Left Turn Investments, LLC v. Three Four Global Investments, LLC

2023 IL App (1st) 220764-U

No. 1-22-0764

Order filed September 20, 2023
THIRD DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in
the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT

LEFT TURN INVESTMENTS, LLC, )
a Delaware Limited Liability Company, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
THREE FOUR GLOBAL INVESTMENTS, )
LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company, )
DAVID BEAMISH, Individually, and )
STEPHEN KUBINSKI, Individually, )
) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
Defendants-Appellants. )
_____________________________________ ) Nos. 2020 L 004302, 2020 L 004303
) (cons.)
CRAIG DOW, )
) Honorable
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) John J. Curry
) Judge, Presiding
v. )
)
THREE FOUR GLOBAL INVESTMENTS, )
LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company, )
DAVID BEAMISH, Individually, and )
STEPHEN KUBINSKI, Individually, )
)
)
Defendants-Appellants. )
 No. 1-22-0764

JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

Held: We affirm the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.
We lack jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s denial of the motion for substitution of judge
by right.

¶1 This case arises from a default on a pair of loans made in two promissory notes. One note

provided for a loan from plaintiff Left Turn Investments, LLC (Left Turn) to defendant Three

Four Investments, LLC (Three Four); the other provided for a loan from plaintiff Craig Dow

to Three Four. Both promissory notes were signed by defendants David Beamish and Stephen

Kubinski as personal guarantors. Three Four failed to timely repay the loans and plaintiffs

sued. The circuit court ultimately entered partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.

Defendants now appeal, arguing that summary judgment was inappropriate and that their

motion for substitution of judge as of right (SOJ motion) was erroneously denied by the circuit

court. We disagree and affirm the circuit court’s orders.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 The facts of this case are largely undisputed. Beamish and Kubinski are the sole members

and managers of Three Four. On June 28, 2017, defendants entered into two separate contracts,

both titled “Three Four Global Investments LLC 6 to 12 Month Promissory Note.” In one of

these contracts, Left Turn lent $125,000 to defendants; in the other, Dow lent $125,000 to

defendants. Both notes were personally drafted by Beamish.

¶4 Both Beamish and Kubinski testified before the circuit court that they signed the

promissory notes and that those notes represented their understanding of the loan. Beamish

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signed the notes on behalf of the defendant corporation and as a personal guarantor. Kubinski

signed the notes as a personal guarantor. Both notes contain the language: “This Note shall be

the joint and several obligation of all makers, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers hereof and

shall be binding upon them and their respective administers, successors and assigns.” This

language was initialed by both Beamish and Kubinski on both notes.

¶5 The notes each provided for a $125,000 principal amount, 30% annual interest, and a due

date of January 3, 2018, by which the principal and any accrued interest was to be paid. In

addition, both notes included the language: “Borrow [sic] also will deliver to Lender 50 Pieces

of Original Matt Lamb Artwork to be kept as collateral until the note and interest are paid back

in full.” Plaintiffs upheld their end of the deal by lending the money, but Three Four repaid

only $6,000 on each of the notes. Defendants do not dispute that the money was lent or that

the loans were defaulted upon.

¶6 Plaintiffs filed separate complaints against defendants alleging, inter alia, breach of

contract. The cases that resulted from those complaints were subsequently consolidated into a

single case, from which this appeal arises. Plaintiffs assert in their response brief that

defendants baselessly denied a number of requests to admit facts, but later contradicted those

sworn responses when confronted with the promissory notes bearing their initials and

signatures during depositions. Defendants admitted during depositions that they had signed

and initialed the notes. Defendants do not dispute these assertions. Similarly, it is undisputed

that when plaintiffs requested that defendants produce any and all documents relating to the

notes and the loan transactions, defendants produced no documents at all. The case was

assigned to mandatory arbitration. The arbitrator entered an award for the plaintiffs, but

defendants rejected the award.

