If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES DERRICK MAPSON, UNPUBLISHED
September 14, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 361240
Oakland Circuit Court
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, LC No. 2021-190970-NF
Defendant,
and
MICHIGAN CATASTROPHIC CLAIMS
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
TRAVIS BOUCHARD,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 362756
Oakland Circuit Court
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, LC No. 2022-192261-NF
Defendant,
and
MICHIGAN CATASTROPHIC CLAIMS
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and MURRAY and PATEL, JJ.
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PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 361240, defendant Michigan Catastrophic Claims Association (MCCA)
appeals by leave granted1 the trial court order denying its motion for summary disposition in favor
of plaintiff, James Derrick Mapson (Mapson). In Docket No. 362756, defendant MCCA appeals
by leave granted2 the trial court order denying its motion for summary disposition in favor of
plaintiff, Travis Bouchard (Bouchard). After a joint motion by the parties, this Court consolidated
the appeals “to advance the efficient administration of the appellate process.”3 We reverse the trial
courts’ orders denying MCCA’s motions for summary disposition and remand for entry of orders
granting summary disposition in favor of MCCA.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Docket No. 361240, Mapson filed a complaint against Farmers Insurance Exchange
(Farmers), seeking to enforce a June 21, 2005 judgment. Mapson also requested damages from
MCCA, alleging that it conspired and tortiously interfered with his contract with Farmers.
Specifically, Mapson asserted that he was injured in an automobile accident on March 3, 1996,
that rendered him a “C5 complete quadriplegic.” He had no upper or lower limb functions and
was completely dependent on others for daily living and safety, requiring 24-hour a day attendant
care. In the underlying judgment, $38.00 an hour, 24-hours a day, was deemed a reasonable rate
for family-provided attendant care. Despite the judgment, in June 2021, Farmers allegedly notified
Mapson of its intent to pay for the home-based services contrary to the previously agreed-upon
rate. Mapson raised two claims against Farmers, violation of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et
seq., and breach of contract.
With regard to MCCA, Mapson alleged that it interfered with the contract between Mapson
and Farmers. Specifically, he submitted that MCCA agreed to reimburse Farmers for amounts in
excess of $250,000, under MCL 500.3104(1). Mapson claimed that MCCA did not have the
authority: (1) to withhold payment for the ultimate loss to the insured, (2) to determine
reasonableness of the charges, and (3) to preapprove the insurer’s adjusting decisions. He asserted
that MCCA acted wrongfully and with malice to cause Farmers to breach its agreement. Mapson
also alleged that Farmers and MCCA conspired and acted in concert to deny the underlying
judgment, causing him damages.
MCCA moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) and (C)(8), asserting that
it was created by the Legislature to address the concern that the provision of unlimited personal
protection insurance (PIP) benefits for catastrophic injuries would be too costly and burden the
1
Mapson v Farmers Ins Exch, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 27,
2022 (Docket No. 361240).
2
Bouchard v Farmers Ins Exch, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 2,
2023 (Docket No. 362756).
3
Mapson v Farmers Ins Exchange, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 14,
2023 (Docket Nos. 361240; 362756).
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member insurers. Thus, MCCA reimbursed or indemnified member insurers for the PIP losses
that they incurred in excess of a catastrophic level. Accordingly, MCCA did not write insurance
policies, was not a party to insurance contracts, and served to guard against unreasonable
settlements of catastrophic claims. MCCA asserted that it was given the authority, by statute and
through its plan of operation, to preapprove an insurance claim, and an insurer’s failure to obtain
MCCA preapproval could result in a denial of all or a portion of a request for reimbursement.
Additionally, member insurers had to report catastrophic claims and advise of developments that
may impact MCCA’s interest. It was submitted that Mapson failed to state a claim because MCCA
was authorized to provide oversight by statute, MCL 500.3104, as well as through its plan of
operation.
