NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 13 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KINGSLEY MANAGEMENT CORP., a No. 22-55701
Utah corporation; et al.,
D.C. No.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 8:22-cv-00076-CJC-JDE
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF SANTA ANA, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 22, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and ZOUHARY,** District
Judge.
Mobile home management companies (collectively “Kingsley”) challenge
two City of Santa Ana ordinances that imposed rent control and eviction restrictions.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
The district court stayed Kingsley’s claims based on Pullman abstention. See R.R.
Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). While this appeal was
pending, the City passed a new ordinance that amends and supersedes the challenged
ordinances. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We dismiss as moot in
part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
1. Five of Kingsley’s six causes of action sought only declaratory and
injunctive relief. Because the new ordinance amends and supersedes the prior
ordinances, “it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief” on Kingsley’s
causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief as to the old ordinances.
Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1660 (2019)
(quotation omitted). We therefore dismiss as moot Kingsley’s claims that the former
ordinances are preempted by state and federal law, are unconstitutionally vague, and
violate substantive due process rights.
On remand, Kingsley may amend its complaint to assert challenges to the new
ordinance. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140
S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020) (noting that “where the mootness is attributable to a change
in the legal framework . . . and where the plaintiff may have some residual claim
under the new framework . . . our practice is to vacate the judgment and remand for
further proceedings in which the parties may, if necessary, amend their pleadings or
develop the record more fully” (quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,
2
482 (1990))). The procedure on remand, for amending the complaint in this case
and the companion case (Case No. 8:23-cv-00102-CJC-JDE (C.D. Cal.)), we leave
to the district court’s discretion.
2. This appeal is not entirely moot, however. Kingsley’s final cause of
action asserted that the former ordinances effected an uncompensated taking, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. On this claim, Kingsley sought damages in
addition to declaratory and injunctive relief. Kingsley may no longer seek
declaratory and injunctive relief against the superseded ordinances but may still seek
damages. See Mission Prod. Holdings, 139 S. Ct. at 1660 (explaining that “nothing
so shows a continuing stake in a dispute’s outcome as a demand for dollars and
cents,” and that “[i]f there is any chance of money changing hands, [the plaintiff’s]
suit remains live”). We thus must determine whether the district court properly
stayed this claim based on Pullman abstention. Although our decision here concerns
Kingsley’s takings claim, our reasoning applies to the district court’s Pullman
analysis in toto, both in this case and in the second lawsuit referenced above, which
the district court also stayed under Pullman.
3. “We review a district court’s Pullman abstention under a modified
abuse of discretion standard.” Gearing v. City of Half Moon Bay, 54 F.4th 1144,
1147 (9th Cir. 2022). “We first review de novo whether the requirements for
Pullman abstention are satisfied.” Id. (quoting Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet,
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750 F.3d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 2014)). “If they are not, the district court has little or no
discretion to abstain; if they are, we review the decision to abstain for an abuse of
discretion.” Id. (quoting Courthouse News Serv., 750 F.3d at 782) (internal
quotations omitted). We conclude that the district court’s Pullman analysis was
mistaken.
Pullman abstention is “an equitable doctrine that allows federal courts to
refrain from deciding sensitive federal constitutional questions when state law issues
may moot or narrow the constitutional questions.” Id. (quoting San Remo Hotel v.
City & County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 1998)). But
abstention under Pullman remains “an extraordinary and narrow exception to the
duty of a district court to adjudicate a controversy.” Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d
1045, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation and brackets omitted). Pullman abstention is
appropriate only when “(1) the complaint [] involve[s] a sensitive area of social
policy that is best left to the states to address; (2) a definitive ruling on the state
issues by a state court could obviate the need for federal constitutional adjudication
by the federal court; and (3) the proper resolution of the potentially determinative
state law issue is uncertain.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928,
939–40 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting Cedar
Shake & Shingle Bureau v. City of Los Angeles, 997 F.2d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 1993)).
At minimum, the second Pullman factor is not met here. The only state-law
4
question the district court identified was whether the rent control ordinance
implemented “vacancy control” (i.e., whether the restrictions on annual rent increase
apply across tenants, or whether a landlord may “step up” the rent to the market rate
upon a change in tenants). But the outcome of that question would not meaningfully
narrow Kingsley’s claims. It does not bear on the separate eviction ordinance, and
even as to the takings claim, it is but one issue within a broader legal challenge.
4. We deny Kingsley’s motion to certify a question to the California
Supreme Court regarding vacancy control. “We invoke the certification process
only after careful consideration and do not do so lightly.” Cassirer v. Thyssen-
Bornemisza Collection Found., 69 F.4th 554, 557 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Kremen v.
Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003)). Kingsley has not demonstrated that
certification is warranted here.
DISMISSED AS MOOT IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;
REMANDED.1
1
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
5