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¶7 On November 1, 2021, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding

their breach of contract claim. In the motion, plaintiffs argued that there was no genuine issue

of material fact as to (1) whether the promissory notes were valid and enforceable contracts,

(2) whether plaintiffs performed their obligations under the contracts, (3) whether defendants

breached their obligations under the contracts, and (4) whether defendants are jointly and

severally liable for Three Four’s obligations under the contracts.

¶8 On January 7, 2022, while a response to the motion was pending from defendants, the judge

presiding over the case retired, and the case was reassigned to another judge.

¶9 On January 18, 2022, defendants filed their response to plaintiff’s motion for partial

summary judgment. In it, defendants argued that a genuine question of material fact existed

because the copies of the contract entered into evidence are unsigned, because neither Beamish

nor Kubinski was named as a “borrower,” and because “there are no terms memorialized in

either Note which provide for the alleged ‘personal guarantee’ of both Beamish and Kubinski

and as alleged by the plaintiffs other than the use of the word ‘personal guarantor’ on the last

page of each Note.”

¶ 10 Defendants further argued that Beamish’s testimony established that defendants’ names

“were only inserted by the plaintiffs after plaintiffs insisted that Beamish and Kubinski provide

a personal guaranty that the subject artwork collateral was in the possession and/or owned by

both Beamish and Kubinski at the time of the agreement between plaintiffs and defendant

Three Four.” Defendants alleged that plaintiffs “specifically requested that both Beamish and

Kubinski sign a personal guarantee that they possessed and owned the artwork which was the

collateral specified in each Note.”

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¶ 11 Defendants also argued that they had “attempted on several different occasions to tender

the collateral artwork to both plaintiffs who refused to take possession” and there was no

evidence to support an assertion that Three Four withheld the artwork from the plaintiffs at any

time.

¶ 12 Lastly, defendants argued that some of the documents cited by plaintiffs in their motion for

partial summary judgment were introduced without proper foundation for their admissibility

and therefore should not have been considered with the motion for partial summary judgment.

¶ 13 On February 14, 2022, plaintiffs filed their reply to defendants’ response, in which they

refuted defendants’ claim that a material issue of genuine fact yet remained. Regarding the

lack of signatures on the exhibits, plaintiff indicated that Beamish and Kubinski both admitted

to signing the notes during their respective depositions. Regarding defendants’ argument that

the “personal guarantor” language concerned only a guarantee of ownership of the collateral

artwork, plaintiffs argued that the language of the contract is plain and, since defendants

testified that the notes contained the complete terms of the agreements, there is no genuine

issue of material fact.

¶ 14 Plaintiffs made three additional arguments on the matter of whether Beamish and Kubinski

personally guaranteed the notes. First, plaintiffs argued that defendants’ contention to the

contrary relied on impermissible extrinsic evidence and “[w]here (as here) a contract is clear,

the Court must interpret the contract without considering extrinsic evidence.” Second,

plaintiffs argued that defendants’ interpretation would render the guaranty provision in the

notes illogical and superfluous. Third, plaintiffs argued that defendants admitted in their

depositions that they drafted the notes without any assistance and thus, even if there is

ambiguity in the notes, those ambiguities must be construed against defendants as the drafters.

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¶ 15 Regarding defendants’ arguments pertaining to the inadmissibility of some of the evidence

on which plaintiffs relied, plaintiffs argued that defendants failed to designate the specific

testimony to which they were objecting or what about it was problematic and therefore, for

lack of a proper objection, waived their objection.

¶ 16 Lastly, as to defendants’ argument that they attempted to tender collateral, plaintiffs argued

that the collateral is irrelevant to the matter because under Illinois law, it is permissible to

pursue defendants for a monetary judgment without first resorting to collateral.

¶ 17 Also, on February 14, 2022, plaintiffs emailed courtesy copies of their reply to defendants’

counsel and the new judge. Included in that email was a separately-attached cover letter

addressed to the new judge.