MCCA further alleged that, to succeed on a claim for tortious interference, Mapson must
assert an intentional performance of a per se wrongful act that is unjustified in law and serves the
purpose of invading the contractual or business rights of another. However, Mapson did not
demonstrate that MCCA acted intentionally and improperly because MCCA acted within its
authority. Farmers was required to notify MCCA about Mapson’s claim and any development
likely to materially affect MCCA. And, Farmers was permitted to seek preapproval for a claim
and determine whether and how much should be paid for a claim. It then could seek reimbursement
from MCCA. Because MCCA acted within the authority it was granted, MCCA asserted that
Mapson failed to state a claim and it was entitled to summary disposition. And, because the
underlying claim of tortious interference of a contract failed, MCCA further contended that
Mapson’s claim of civil conspiracy could not be maintained.
Mapson opposed MCCA’s dispositive motion, alleging that MCCA’s position was
contrary to the holding in United States Fidelity Ins & Guaranty Co (USFIG) v Mich Catastrophic
Claims Ass’n (MCCA) (On Rehearing), 484 Mich 1; 795 NW2d 101 (2009). Specifically, Mapson
claimed that the USFIG Court limited MCCA’s authority “to adjusting the ‘practices and
procedures’ of the member insurers and d[id] not encompass adjustment to the payment amount
agreed to between claimants and member insurers.” Id. at 6. Mapson further asserted that MCCA
had no right to challenge the reasonableness of a claim. Rather, MCL 500.3157(7) did not allow
an insurance company to reduce insurance payments by 45% when there was no charge by a
provider for services. The value of services was controlled by a reasonableness standard. MCCA
was not entitled to force member insurers into improper adjustment practices or to use threats of
failure to reimburse the no-fault insurer to compel compliance with MCCA’s rate determinations.
Thus, Mapson submitted that MCCA interfered with Farmers’ insurance payments, causing the
reduced benefit amount. Because MCCA’s actions were improper, Mapson satisfied the elements
of tortious interference with a contract and properly pleaded a conspiracy claim. The trial court
denied MCCA’s motion for summary disposition by simply stating that Mapson had stated a claim.
From this decision, MCCA appeals by leave granted.
In Docket No. 362756, Bouchard filed a complaint against Farmers and MCCA arising
from the payment of no-fault benefits. Specifically, Bouchard alleged that he was rendered a
paraplegic with a traumatic brain injury and posttraumatic diabetes on December 4, 1999, when
the motorcycle he was riding on was struck by a truck that ran a stop sign. Because of the residual
effects of his injuries, Bouchard claimed to continue to require home-based, skilled nursing care.
After multiple disputes over reasonable fees, Farmers paid a daily rate of $672 (or $28 per hour)
from April 1, 2009 through July 1, 2021. However, when Farmers subsequently sought
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preapproval of a rate of $28 an hour, MCCA rejected the rate without negotiation, stating that
$16.03 was the approved rate. Consequently, against Farmers, Bouchard alleged violations of the
no-fault act and breach of contract.
With regard to MCCA, Bouchard alleged that it was required to assume 100% of all
liability of amounts paid by Farmers above the $250,000 threshold set forth in MCL 500.3104.
Bouchard contended that MCCA had no authority to require that insurers obtain preapproval of
amounts and to refuse to pay the loss by disagreeing with an adjusting decision made by a member
insured. It was submitted that MCCA engaged in intentional wrongful acts or lawful acts with
malice and unjustified in law by: (1) requiring that Farmers seek preapproval of payment of benefit
amounts; (2) unlawfully interfering with Farmers contract with Bouchard to pay attendant care
benefits at a previously determined reasonable rate; (3-4) threatening that it would not indemnify
Farmers if it failed to follow MCCA’s rules or if it disagreed with MCCA’s adjusting decision;
(5) refusing to reimburse for previously determined reasonable rates; and (6) causing Farmers to
breach its contract with Bouchard.
MCCA filed its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and raised
essentially the same arguments presented in the Mapson case. Specifically, it alleged that MCCA
was granted authority by statute and through its plan of operation to oversee catastrophic claims
and ensure that their payment did not overwhelm the no-fault system. Therefore, MCCA did not
act improperly or lawfully with malice when it rendered a preapproval decision regarding the
reimbursement rate negotiated between Bouchard and Farmers.
