonte before removal of

Rodriguez. Rodriguez contends that, if the government were truly concerned about reducing the

risk that a target would flee or destroy evidence, it would “coordinat[e] the arrests of both Almonte

and Rodriguez to occur at or around the same time.” ECF No. 158 at 4. Indeed, that appears to

be exactly what the government originally intended. It does not follow, though, that “the best way

to accomplish this is to get the extradition packages moving through the system simultaneously.”

Id. Because extradition often takes substantially longer than removal and requires a laborious

15
bureaucratic process, see generally ECF No. 148-3 ¶¶ 7–14, requesting Rodriguez’s extradition

would have risked even further delay. The government, after all, need not formally request extra-

dition to be diligent. It can also “present[ ] substantial evidence that extradition would be futile”

or “attempt[ ] extradition informally.” See Fernandes, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 69. Here, it presented

substantial evidence that extradition was an inferior option and that it attempted a superior alter-

native—and, it bears repeating, succeeded.

Thus, the roughly 30-month delay resulted from a combination of a legitimate prosecutorial

decision, supported by “a good-faith belief” and “substantial evidence,” and the inherent difficul-

ties of navigating a “complex mix of international and foreign legal rules.” See Demirtas, 204 F.

Supp. 3d at 191. And the delay was not attributable to the government’s negligence or its desire

for a tactical advantage. So the second factor favors the government. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.

3. Assertion of the Right

The third factor is the extent to which Rodriguez asserted his speedy-trial right. See Barker,

407 U.S. at 531. “[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he

was denied a speedy trial.” Id. But of course, a defendant cannot be faulted for failing to demand

a speedy trial before he knew about the charge against him. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653–54. Still,

even in prearrest-delay cases, what a defendant does after arrest is relevant to this factor. See

Tchibassa, 452 F.3d at 926 (noting that the defendant did not move to dismiss until “nine months

after his arrest”). That is so because a defendant’s behavior reflects both “the reason for the delay”

and how much prejudice he suffers from it. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531–32.

Rodriguez rightly points out that he did not waive his speedy-trial right before his arrest.

See ECF No. 121 at 11. His indictment was sealed until well after his arrest, and no record evi-

dence suggests he knew about the charges. See ECF No. 11; Min. Order of Dec. 19, 2022. He

also asserts—and the government does not dispute—that he was living “openly and in his own

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name” in the Dominican Republic. ECF No. 121 at 11.

But Rodriguez ignores his post-arrest conduct. In his first appearance before this Court,

he requested a continuance of between 60 and 75 days to review discovery. He requested another

60 days at his next appearance. The next five months proceeded similarly, although one week of

delay was attributable to the Court’s calendar. See Min. Order of Aug. 30, 2022; Min. Entry of

Sep. 8, 2022. In November 2022, Rodriguez joined a motion to continue the case another 60 days,

citing the parties’ then-ongoing plea negotiations. ECF No. 113 at 1–2. It was not until December

21, 2022—more than 11 months after his arrest—that Rodriguez first hinted at his desire for a

speedy trial. See ECF No. 116 at 1 (“[I]t appears this matter is in a trial posture . . . .”). Two days

later, Rodriguez announced he would move to dismiss on that basis, and the Court set a briefing

schedule. See Min. Entry of Dec. 23, 2022; Min. Order of Dec. 27, 2023.

That belated assertion of his right to a speedy trial weighs against dismissing the indict-

ment. The D.C. Circuit has concluded that this factor “cut[ ] decidedly against” a defendant who

“did not raise any [statutory speedy-trial] challenge until nearly a year after his arraignment,

and . . . never alleged a Sixth Amendment violation.” United States v. Rice, 746 F.3d 1074, 1082

(D.C. Cir. 2014). And in a case much like Rice, it noted that the defendant had “joined in or

requested many of the continuances, and he waited fourteen months after his arraignment before

filing a motion to dismiss” on statutory grounds. See United States v. Taplet, 776 F.3d 875, 881

(D.C. Cir. 2015). The Circuit applied the same reasoning in a recent constitutional speedy-trial

case, United States v. Bikundi, noting that the defendant there had failed to “assert her speedy trial

rights early or often.” 926 F.3d 761, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Rodriguez’s assertion was not so feeble as in those cases, however. Unlike the defendants

in Rice and Taplet, he did ultimately move for dismissal on constitutional grounds before this

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Court, and so he has not forfeited his claim as those defendants did. And his assertion came ma-

terially faster than the defendant’s in Bikundi. Even so, taking all that into account, the third factor

weighs slightly in the government’s favor.