¶ 18 On February 24, 2022, prior to the hearing on the motion for partial summary judgment

that was scheduled for that day, “[d]efendants’ counsel emailed [p]laintiffs’ counsel stating: ‘I

am [on] zoom for the case with Judge Mulroy and he is not here; instead it is Judge Curry. Is

this correct? I had no advance notice that a new judge was assigned. Please advise.’ ” This

email was sent from the same email address to which the previous email containing the cover

letter addressed to Judge Curry had been sent.

¶ 19 The record on appeal contains no record of the February 24, 2022 hearing. To the degree

that the record contains any indication of the order of events at that hearing, it is in Judge

Curry’s description of the previous hearing in the transcript of the subsequent hearing

pertaining to the motion to reconsider. In that hearing, Judge Curry stated:

“The movant in this matter wishes to have me reconsider my prior order denying his

oral motion made in the course of this Court’s hearing on a dispositive motion, which

was a substantive matter on February 24th, 2022.

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***

“I commenced the hearing. And it was at that point that defendant’s counsel interjected

his oral motion for substitution of judge without notice. So the hearing had begun and

the motion wasn’t timely in that respect.”

¶ 20 Defendants allege that they orally moved for a substitution of judge as of right before the

hearing started. Plaintiffs allege that the hearing had already begun before the oral motion was

made. Defendants allege that Judge Curry denied their motion because it was not submitted in

writing. Defendants assert that they objected to continuing the hearing and, because the hearing

continued over that objection, defense counsel did not argue on defendants’ behalf. Defendants

requested that Rule 304(a) language be included in the court’s order.

¶ 21 On the same day, the circuit court entered an order granting partial summary judgment

against defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $309,482.75. The order did not

include Rule 304(a) language. The court’s conclusion that there were no genuine issues of

material fact was “[f]or the reason stated in open court.” Again, there is nothing in the record

on appeal detailing what was said during the summary judgment hearing.

¶ 22 On March 8, 2022, defendants filed a motion to reconsider the court’s February 24, 2022

order denying defendants’ motion to substitute judge and granting partial summary judgment.

Although the motion requested that the summary judgment order be vacated, defendants’

argument was solely focused on the motion to substitute judge. Defendants argued (1) that the

motion had been made before the hearing started, (2) that, by statute, a motion for substitution

of judge can be made orally, and (3) the court should reverse its decision based on the principles

of equity. Defendants’ motion to reconsider contained no citations to authority beyond the

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substitution of judge statute and citations related to principles of equity and citations regarding

motions to reconsider generally.

¶ 23 On April 11, 2022, plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to reconsider. In it, they argued

that the court’s ruling on the motion for substitution was correct because (1) the motion was

not timely because it was not filed at the earliest practicable time, (2) defendants provided no

notice whatsoever of the motion, and (3) the motion was a transparent delay tactic. On April

29, 2022, plaintiffs filed a motion for legal fees for the mandatory arbitration conducted in the

case.

¶ 24 On May 3, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion to reconsider in which it

denied the motion. At that hearing, the circuit court reasoned that because the moving party is

required to give due notice to the other party and no notice was given whatsoever for the motion

in question, it was correct to deny the motion for substitution. The circuit court examined the

particular facts before it and noted that defendants had time to provide notice and failed to do

so. The circuit court noted that, to the degree that defense counsel may have been unaware of

the change in judges, that was due to their failure to read documents and therefore was no

defense. The circuit court further noted that the motion was made after the hearing began and

so was not timely. The circuit court determined the motion to be frivolous under Rule 137 and

ordered defendants to file a memorandum or statement as to why they should not be sanctioned

under Rule 137. Defendants requested Rule 304 language in the order disposing of the motion

to reconsider. The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider, granted plaintiffs’ voluntary

dismissal of all other counts, and provided Rule 304(a) language reading: “this Court makes a

specific finding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both

of this Order.” All rulings in the order were made “for the reasons stated on the record.”