Bouchard opposed the dispositive motion, alleging that MCCA misconstrued the caselaw
and its statutory authority. Similar to the arguments raised by Mapson, Bouchard alleged that
MCCA was not a “super-adjuster” of no-fault claims and could not force member insurers to
reimburse claims simply because it disagreed with the negotiated rates. Therefore, Bouchard
alleged that it satisfied the elements of tortious interference with a contract. The trial court denied
MCCA’s motion for summary disposition, but questioned the soundness of its ruling. When
apprised that MCCA would seek interlocutory relief with this Court, the trial court granted a stay.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Meyers v
Rieck, 509 Mich 460, 468; 983 NW2d 747 (2022). Summary disposition is appropriate when the
opposing party failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted, MCR 2.116(C)(8).4 In re
Lett Estate, 314 Mich App 587, 595; 887 NW2d 807 (2016). Under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the legal
sufficiency of the claim is examined by the pleadings alone with the factual allegations accepted
as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
4
Although MCCA also moved for summary disposition premised on MCR 2.116(C)(5) (legal
capacity to sue), there is no indication that it presented legal authority in support. Therefore, this
argument is not addressed on appeal.
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III. ANALYSIS
MCCA contends that the trial courts erred in denying MCCA’s dispositive motions and
allowing the claims of tortious interference and civil conspiracy to proceed. We agree.
“The elements of tortious interference with a contract are (1) the existence of a contract,
(2) a breach of the contract, and (3) an unjustified instigation of the breach by the defendant.”
Knight Enterprises, Inc v RPF Oil Co, 299 Mich App 275, 279-280; 829 NW2d 345 (2013)
(citation omitted). To support a claim of tortious interference with a contract, a plaintiff must
allege the “intentional doing of a per se wrongful act or the doing of a lawful act with malice and
unjustified in law for the purpose of invading the contractual rights or business relationship of
another.” Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 382; 689 NW2d 145 (2004)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). A wrongful per se act is defined as an act that “is inherently
wrongful or an act that can never be justified under any circumstances.” Knight Enterprises, Inc,
299 Mich App at 280 (quotation marks and citation omitted). If a defendant’s conduct is not
deemed wrongful per se, the plaintiff must allege specific, affirmative acts to corroborate the
unlawful purpose of the interference. Id. Further, to support a claim of tortious interference with
a contract, the defendant must unjustifiably instigate or induce a party to breach its contract. Id.
at 281. Liability will only be imposed if the defendant’s purpose is to cause the result. Id.
Civil conspiracy is defined as “a combination of two or more persons, by some concerted
action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by
criminal or unlawful means.” Urbain v Beierling, 301 Mich App 114, 131-132; 835 NW2d 455
(2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To support a claim of civil conspiracy, a plaintiff
must assert some underlying tortious conduct. Id. at 132. “[A] claim for civil conspiracy may not
exist in the air; rather it is necessary to prove a separate, actionable tort.” Advocacy Org for
Patients & Providers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 257 Mich App 365, 384; 670 NW2d 569 (2003)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, when a plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case of
tortious interference, the conspiracy claim also failed. See id.
“The MCCA is an unincorporated nonprofit association, whose purpose is to provide
insurers with indemnification for PIP policies that exceed a certain threshold.” USFIG 484 Mich
at 18-19. The MCCA is empowered to establish procedures to protect itself from unreasonable
settlements when the claim may exceed the statutory threshold and affect the MCCA. Id. at 20.
Accordingly, the MCCA has the authority to intervene before a settlement is reached “and adjust
situations that it anticipates might otherwise expose it to unreasonable indemnification costs.” Id.
at 22. The requirement that proposed settlement agreements be submitted to MCCA for approval
allows it to protect against having to pay unreasonable claims from member insurers. Id.
In Hope Network Rehabilitation Servs v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n, ___ Mich App
___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 355372), slip op at 1-2, the plaintiff, Hope Network
Rehabilitation Servs (Hope), provided services to an insured, Marilyn Koyl, and received an
assignment to pursue claims against Koyl’s insurance company, Farm Bureau General Insurance
Company. Hope subsequently amended its complaint to raise the claim of tortious interference
with a business relationship or expectancy against the MCCA, claiming it interfered with Hope’s
ability to obtain payment for the benefits at issue. Id. MCCA moved to dismiss the tortious
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interference claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8), but the trial court denied the dispositive motion,
concluding that Hope met its burden of stating a cause of action. Id. at 2-3.