4. Prejudice

The final factor is “prejudice to the defendant.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Three types of

prejudice are relevant: (1) oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) anxiety and concern of the accused;

and (3) the possibility that the accused’s defense will be impaired because of “dimming memories

and loss of exculpatory evidence.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654. Of those, Rodriguez makes only a

general reference to “faded memories.” See ECF No. 121 at 10–11. But he also suggests that the

presumptive prejudice associated with a delay over a year is enough to tilt this factor in his favor.

See id. at 11.

On the latter point, Rodriguez is mistaken. Because the Court has already concluded that

the government pursued his arrest “with reasonable diligence,” he must “show specific prejudice

to his defense.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656. “[G]eneral” references to “the passage of time” will

not do—the movant needs an “articulable” connection to specific witnesses’ memory, evidence he

cannot locate, or specific events he cannot recall. See Tchibassa, 452 F.3d at 927 & n.10.

Rodriguez does not approach a showing of specific prejudice. In his motion, he says, in

full: “The faded memories due to the delay seriously hinder the Defendant’s ability to defend

himself against the charges alleged in the indictment particularly when the alleged conspiracy be-

gan in in approximately 2014.” ECF No. 121 at 10–11. In his reply, he rests solely on presumptive

prejudice without mentioning any specifics. See ECF No. 130 at 4 (“[N]o showing of prejudice is

required . . . .”); id. at 7–8. So too in his post-evidentiary-hearing supplementary brief. See ECF

No. 158 at 7 n.4 (mentioning this factor only to say that “prejudice of the delay is presumed”).

At most, Rodriguez has gestured at faded memories and mentioned “the mere passage of

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time.” Tchibassa, 452 F.3d at 927. In light of the Court’s conclusion on the second Barker factor,

the reason for the delay, that showing falls far short of what is required. Thus, the fourth factor

favors the government.

* * *

On balance, the Barker factors come out strongly against finding a Sixth Amendment vio-

lation. The most important ingredient in that conclusion is the second factor, the government’s

reasonable diligence in pursuing Rodriguez. Also significant is Rodriguez’s failure to articulate

any specific prejudice arising from the delay. The length of the delay slightly favors Rodriguez,

and Rodriguez’s belated assertion of his speedy-trial right slightly favors the government, but those

factors played little role in the Court’s analysis. Because the government acted rationally, sup-

ported its decisions with substantial evidence, and maintained steady progress towards—and suc-

ceeded in—bringing Rodriguez to the United States to face the charges against him, it did not

violate his right to a speedy trial. So the Court will deny his motion to dismiss the indictment on

that basis.

C. Almonte Has Not Shown Prosecutorial Misconduct

Almonte’s pending motion to dismiss, ECF No. 135, seeks to revisit his prior motion to

dismiss on constitutional speedy-trial grounds, ECF No. 60. In opposing his first motion, the gov-

ernment proffered that it did not attempt to extradite Almonte earlier for fear of inducing Finoc-

chiarrio “to destroy evidence, flee prosecution, or otherwise impede the investigation.” ECF

No. 61-1 at 9. Almonte now says that explanation “was likely false,” ECF No. 135 at 1, or “fab-

ricated,” id. at 6. And he argues that the Court should dismiss the indictment under its supervisory

authority to discipline “egregious actions by the government prosecutors,” as opposed to pushing

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for a reassessment of the Barker factors in his case. Id. at 5. 4

The Court can readily dispense with Almonte’s motion. First, it is dubious that dismissal

would be an appropriate remedy on prosecutorial-misconduct grounds even if Almonte had shown

such misconduct. In support of his motion, he cites United States v. Darui, 614 F. Supp. 2d 25

(D.D.C. 2009). ECF No. 135 at 5. In Darui, the court mentioned that dismissal could hypotheti-

cally be appropriate in extreme circumstances, but it also noted that even perjury by a government

witness of which the prosecution was aware had previously been held to justify only a new trial,

not dismissal. See id. at 36–38 (citing United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991)).

