Tarquinii v. Harker

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JAWAN N. TARQUINII, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 21-1567 (RC)
:
v. : Re Document Nos.: 38, 40, 42, 43, 44,
: 47
CARLOS DEL TORO, in his official capacity :
as U.S. Secretary of the Navy :
:
Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL; DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendant 1 violated Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by terminating her employment at Marine Corps

Community Services in Iwakuni, Japan in 2015. See Compl. at 1–2, ECF No. 1. Specifically,

Plaintiff alleges that her termination amounts to unlawful discrimination based on her race, sex,

religion, and disability status and retaliation for her protected equal employment opportunity

(“EEO”) activity. See id. Discovery in this matter closed on March 31, 2022, after which, at the

Court’s direction, the parties continued to confer to attempt to resolve outstanding issues. See

Scheduling Order, ECF No. 16; Min. Order, Apr. 7, 2022. On September 19, 2022, the Court

ordered Plaintiff to file a motion to compel on all remaining discovery disputes. See Min. Order,

Sept. 19, 2022. On March 9, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion

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Carlos Del Toro was automatically substituted as Defendant upon assumption of the
position of U.S. Secretary of the Navy pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
to compel. See Tarquinii v. Del Toro, No. 21-cv-1567, 2023 WL 2424618, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 9,

2023).

Plaintiff filed a motion to sanction Defendant on April 12, 2023, for not complying with

the Court’s order. Pl.’s Mot. Sanctions, ECF No. 38. On April 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed another

motion for discovery, again claiming that Defendant did not fully comply with the Court’s order.

Pl.’s Mot. & Report Def.’s Deficient Resp. to Order (“Pl.’s 1st Mot.”), ECF No. 40. Plaintiff

filed a second motion for discovery on May 25, 2023. Pl.’s Mot. & 2d Report Def.’s Deficient

Resp. to Order (“Pl.’s 2d Mot.”), ECF No. 42. On June 6, 2023, Defendant filed a combined

motion to strike Plaintiff’s May 25 motion and stay Defendant’s obligation to respond, or in the

alternative, a motion to seal Plaintiff’s May 25 motion. Def.’s Mot. Strike (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF

No. 43. Plaintiff filed a third motion for discovery on July 17, 2023. Pl.’s Mot. & 3d Report

Def.’s Deficient Resp. to Order (“Pl.’s 3d Mot.”), ECF No. 44. On July 28, 2023, Defendant

filed a motion for a status conference. Def.’s Mot. Status Conference, ECF No. 47.

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, ECF No. 38, is denied,

Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel, ECF Nos. 40, 42, & 44 are granted in part and denied in part,

Defendant’s Motion to Strike, ECF No. 43, is denied, and Defendant’s Motion for a Status

Conference, ECF No. 47, is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff worked in human resources capacities, all Non-Appropriated Fund (“NAF”)

positions, for Marine Corps Community Services (“MCCS”) in Iwakuni, Japan, from July 2013

to November 2015. See Compl. ¶¶ 15–16; Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Compel (“Def.’s Opp’n”)

at 1, ECF No. 32. In September 2014 she worked to facilitate a job fair for MCCS. Compl.

¶ 30(p); Answer ¶ 30(p), ECF No. 14. Plaintiff’s spouse and brother interviewed for jobs and

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ultimately were hired. See Compl. ¶ 30; Answer ¶ 30. In November 2015, Plaintiff was

terminated for “engaging in a pattern of misconduct that violated the rules of [sic] prohibiting

nepotism and actual or apparent conflicts of interest” through actions “in connection with the

employment of [her] husband and brother by MCCS.” Compl. ¶ 31(a).

Plaintiff filed this suit on February 26, 2021 alleging violations of Title VII of the 1964

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.

§ 701, et seq. See Compl. at 1. She alleges that she was subjected to discrimination based on her

race (African American), sex (female), disability (hypertension), and religion (Catholic),

predominantly by her first-level supervisor, Robert Johnston, and her second-level supervisor,

John Iwaniec. See id. ¶¶ 27–29. She also claims that she engaged in several protected “EEO

activities,” such as reporting these instances of discrimination and objecting to similar treatment

of others. See id. at 3–10. Accordingly, Plaintiff claims that her termination was not motivated

by the alleged nepotism in facilitating the hiring of her husband and brother, but rather reflects

discrimination based on her protected characteristics and retaliation for protected EEO activities.