This Court granted MCCA’s application for leave to appeal. Id. at 1. After delineating the
elements of tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy, this Court concluded
that unlawful action was not established in light of MCCA’s authority, stating:
With respect to the third element, interference alone will not support a claim
under this theory. “[T]o satisfy the third element, the plaintiff must establish that
the defendant acted both intentionally and either improperly or without
justification.” Puetz v Spectrum Health Hosps, 324 Mich App 51, 78; 919 NW2d
439 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A tortious interference with a
business relationship claim requires an allegation “of a per se wrongful act or the
doing of a lawful act with malice and unjustified in law for the purpose of invading
the contractual rights or the business relationship of another.” CMI Int’l, Inc v
Intermet Int’l Corp, 251 Mich App 125, 131; 649 NW2d 808 (2002)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the defendant’s conduct was not
wrongful per se, the plaintiff must demonstrate specific, affirmative acts that
corroborate the unlawful purpose of the interference.” Id. “Where the defendant’s
actions were motivated by legitimate business reasons, its actions would not
constitute improper motive or interference.” Dalley [v Dykema Gossett, PLLC, 287
Mich App at 296, 324; 788 NW2d 679 (2010)] (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Thus, if a defendant’s actions were motivated by a legitimate business
reason, those actions do not constitute improper motive or interference, and they
cannot be wrongful per se. Badiee v Brighton Area Sch[s], 265 Mich App 343,
366; 695 NW2d 521 (2005). “If the defendant’s conduct is not wrongful per se, the
plaintiff must demonstrate specific, affirmative acts that corroborate the unlawful
purpose of the interference.” Id. at 367 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, the sole conduct alleged was that the MCCA had either
withheld or threatened to withhold reimbursement to Farm Bureau, and that by
doing so the MCCA intentionally interfered with Hope’s business relationship
and/or expectancy with Farm Bureau, inducing, causing, or contributing to a breach
of that relationship or expectancy. Hope’s alleged business expectancy was that
“its reasonable charges for the reasonably necessary services, products and/or
accommodations that it provided to Marilyn Koyl for her care, recovery, or
rehabilitation from her accident-related injuries would be covered and, ultimately,
paid for by Defendant Farm Bureau.” Hope’s act of filing a complaint against Farm
Bureau for its alleged refusal to pay demonstrated that Hope and Farm Bureau were
unable to reach an agreement with respect to whether the expenses were reasonable
and necessary, and that it would be up to a jury to resolve the issue. See Nasser v
Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 435 Mich 33, 55; 457 NW2d 637 (1990) (stating that “whether
expenses are reasonable and reasonably necessary is generally one of fact for the
jury”). Hope acknowledged, when moving to amend its complaint to add the
tortious interference claim against the MCCA, that it had been attempting to resolve
the dispute with Farm Bureau “for months,” and that the MCCA’s alleged
interference did not begin until after Hope filed this lawsuit against Farm Bureau.
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Even accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Hope did not allege
that the MCCA committed an inherently wrongful act, and Hope failed to allege,
with any degree of specificity, affirmative acts that the MCCA committed with the
motive of interfering with Hope’s business relationship or expectancy. Hope
simply stated in its complaint that the MCCA refused to approve payment and/or
threatened to withhold reimbursement to Farm Bureau and that these acts interfered
with Hope’s business relationship with Farm Bureau. The MCCA’s alleged
involvement with Farm Bureau with respect to Hope’s claim, which was not
supported by specific facts, was not so inherently wrongful that it could never be
justified given the MCCA’s power to step in before a settlement has been reached
and adjust situations that it anticipates might otherwise expose it to unreasonable
indemnification costs. See Badiee, 265 Mich App at 367. Therefore, Hope was
required to allege in its complaint specific and affirmative acts that the MCCA
intentionally committed in order to interfere with Hope’s business relations or
expectancy. See CMI Int’l, Inc, 251 Mich App at 131. Because Hope failed to
make any specific allegations to demonstrate acts of unlawful interference, the trial
court erred by failing to grant summary disposition on Hope’s tortious interference
claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
With respect to the fourth element, a plaintiff pleading a claim of tortious
interference with a business relationship or expectancy must show that, as a result
of the interference, the plaintiff has suffered damages. Dalley, 287 Mich App at
323. The “business expectancy” that Hope alleged to be interfered with was the
payment of no-fault benefits for reasonable and necessary PIP expenses. The
benefits were not paid, at least initially, because Farm Bureau disputed them. The
MCCA had nothing to do with that decision. A jury will determine whether the
expenses were reasonable and necessary. Nasser, 435 Mich at 55. Farm Bureau
will be liable for the benefits that are legitimately due as determined by the jury.