After all, the power to dismiss an indictment under supervisory authority is “frequently discussed

but rarely invoked.” United States v. Samago, 607 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1979). It requires at

least that a “specific constitutional right of the defendant has been violated.” See United States v.

Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1983). And if Almonte means to rely on due process, the

D.C. Circuit has recently reaffirmed a daunting legal standard for dismissal—“that the govern-

ment . . . committed coercion, violence, or brutality to the person.” See United States v. McKeever,

824 F.3d 1113, 1127–28 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). So even on his own terms, to the

extent Almonte’s request is grounded on alleged prosecutorial misconduct, no caselaw supports it.

Second, and more importantly, Almonte has not shown prosecutorial misconduct, or any-

thing that would cause the Court to reassess the Barker factors in his favor. The crux of his motion

is that, in delaying his extradition, the government was not truly motivated by fears about what

Finocchiarrio would do. See ECF No. 135 at 4. But the Court has already found otherwise, based

4
Rodriguez moves to “join and adopt” the arguments in Almonte’s motion, along with
Almonte’s relevant arguments in other filings. See ECF No. 164. The Court will grant that motion
and consider these arguments as having been advanced by both defendants.

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on Special Agent Herrera’s sworn testimony, written and live, and other contemporaneous evi-

dence of his motivation. Almonte also argues that the government cannot “prove” that he con-

spired with Finocchiarrio or that Finocchiarrio would have fled the Dominican Republic if Al-

monte had been arrested first. ECF No. 135 at 4. But the government need not prove all that at

this stage. See id. It is enough for the government to show that it had a genuine, reasonable belief

in those things based on substantial evidence, which it has done.

The evidence now in the record and the Court’s factfindings based on it confirm what the

government has said all along: that it “prudentially refrained from initiating extradition” until Fi-

nocchiarrio was arrested, after which point it “proceeded diligently in seeking [Almonte’s] extra-

dition.” ECF No. 61-1 at 10. Thus, there is no basis for finding prosecutorial misconduct, much

less dismissing the indictment, for that or any other reason.

IV. Conclusion and Order

For all the above reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the government’s Sealed Motion for Leave to File under Seal, ECF

No. 148, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ECF Nos. 148-3 and 148-4 shall remain provi-

sionally under seal until further order of the Court. The Clerk of Court is directed to file on the

public docket Government’s Exhibits 1–13, ECF Nos. 148-5, 148-6, 148-7, 148-8, 148-9, 148-10,

148-11, 148-12, 148-13, 148-14, 148-15, 148-16, and 148-17. It is further

ORDERED that the government may file, by August 15, 2023, a motion renewing its re-

quest to file ECF Nos. 148-3 and 148-4 under seal. If the government does not renew its request

by that date, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to file those declarations on the public docket.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall propose, by August 15, 2023—jointly if possible, and

individually if necessary—specific redactions to this order that eliminate references to material the

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parties wish to remain sealed, enabling a version of this order to be filed on the public docket. It

is further

ORDERED that Defendant Rodriguez’s Motion to Join and Adopt Co-Defendant’s Mo-

tion to Dismiss Indictment for Government Misconduct, ECF No. 164, is GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED that Defendant Rodriguez’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Prearrest De-

lay, ECF No. 121, is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that Defendant Almonte’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Government

Misconduct, ECF No. 135, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
TIMOTHY J. KELLY
United States District Judge
Date: August 1, 2023

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