See id. at 10–11.

On March 9, 2023, the Court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting in part

and denying in part Plaintiff’s motion to compel. See Tarquinii, 2023 WL 2424618, at *1.

Plaintiff filed a motion to sanction Defendant on April 12 for not complying with the Court’s

order after she had not received Defendant’s compelled discovery response. See Pl.’s Mot.

Sanctions. On April 14, Defendant provided part of the supplemental discovery responses to

Plaintiff. Def.’s Suppl. Resp., Pl.’s 1st Mot., Ex. 1 at 4, ECF No. 40-2; see also Def.’s Opp’n to

Pl.’s Mot. Compel (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 41. On April 26, Plaintiff filed another motion for

discovery, claiming that Defendant produced deficient responses to production requests Nos. 5,

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12, 13, 16-24, 26, 27, and admission requests Nos. 25 and 38. See Pl.’s 1st Mot. Defendant

provided the next part of the supplemental discovery responses on May 10. See Def.’s Reply at

3. Plaintiff filed a second motion for discovery on May 25, reiterating that Defendant produced

deficient responses to production requests Nos. 5, 12, 16-24, 26, 27, and admission request No.

25, but did not include the claims about production request No. 13 and admission request No. 38

from the April 26 motion. See Pl.’s 2d Mot. Defendant provided the third supplemental

discovery response on May 31. See Def.’s Mot. at 3. On June 6, Defendant filed a combined

motion to strike Plaintiff’s May 25 motion and stay Defendant’s obligation to respond, claiming

that Plaintiff should be sanctioned for acting in bad faith. See id. at 4-6. Defendant also

motioned in the alternative to seal Plaintiff’s May 25 motion because she published confidential

information on the public docket. See id. at 7-11. Considering the arguments made by

Defendant in the motion to strike and the earlier granted protective order, the Court placed

Plaintiff’s May 25 motion for discovery under seal. See Min. Order, July 7, 2023; Def.’s Mot. at

7-11; Protective Order, ECF No. 21. On July 17, Plaintiff filed a third motion for discovery,

repeating the claims from the May 25 motion. See Pl.’s 3d Mot. On July 28, 2023, Defendant

responded to the Plaintiff’s third motion and filed a motion for a post-discovery status

conference. See Def.’s 3d Reply, ECF No. 45. Plaintiff responded to that pleading on July 31,

2023. See Pl.’s Reply to Opp’n to 3d Mot., ECF No. 46.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion for Sanctions

Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to seek sanctions

when another party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(b)(2)(A). “A court has broad discretion to manage discovery, and ‘[t]his deference [] extends

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to the district court’s imposition of discovery sanctions.’” See Mokhtar v. Kerry, No. 12-cv-

1734, 2014 WL 12792553, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2014) (citing Flynn v. Dick Corp., 481 F.3d

824, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). The D.C. Circuit has held that “[t]he central requirement of Rule 37

is that ‘any sanction must be just.’” Bonds v. Dist. Of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801, 808 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (citing Ins. Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694, 707 (1982)).

When determining whether a sanction is just, a court may consider “the resulting prejudice to the

other party, any prejudice to the judicial system, and the need to deter similar misconduct in the

future.” Mokhtar, 2014 WL 12792553, at *2; see Shea v. Donohoe Constr. Co., 795 F.2d 1071,

1074 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).