The MCCA, in turn, will be required to indemnify Farm Bureau “for 100% of the
amount of ultimate loss sustained under personal protection insurance coverages in
excess of” the applicable statutory threshold. MCL 500.3104(2). Thus, as a matter
of law, Hope will receive 100 percent of the expenses that a jury concludes to be
reasonable and reasonably necessary and, therefore, Hope would have no resultant
damages as a result of the MCCA’s alleged interference.
In its complaint, Hope simply alleged that its damages were “including, but
not limited to, the costs of prosecuting the instant lawsuit.” Attorney fees incurred
in litigating a matter do not constitute “damages” unless a statute or court rule
explicitly provides otherwise. See Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 560;
564 NW2d 532 (1997), impliedly overruled on other grounds by Garg v Macomb
Co Community Mental Health Servs, 472 Mich 263, 290; 696 NW2d 646, amended
473 Mich 1205 (2005) (stating that “[a]wards of costs and attorney fees are
recoverable only where specifically authorized by a statute, a court rule, or a
recognized exception”); see also Cooley v Mid-Century Ins Co, 52 Mich App 612,
617; 218 NW2d 103 (1974) (explaining that “[a]s a general rule, our courts have
refused to allow recovery of attorneys’ fees, either as an element of the costs of the
suit or as an item of damages, unless allowance of a fee is expressly authorized by
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statute or court rule.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A prevailing party
recovers litigation costs and attorney fees not by claiming them as damages, but by
persuading the trial court that one of the recognized exceptions justifies an award
of such costs and fees. Because plaintiff’s complaint failed to sufficiently plead the
element of resultant damages, summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) was
warranted for this reason as well.
If a motion for summary disposition is based on MCR 2.116(C)(8), “the
court shall give the parties an opportunity to amend their pleadings as provided by
MCR 2.118, unless the evidence then before the court shows that amendment would
not be justified.” MCR 2.116(I)(5). “The amendment of a pleading is properly
deemed futile when, regardless of the substantive merits of the proposed amended
pleading, the amendment is legally insufficient on its face.” Kostadinovski v
Harrington, 321 Mich App 736, 743-744; 909 NW2d 907 (2017). At the hearing
on the MCCA’s motion to dismiss, Hope cited the additional “delay” in the
payment of no-fault benefits and “additional fees” and interest, as well as the costs
of litigation, as damages. On the basis of the above analysis regarding resultant
damages, we conclude as a matter of law that amendment of the complaint would
be futile because Hope could not sufficiently allege resultant damages as a result of
any alleged improper interference. [Id. at 5-7 (footnotes omitted).]
Applying the Hope decision to the present cases,5 we conclude that the trial courts erred in
denying MCCA’s motions for summary disposition. As noted, “[t]he elements of tortious
interference with a contract are (1) the existence of a contract, (2) a breach of the contract, and
(3) an unjustified instigation of the breach by the defendant.” Knight Enterprises, Inc, 299 Mich
App at 279-280 (citation omitted). To support a claim of tortious interference with a contract, a
plaintiff must allege the “intentional doing of a per se wrongful act or the doing of a lawful act
with malice and unjustified in law for the purpose of invading the contractual rights or business
relationship of another.” Derderian, 263 Mich App at 382 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A wrongful per se act is defined as an act that “is inherently wrongful or an act that can never be
justified under any circumstances.” Knight Enterprises, Inc, 299 Mich App at 280 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). If a defendant’s conduct is not deemed wrongful per se, the plaintiff
must allege specific, affirmative acts to corroborate the unlawful purpose of the interference. Id.