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¶ 25 Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal on May 31, 2022 and this appeal follows.

¶ 26 ANALYSIS

¶ 27 On appeal, defendants argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment

because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding (1) ambiguity in the language of

the contract and (2) impairment of the collateral by the plaintiffs. Both of these arguments are

waived because they were not raised below, but we will nonetheless address the former, since

that argument resembles an argument made below. Defendants also argue that the circuit court

erred in denying their SOJ motion because the motion was properly made, and the circuit court

had no discretion to deny it. Because we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of the SOJ

motion, we dismiss that portion of the appeal, but we affirm the trial court’s grant of partial

summary judgment.

¶ 28 I. Jurisdiction

¶ 29 The parties agree that this court has jurisdiction under Rule 304(a). Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff.

Mar. 8, 2016). However, this court has duty to ascertain our jurisdiction even if it is not raised

by the parties. Cushing v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 103197, ¶ 297; In re

Marriage of Ehgartner-Shachter and Shachter, 366 Ill. App. 3d 278, 283 (2006).

¶ 30 Rule 304(a) provides that where there are multiple parties or claims involved in an action,

“an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the parties

or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason

for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).

¶ 31 In this case, the circuit court did not provide Rule 304(a) language with its initial order

granting partial summary judgment. However, when the circuit court issued its May 3, 2022

order denying defendants’ motion for reconsideration and granting plaintiffs’ motion for

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voluntary dismissal of its other claims, that order included Rule 304(a) language. The order

also included a sua sponte order requiring that defendants submit a memorandum explaining

their actions or face Rule 137 sanctions. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303:

“The notice of appeal must be filed *** within 30 days after the entry of the final

judgment appealed from, or, if a timely posttrial motion directed against the judgment

is filed, whether in a jury or nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of the order

disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion directed against that judgment or

order. A judgment or order is not final and appealable while a Rule 137 claim remains

pending unless the court enters a finding pursuant to Rule 304(a).” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303

(eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 32 Since there was a motion for Rule 137 sanctions pending, we do not have jurisdiction over

the motion for substitution of judge as of right. Defendants assert that the circuit court reversed

itself and withdrew the Rule 137 sanctions, but do not specify whether this was before or after

this appeal was initiated. The circuit court entered an order June 28, 2022 finding that

defendants violated Rule 137 and stating that sanctions would be issued. Accordingly, the issue

was still pending at the time of appeal on May 31, 2022. The same June 28, 2022 order includes

a briefing schedule for plaintiffs’ motion for legal fees, indicating that there was a second

pending issue that precluded finality. See Law Offices of Brendan R. Appel, LLC v. Georgia’s

Restaurant and Pancake House, Inc., 2021 IL App (1st) 192523, ¶69 (finding that without a

Rule 304(a) finding, an otherwise final judgment was not final due to a pending request for

attorney fees).

¶ 33 Since the circuit court ruled on the motion to reconsider and included Rule 304(a) language

with its order, the court’s final order granting plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment

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became appealable at that time. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Additionally, the

motion was timely appealed within 30 days. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to review the

circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment. Heller Financial, Inc. v. Johns-Byrne Co.,

246 Ill. App. 3d 754 (1992); Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016); Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. July

1, 2017).

¶ 34 The trial court’s order denying the SOJ motion is more complex. Rule 304(a) applies

exclusively to final orders. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 304(a). (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) “An order is final and

appealable if it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits or disposes of the

rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or a separate part thereof.” In re Marriage

of Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d 145, 151 (2008). An order denying a motion for substitution of judge

does not fit that description and is not a final order, it is an interlocutory order. Inland

Commercial Property Management, Inc. v. HOB I Holding Corp., 2015 IL App (1st) 141051,

¶ 19. “Preliminary orders in a pending case are not appealable because they are reviewable on

appeal from the final order.” People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (1981); see

also Inland Commercial Property Management, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 141051, ¶ 19-20

(holding that an order denying a motion for substitution of judge is a non-final preliminary

order). “[I]t is well-settled law that the mere inclusion of a Rule 304(a) finding in a nonfinal

order does not make the order appealable under the supreme court rules.” Id. ¶ 23; see also In

re Marriage of Nettleton, 348 Ill App. 3d 961, 969 (2004) (finding that a Rule 304(a) finding

would not have rendered the denial of a motion to substitute judge as of right appealable).