B. Motion for Discovery

1. Requests for Production

“For each item or category” requested, a party “must either state that inspection and

related activities will be permitted as requested or . . . that it will produce copies of documents or

of electronically stored information instead of permitting inspection,” or else object. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B)–(C). The responding party must conduct a “reasonable” search for the

requested documents but may stop when the extent of the search constitutes an “undue burden”

that “would be disproportionate to the needs of [the] case.” Prasad v. George Washington Univ.,

323 F.R.D. 88, 90 (D.D.C. 2017). “To the extent that documents do not exist, they are not

discoverable.” Davis v. Yellen, No. 08-cv-447, 2021 WL 2566763, at *20 (D.D.C. June 22,

2021). However, the movant may present evidence “that the documents that have been produced

permit a reasonable deduction that other documents may exist or did exist and have been

destroyed.” Hubbard v. Potter, 247 F.R.D. 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2008).

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 2. Requests for Admission

A refusal to admit “must specifically deny [the requested admission] or state in detail

why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). “The

answering party may assert lack of knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or

deny only if the party states that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows

or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.” Id. While a party may not

“object solely on the ground that the request presents a genuine issue for trial,” id. at (a)(5), an

“‘outright denial’ of each of the [requests for admission] at issue . . . fulfill[s] its obligations,”

United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer, No. 04-cv-798, 2019 WL 1167743, at *5

(D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2019) (internal citations omitted).

C. Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides in part that “the court may strike from a

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “A court has broad discretion in considering a motion to strike

but granting such a motion is a drastic remedy. As a result, motions to strike are disfavored.”

Jackson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 19-cv-1487, 2020 WL 3791873, at *2 (D.D.C. July 7, 2020)

(internal citations omitted). When considering a motion to strike, a court must “draw all

reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor and resolve all doubts in favor of denying the motion

to strike.” Nwachukwu v. Karl, 216 F.R.D. 176, 178 (D.D.C. 2003). Motions to strike will be

granted “only if the portions sought to be stricken are prejudicial or scandalous.” Id. Therefore,

“motions to strike are typically granted when the allegations are ‘indefensible and wholly

inappropriate’ and undermine the dignity of the Court.” Jackson, 2020 WL 3791873, at *2

(citing Pigford v. Veneman, 215 F.R.D. 2, 4 (D.D.C. 2003)).

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 IV. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

Slightly over a month after the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion

to compel, Plaintiff filed a motion to sanction Defendant “for not complying with Judge’s

Order.” Pl.’s Mot. Sanctions at 1. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant was required to respond to

the discovery items, but that Plaintiff had not yet received a response as of April 12. Id. Since

then, Defendant has provided three separate supplemental discovery responses. Def.’s Reply at 3

(stating that Defendant sent discovery on April 14 and May 10); Def.’s Mot. at 3 (stating that

Defendant provided the third discovery response on May 31). On April 4, 2023, Plaintiff

emailed Defendant regarding the lack of discovery and claims that she never received a response.

Pl.’s Mot. Sanctions at 1. However, Defendant’s counsel shows they responded to this email

within an hour, stating that they “hope[d] to send [Plaintiff] a production by the end of this

week/early next week.” Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Sanctions (“Def.’s Sanction Reply”), Ex. 2 at

1, ECF No. 39-2. 2 Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant has now provided these discovery

responses and references them in the three motions to compel. See Pl.’s 1st Mot. at 1; Pl.’s 2d

Mot. at 1-2; Pl.’s 3d Mot. at 1-2.

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Defendant states that “[u]ndersigned counsel received no bounce-back indicating that
the message was not received by Plaintiff and has had no other problems communicating with
Plaintiff via the same email address.” Def.’s Sanction Reply at 2. Defendant argues Plaintiff
failed to follow Local Rule 7(m) by not responding or conferring with Defendant before filing
the motion for sanctions. Def.’s Sanction Reply at 3-4. Local Rule 7(m) requires parties to
confer in “good faith” to “determine whether there is any opposition to the relief sought” and
“narrow the areas of disagreement.” LCvR 7(m); see Raynor v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 14-cv-
0750, 2020 WL 13603998, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2020). Defendant also claims that Plaintiff
failed to follow Local Rule 7(m) before filing Plaintiff’s first and second motion to compel.
Def.’s Mot. at 5. Plaintiff has been previously reminded by the Court to comply with this rule
and confer with counsel for Defendant before seeking non-dispositive relief. See Scheduling.
Order. The Court admonishes Plaintiff for failing to follow this rule and will expect compliance
in the future.