Further, to support a claim of tortious interference with a contract, the defendant must unjustifiably
5
We acknowledge that the claim raised in Hope was tortious interference with a business
expectancy. Indeed, the Hope Network Rehabilitation Services entity was not a party to the
insurance contract it sought to enforce, and it obtained its rights through the assignment from the
insured Koyl. Although tortious interference with a contract is a cause of action distinct from
tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy, Health Call of Detroit v Atrium
Home & Health Care Servs, Inc, 268 Mich App 83, 89; 706 NW2d 843 (2005), both actions require
that the interference occur with malice and without justification, see Derderian, 263 Mich App at
382; Mino v Clio Sch Dist, 255 Mich App 60, 78; 661 NW2d 586 (2003). Accordingly, the specific
type of action raised was not a distinction that precluded application of the Hope decision to the
present case.
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instigate or induce a party to breach its contract. Id. at 281. Liability will only be imposed if the
defendant’s purpose is to cause the result. Id.
However, the MCCA was established as an unincorporated, nonprofit association with the
purpose of indemnifying insurers for PIP benefits that exceed a particular threshold. USFIG, 484
Mich at 18. MCCA must establish procedures for members to promptly report each claim that
may involve the association, MCL 500.3104(7)(b), maintain loss and expense data pertaining to
all liabilities of the MCCA and require members to provide statistics, MCL 500.3104(7)(c), and
calculate and charge association members a premium sufficient to cover expected losses and
expenses, MCL 500.3104(7)(d). MCCA also must establish “procedures for reviewing claims
procedures and practices of members of the association.” MCL 500.3104(7)(g).
Contrary to Mapson’s and Bouchard’s assertions, MCCA did not engage in a “per se
wrongful act or the doing of a lawful act with malice and unjustified in law for the purpose of
invading the contractual rights or business relationship of another.” Derderian, 263 Mich App at
382. Rather, MCCA was charged with maintaining the financial soundness of the member
association and was given statutory authority to establish procedures to review claims. Further, to
support a claim of tortious interference with a contract, the defendant must unjustifiably instigate
or induce a party to breach its contract. Knight Enterprises, Inc, 299 Mich App at 281 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Id. at 281. There is no contention that the preapproval process of a
claim by MCCA was unjustifiably instigated or induced Farmers to breach its insurance contract
with either plaintiff. Moreover, there is no assertion that MCCA’s purpose was to cause the
rejection of negotiated settlements between Mapson and Farmers and Bouchard and Farmers.
Rather, the Legislature authorized the MCCA to develop policies and procedures, to maintain
statistical data, and to cause member insurers to report their claims to ensure the financial viability
of the no-fault system. See USFIG, 484 Mich at 6; MCL 500.3104(7).
Indeed, Mapson and Bouchard did not assert that MCCA’s preapproval process was
designed with the nefarious purpose of rejecting negotiated settlements or rendering PIP benefit
payments unreasonable. Rather, Mapson seemingly alleged that MCCA acted contrary to and
misconstrued the USFIG decision as well as the statutory provisions within the no-fault act. But
a misconstruction of caselaw or statutory authority does not rise to the level of unjustifiably
instigation or inducement to breach a contract. Accordingly, the trial courts erred in denying
MCCA’s motion for summary disposition of Mapson’s and Bouchard’s claims of tortious
interference with a contract. The monitoring of the insurance members and preapproval process
for claims by MCCA failed to state a claim of tortious interference of a contract.
Furthermore, to support the claim of civil conspiracy, Mapson was required to assert some
underlying tortious conduct. Urbain, 301 Mich App at 132. “[A] claim for civil conspiracy may
not exist in the air; rather it is necessary to prove a separate, actionable tort.” Advocacy Org for
Patients & Providers, 257 Mich App at 384. Thus, when a plaintiff failed to state a prima facie
case of tortious interference, the conspiracy claim also failed. See id. Because Mapson failed to
state a claim of tortious interference premised on MCCA’s performance of its duties as set forth
by statute and its plan of operation, his claim of civil conspiracy also failed. Accordingly, the trial
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courts’ orders denying MCCA’s motions for summary disposition are reversed, and the cases
remanded for entry of orders granting summary disposition in favor of MCCA.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Sima G. Patel
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