BLD-210 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 23-2396
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHAKA FATTAH, JR.,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-14-cr-00409-001)
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle III
____________________________________
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 7, 2023
Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 19, 2023)
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OPINION *
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PER CURIAM
In the District Court, Chaka Fattah, Jr., proceeding pro se, filed a motion to lift the
condition of his supervised release that prevents him from leaving the Eastern District of
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pennsylvania without the permission of the Court or his probation officer. See ECF Nos.
254, 308. 1 Fattah argued that this condition hinders his freedom to travel and is
unnecessary because he had complied with all the conditions of his supervised release
over the preceding three years. The Government and Fattah’s probation officer opposed
this modification. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that a modification
was unwarranted because Fattah had committed serious crimes and his probation officer
had granted every one of his requests to travel. Fattah appealed, and the Government has
filed a motion to summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
order for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Wilson, 707 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir.
2013) (noting that district courts “possess broad discretionary authority” in this context).
We may take summary action if an appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4, I.O.P. 10.6.
We will grant the Government’s motion and summarily affirm the District Court’s
order. Fattah argues that this condition infringes his constitutional right to travel, but
such a limitation is permissible in light of his conviction. See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S.
412, 419 (1981); United States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir. 1999); Williams v.
1
After being found guilty by a jury of numerous charges involving fraud and making
false statements, Fattah was sentenced to 60 months in prison and five years of
supervised release. We affirmed the criminal judgment. See United States v. Fattah, 858
F.3d 801 (3d Cir. 2017). Fattah has filed three motions for early termination of
supervised release; the District Court denied each motion, and on the two occasions that
Fattah appealed, we affirmed. See United States v. Fattah, No. 23-1064, 2023 WL
4615300, at *1 (3d Cir. July 19, 2023) (per curiam) (discussing procedural history and
affirming denial of third such motion).
2
Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 2003). Further, this is a standard administrative
condition of supervised release, see U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3), which courts view as a
“necessary incident[] of supervision,” United States v. Warren, 843 F.3d 275, 281 (7th
Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted), that is “essential to the functioning of the
supervised release system,” United States v. Truscello, 168 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1999)
(quotation marks omitted). This condition also “allows the probation officer to
implement supervision methods demonstrated by social science to be effective at
achieving positive outcomes.” Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Probation and Pretrial Services Office, Overview of Probation and Supervised Release
Conditions 20 (Nov. 2016). Given these interests and the fact that Fattah’s parole officer
has never denied a request to travel, we cannot conclude that the District Court abused its
considerable discretion in declining to lift this condition. 2
We therefore grant the Government’s motion and will summarily affirm the
District Court’s order.
2
Fattah objects to the District Court’s reference to his past gambling. As we noted on
direct appeal, however, Fattah previously had financial difficulties: he “incurred lavish
personal expenses, owed exorbitant gambling debts, and owed thousands of dollars in
unpaid taxes.” Fattah, 858 F.3d at 811. Thus, as part of Fattah’s supervised release, the
District Court has ordered his probation officer to help oversee his financial dealings.
See Fattah, 2023 WL 4615300, at *2. Fattah’s financial history is therefore relevant to
his supervised release.
3