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 Because Defendant has now produced the compelled discovery responses, Plaintiff’s

original argument for sanctions is moot. See G & E Real Est., Inc. v. Avison Young-Wash., D.C.,

LLC, 323 F.R.D. 67, 69 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[A]s a technical matter, [moving party] may not obtain

the sanction they seek pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) because the application of that rule is triggered

only by the violation of a discovery order.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (applying sanctions

when a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery”). Defendant accurately

points out that there was no discovery deadline in the Court’s order that would have required a

response be sent to Plaintiff by a specific date. Def.’s Sanction Reply at 6; see generally

Tarquinii, 2023 WL 2424618. Therefore, it would not be “just” to sanction Defendant under

Rule 37(b)(2), as there has been no violation of a discovery deadline or order that caused

prejudice to the other party, prejudice to the judicial system, or caused a need to deter future

misconduct. See Bonds, 93 F.3d at 808; Mokhtar, 2014 WL 12792553, at *2; Shea,795 F.2d at

1077.

Plaintiff moved for sanctions again in her May 25 motion, repeating that Defendant failed

“to fully comply with the discovery Order issued on March 9.” Pl.’s 2d Mot. at 4. Plaintiff

based this motion “on the foregoing,” referencing her claims that Defendant produced deficient

supplemental discovery responses but provides no other explanation or analysis. See id.

Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant’s discovery response has caused prejudice to herself, to

the Court, or that there is a need to deter similar future misconduct. See Shea, 795 F.2d at 1077.

Plaintiff also fails to reiterate the call for sanctions in her July 17 motion. See Pl.’s 3d Mot.

Again, it would not be “just” to sanction Defendant under Rule 37(b)(2). See Bonds, 93 F.3d at

808; Mokhtar, 2014 WL 12792553, at *2. Therefore, the motions for sanctions are denied.

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 B. Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Discovery

1. Production Request No. 5

The Court partially granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel production request No. 5 and

instructed Defendant “to search for and produce responsive records concerning [] 30 individuals

that hit on any variation of the following search terms: discriminate, harass, misconduct,

uncomfortable, mistreat, retaliate, EEO, hostile, discipline, performance, terminate, caution,

violate.” Tarquinii, 2023 WL 2424618, at *4. In her April 26 motion, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant’s April 14 discovery response did “not even mention Production Request 5.” Pl.’s 1st

Mot. at 1-2. Defendant stated in the opposition brief to Plaintiff’s sanction motion and in

Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s April 26 motion that Defendant was “working to provide

supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s Production Request No. 5, but that [the] supplemental

response [was] taking time.” Def.’s Reply at 5; Def.’s Sanction Reply at 6. Defendant provided

a supplemental response for production request No. 5 on May 10. See Def.’s Reply. at 3; Def.’s

2d Suppl. Resp., Def.’s Reply, Ex. 1 at 2; Pl.’s 2d Mot. at 2.

Plaintiff claims in the May 25 motion that Defendant’s response was deficient,

contending that Defendant failed to provide copies of email attachments that were referenced in

the provided emails. Pl.’s 2d Mot. at 2-3. In the July 17 motion, Plaintiff repeats this claim.

Pl.’s 3d Mot. at 2-3. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s claim is untrue, and that Plaintiff “omits

those purportedly missing attachments from her improper disclosure of other personnel records

on the public docket.” Def.’s Mot. at 4. Defendant references two instances in which Plaintiff

uploaded an email with a bates stamp but did not include the attachment that was referenced. Id;

Pl.’s 2d Mot. at 5, ECF No. 42-2. (referencing an attachment in the header of the email bates

stamped DON002102, which was produced under bates stamp DON002103 and is not attached

9
to Plaintiff’s May 25 Motion); see also id. at 9 (referencing an attachment in the header of an

email bates stamped DON002181, which was produced under bates stamps DON002183-2186

and is not attached to Plaintiff’s May 25 Motion). Defendant also provides a list “as to where

Plaintiff can find the purportedly missing attachments.” Def.’s 3d Reply at 8-9.