¶ 35 In Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center v. Berlin, 268 Ill. App. 3d 184, 187 (1994), our court

held that an order denying a motion to substitute judge was reviewable prior to a final order

resolving all remaining claims in one very limited circumstance. In Berlin, we were presented

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with an issue properly subject to interlocutory appeal, as well as a denial of a motion to

substitute judge. Id. The outcome of the motion to substitute judge was determinative of

whether the correct judge was presiding when the interlocutory order being appealed was

issued. Id. As such, we found that we could review the denial of the motion to substitute judge

because “the proper scope of review under Rule 307 is to review any prior error that bears

directly upon the question of whether the order on appeal was proper.” Id.; see also In re A.N.,

324 Ill. App. 3d 510, 511-12 (2001). The appeal here is not a Rule 307 interlocutory appeal,

so this narrow exception does not apply. As such, we find no basis on which this court can

exercise jurisdiction to review the SOJ motion.

¶ 36 II. Forfeiture

¶ 37 It is well established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited. Mabry

v. Boler, 2012 IL App (1st) 111464, ¶ 15; Keefe-Shea Joint Venture v. City of Evanston, 332

Ill. App. 3d 163, 170 (2002); Village of Roselle v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 368 Ill. App.

3d 1097, 1109 (2006); Chicago v. Michigan Beach Housing Cooperative, 297 Ill. App. 3d 317,

324 (1998). To hear a novel issue on appeal would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to

address the issue, would be a waste of judicial resources, and would prejudice the opposing

party by depriving that party of the opportunity to present evidence and argument on the issue.

Department of Transportation v. GreatBanc Trust Company, 2018 IL App (1st) 171315, ¶ 13.

¶ 38 Defendants raise an argument regarding impairment of collateral for the first time on

appeal. This argument does not appear in defendants’ response to plaintiffs’ motion for partial

summary judgment. Accordingly, we find that the argument is forfeited, and we will not

address it.

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¶ 39 Defendants also argue for the first time on appeal that the contract’s language was

ambiguous. While the language contained in this argument is largely the same language that

was included in defendants’ response to plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment

below, the word “ambiguity” never appeared in defendants’ response in any form. In the trial

court, defendants primarily asserted that the individual defendants’ deposition testimony and

the contract read as a whole created a genuine issue of material fact. While this may have been

intended to be an argument about ambiguity, defendants failed to articulate that argument and

only made conclusory statements. As such, defendants’ argument as to why the contract was

ambiguous is being presented for the first time on appeal and is waived. As explained below,

we will nonetheless address defendants’ ambiguity argument for the sake of completeness.

Wilson v. Humana Hosp., 399 Ill. App. 3d 751, 757 (2010) (“Forfeiture *** is a limitation on

the parties and not the reviewing court and this court may overlook forfeiture where necessary

to obtain a just result or maintain a sound body of precedent.”).

¶ 40 III. Summary Judgment

¶ 41 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c)

(West 2020). To determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, we construe the

pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits strictly against the moving party and

liberally in favor of the opponent. MEP Construction, LLC v. Truco MP, LLC, 2019 IL App

(1st) 180539, ¶ 12 (citing Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d

90, 131-32 (1992)). If reasonable people would draw divergent inferences from undisputed

facts, summary judgment is inappropriate. Id. (citing Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404,

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417 (2008)). It should be noted, however, that “[s]tatements in an affidavit which are based

on information and belief or which are unsupported conclusions, opinions, or speculation are

insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” (Alteration in the original.) Id. ¶ 13

(quoting Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 132). “Contract construction and interpretation are

generally well suited to disposition by summary judgment.” William Blair and Co., LLC v. FI

Liquidation Corp., 358 Ill. App. 3d 324, 334 (2005). If the language of a contract is ambiguous,

summary judgment is not appropriate. Id.