Both parties provide conflicting accounts of what discovery has been provided without

enough support for the Court to identify what is accurate. 3 Defendant does not provide the

allegedly missing documents under seal to support the claim that Plaintiff has received the

referenced email attachments. See generally Def.’s Mot. Conversely, Plaintiff does not address

Defendant’s claim that she is purposefully omitting pages and potentially misleading the Court.

See Pl.’s 3d Mot. at 2-3. Plaintiff has not submitted enough evidence for the Court to evaluate

whether Defendant’s responses were deficient and, thus, fails to meet her burden. Therefore, the

Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel production request No. 5.

2. Production Request No. 13

The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel production request No. 13, which sought

a “copy of the Family Care Investigation report Plaintiff submitted in connection with the hostile

work environment allegations raised against Tim Cook, Senior Manager, Child Development

Center in 2015.” Tarquinii, 2023 WL 2424618, at *6 (citing Pl.’s Disc. Req. at 3, ECF No. 31-

2). In Plaintiff’s April 26 motion, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant produced a copy of the Family

3
Defendant points to evidence that indicates that Plaintiff’s representations about what
documents have been provided to her are misleading. To the extent that Defendant’s claims are
truthful, the Court admonishes Plaintiff for attempting to deceive the Court. Rule 11(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for sanctions to be imposed on parties that present claims
that lack evidentiary support. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). “[T]he Court certainly has the authority to
impose Rule 11 sanctions against a pro se plaintiff.” Hamrick v. Gottlieb, 416 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 n.
3 (D.D.C. May 2, 2005). The Court is not imposing sanctions in this instance but urges the
parties to avoid potentially purposeful inaccuracies in the future.

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Care Investigation report, but “failed to produce the accompanying exhibits referenced therein.”

Pl.’s 1st Mot. at 2. Defendant claims that the supplemental response produced to Plaintiff on

May 10 included the exhibits to the Family Care Investigation, making the request to compel the

discovery moot. Def.’s Reply at 6. Defendant “provides this second supplemental response and

refers Plaintiff to the accompanying production bates stamped DON001486-2065, containing the

underlying exhibits related to the Family Care Investigation.” See Def.’s Reply, Ex. 1 at 2-3,

ECF No. 41-1. Plaintiff does not reiterate the motion to compel production request No. 13 in

Plaintiff’s May 25 or July 17 motions, indicating to the Court that Defendant produced the

requested documents. See Pl.’s 2d Mot. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to

compel as to the request for production No. 13.

3. Certification for Production Request Nos. 12, 16-24, 26-27

The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel production request Nos. 12, 16-24, 26,

and 27. Tarquinii, 2023 WL 2424618, at *5, 6-7. For request No. 12, Defendant’s counsel states

they “undertook a reasonable search for records responsive to this request and found no results.”

See Pl.’s 2d Mot.at 3. For Nos. 16-24, 26 and 27, “Defendant undertook a reasonable search for

records responsive to these requests … and found no records responsive to four individuals,

Marty Carter, Vincent Endresen, Tony Taylor, and Sue Campbell.” Def.’s Suppl. Resp., Pl.’s

1st Mot., Ex. 1 at 4. Plaintiff claims that Defendant has “failed to certify the claim that he

‘undertook a reasonable search for records responsive to this request and found no results,’” and

that Defense counsel’s “statement cannot be accepted unless it is supported by declaration or

certification specifying the scape [sic] and matter of ‘reasonable search,’ signed by a qualified

individual who had performed such a search.” Pl.’s 1st Mot. at 2; Pl.’s 3d Mot. at 3-4. Despite

11
the use of quotation marks, Plaintiff does not refer to a source to support this requirement. See

Def.’s Reply at 7.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(1) requires that “every discovery . . . response . . .

be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s own name . . . and must state the

signer’s address, email address, and telephone number.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1). By signing,

the “attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief

formed after a reasonable inquiry” that the response is “complete and correct as of the time it is

made.” Id. Defendant’s supplemental responses meet this certification requirement as provided

by undersigned counsel’s signature and signature block added to the last page of the

supplemental responses. See Def.’s Reply, Ex. 1 at 4. Plaintiff provides no support for her

argument and does not point to any evidence to show that Defendant’s discovery searches were

unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court will not require Defendant to provide any further

certification for production requests Nos. 12, 16-24, 26, and 27.

4. Production Requests Nos. 16-24, 26-27

Regarding Production Requests No. 16-24, 26, and 27, Plaintiff also alleges that

“Defendant failed to identify for each relevant individual race, sex, religion, and if any had

known disability and had engaged in prior protected EEO activities.” Pl.’s 2d Mot. at 4; Pl.’s 3d

Mot. at 4. Defendant claims that this is the first time that Plaintiff has raised this “purported

deficiency” and that she should have raised it before the discovery period ended. Def.’s Reply at

9; Def.’s 3d Reply at 12. However, Plaintiff has presented this request multiple times, including

in her first request for production on January 11, 2022. Pl.’s Disc. Req., Pl.’s Original Mot., Ex.

A, ECF Nos. 31, 31-2. Defendant also claims that there is “nothing in the Court’s March

Discovery Order [that] compels Defendant to identify such comparator information.” Def.’s

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Reply at 9. When the motion to compel was granted, the Court not only looked to Plaintiff’s

motion, see Pl.’s Original Mot., but to Plaintiff’s original discovery request, which included the

request for Defendant to “[i]dentify for each race, sex, religion; and if any had known disability

and/or had engaged in prior EEO activity.” See Pl.’s Disc. Req. at 3-4. There is nothing in the

Court’s March Discovery Order that specifically excludes Defendant from having to identify

such comparator information. See generally Tarquinii, 2023 WL 2424618. Defendant also

argues that the correct method of inquiry to serve such requests is through written

interrogatories. Def.’s Reply at 10. Under the same timeliness logic that Defendant uses, this

should have been an argument that Defendant presented in his response to the original motion to

compel, as the request for this information had already been made known to Defendant. See

generally Def.’s Opp’n; Pl.’s Disc. Req. at 3-4.

The Court ultimately granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel production requests Nos. 16-

24, 26, and 27, as evidence for possible “similarly situated” comparators. Tarquinii, 2023 WL

2424618, at *6. Although she “may not succeed in proving that any of these individuals [are]

similarly situated… Plaintiff [] alleged sufficient information concerning nine out of the eleven

individuals to clear the low bar of relevance.” Id. Part of proving whether the other individuals

are similarly situated can include the relevant comparator information. See Waters v. U.S.

Capitol Police Bd., 216 F.R.D. 153, 158 (D.D.C. 2003) (“Evidence that the defendant treated

persons similarly situated differently may be relevant evidence of racial discrimination.

Information that may permit such a comparison is ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery’ of relevant evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) permits the discovery of both.”). It

seems that this information concerning possible comparators will be essential in resolving the

proposed motion for summary judgment that Defendant intends to file. Therefore, the Court

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grants Plaintiff’s motion and compels Defendant to, within the next 30 days, reasonably search

for and provide relevant information regarding the race, sex, religion, known disability, and

engagement in prior protected EEO activities for the previously compelled nine individuals

included in production requests Nos. 16-24, 26, and 27. This information may be produced in

the form of a chart prepared for this purpose.

5. Admission Request No. 25

The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel admission request No. 25, which sought

Defendant’s admission that “[a]t the job fair held in September 2015 the applicants submitted

their applications in electronic form.” Tarquinii, 2023 WL 2424618, at *7. In her April 26

motion, Plaintiff states that “Defendant failed to either admit or deny. A proper response must

be provided.” Pl.’s 1st Mot. at 2-3. In her May 25 and July 17 motions, Plaintiff repeats the

claim. Pl.’s 2d Mot. at 4. In the April 14 discovery response, Defendant states:

A reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in this Request has been made and the
information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable Defendant to
admit or deny this Request. Defendant avers that job applicants were able to
submit their application electronically or, if unable to do so, could submit
applications by hard copy.
Def.’s April Supp. Resp., Pl.’s 1st Mot., Ex. 1 at 3, ECF No. 40-2. Defendant claims that this

response is sufficient under Rule 36 because a party is allowed to explain why the request cannot

be admitted or denied. Def.’s Reply at 11.

The Court initially granted the motion to compel Defendant’s response to request No. 25

under the understanding that it would provide “limited support” to Plaintiff’s argument “that her

conduct at that job fair was otherwise identical to her conduct at the job fair the prior year after

which she faced discipline[].” Tarquinii, 2023 WL 2424618, at *7. Defendant does not refuse to

respond to the admission request, but provides an appropriate response and explains that

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applications could be submitted both electronically and by hard copy. See Def.’s April Supp.

Resp. at 3. The Court finds that Defendant’s response is sufficient under Rule 36 because

Defendant states in detail why it cannot be simply admitted or denied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel as to admission request No. 25 is denied.

6. Admission Request No. 38

The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel admission request No. 38. Tarquinii,

2023 WL 2424618, at *8. In the April 26 motion, Plaintiff claims that Defendant “failed to

respond at all” to No. 38. Pl.’s 1st Mot. at 3. Defendant shows that an amended response to No.

38 was provided to Plaintiff on May 10. Def.’s Suppl. Resp., Def.’s Reply, Ex. 1 at 3; Def.’s

Reply at 6. Plaintiff does not reiterate the motion to compel request No. 38 in Plaintiff’s May 25

or July 17 motions, again indicating to the Court that Defendant produced the requested

response. See Pl.’s 2d Mot. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to compel the request for admission

No. 38 is denied.

C. Defendant’s Motion to Strike

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s May 25 motion as a sanction for abusive litigation

practices. See Def.’s Mot. at 4-6. Defendant makes a series of arguments alleging that Plaintiff

has acted in bad faith and for oppressive reasons. Id. Defendant first points out that Plaintiff

violated this Court’s March 1, 2022, Protective Order by publishing sensitive third-party

personnel information on the public docket, which Plaintiff alleges was “inadvertent.” Id.; Pl.’s

3d Mot. at 1. 4 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has engaged in an abuse of motion practice by

4
After this violation was brought to the Court’s attention, Plaintiff’s 2d Motion was
placed under seal. Min. Order, July 7, 2023.

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continuing to file new motions that raise repetitive arguments. Def.’s Mot. at 6. 5 However,

Defendant fails to argue why the Court should take the “disfavored” and “drastic remedy” to

strike Plaintiff’s motion. See Jackson, 2020 WL 3791873, at *2. Defendant states that Plaintiff

acts “vexatiously and for oppressive reasons,” Def.’s Mot. at 6, but does not explain how

Plaintiff’s May 25 motion is prejudicial, scandalous, indefensible, or wholly inappropriate, see

id.; Nwachukwu, 216 F.R.D. at 178. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendant has failed

to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s motion should be stricken and will deny the Defendant's motion to

strike.

* * *

Defendant also asks that the Court “schedule a post discovery status conference, wherein

Defendant would respectfully request that the Court (1) affirm that all discovery in this matter is

closed, and (2) set a briefing schedule for summary judgment.” Def.’s 3d Reply at 13. As the

Court is granting in part Plaintiff’s motion to compel, discovery is not closed in this matter.

Moreover, the Court believes that a post discovery status conference is unnecessary.

Accordingly, Defendant shall file any motion for summary judgment 30 days after complying

with production of the above-ordered comparator-information (i.e., 60 days from the date of this

order).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 38) is DENIED,

Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel (ECF Nos. 40, 42, & 44) are GRANTED IN PART AND

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The Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s three motions to compel that state almost identical
claims are redundant and unnecessary. As addressed with Plaintiff’s failure to follow Rule 7(m),
the Court admonishes Plaintiff for filing repetitive motions and advises that Plaintiff avoid
similar actions in the future.

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DENIED IN PART, Defendant’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 43) is DENIED, and Defendant’s

Motion for a Status Conference (ECF No. 47) is DENIED. An order consistent with this

Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: September 14, 2023 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge

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