¶ 42 “In appeals from summary judgment rulings, review is de novo.” Adams v. Northern

Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2004). “De novo review means that we perform the same

analysis that a trial judge would perform. In addition, we may affirm on any basis appearing

in the record, whether or not the trial court relied on that basis and whether or not the trial

court’s reasoning was correct.” Khan v. Fur Keeps Animal Rescue, Inc., 2021 IL App (1st)

182694, ¶ 25.

¶ 43 “A contract term is ambiguous if it can reasonably be interpreted in more than one way due

to the indefiniteness of the language or due to it having a double or multiple meaning.” William

Blair, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 334. “A contract is not ambiguous, however, if a court can ascertain

its meaning from the general contract language.” Id. “Whether a contract is ambiguous is a

question of law for the trial court.” Id. “However, the mere fact that the parties disagree as to

the meaning of a term does not make that term ambiguous.” Id. “In the absence of ambiguity,

a court must construe a contract according to its own language, not according to the parties’

subjective constructions.” Id. at 335. “Unless a contract clearly specifies its own meanings, a

court must interpret the words of the contract with their common and generally accepted

meanings.” Id. “We construe the contract as a whole, viewing each provision in light of the

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other provisions.” Morningside North Apartments I, LLC v. 1000 N. LaSalle, LLC, 2017 IL

App (1st) 162274, ¶15. “We do not construe a contract by viewing a clause or provision in

isolation.” Id. If the contract is unambiguous on its face, we interpret “solely from the contract

itself, without resorting to extrinsic evidence.” Id.

¶ 44 Defendants argue that because Beamish and Kubinski testified in their depositions that the

words “Personal Guarantor” beneath each of their signatures were only added at plaintiffs’

request and signified only that Beamish and Kubinski “possessed and/or owned the subject

collateral artwork,” there is a genuine issue of material fact that should have precluded a grant

of summary judgment. Defendants also argue that the fact that the contract “contained no

corroborating language reciting the terms of the promissory notes” shows a “lack of credible

evidence” for plaintiffs’ contention regarding the language and so supports defendants’

contention. Defendants’ argument, simply put, is that their deposition testimony created a

question of fact because that testimony conflicted with the unambiguous meaning of the

contract. However, this argument is without any legal support.

¶ 45 Defendants suggest that their disagreement over the meaning of a term means that the term

is ambiguous, and therefore creates a genuine issue of material fact. As the case law cited

above has established, the presence of ambiguity in a contract would render the matter

inappropriate for summary judgment.

¶ 46 Defendants are correct that there is no additional corroborating language in the contract

that addresses personal guarantors specifically, but there is also no corroborating language

establishing the definition that defendants seek to assign to the language regarding a guarantee

of ownership of collateral. The first term of the contract reads:

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“FOR RECEIVED VALUE, the Borrower promises to pay to the order of Lender ***

the principal sum of $125,000.00 together with all charges and interest herein provided,

payable at the rate and in the manner hereinafter set forth. Borrow [sic] also will deliver

to Lender 50 Pieces of Original Matt Lamb Artwork to be kept as collateral until the

note and interest are paid back in full.”

Plaintiffs’ interpretation, that “personal guarantor” indicated that Beamish and Kubinski would

be personally responsible for repayment if the borrower, Three Four, failed to repay the debt,

is the plain meaning of the words. The language that does exist in the contract supports that

meaning. The notes dictate that: “This Note shall be the joint and several obligation of all

makers, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers hereof and shall be binding upon them and their

respective administers, successors, and assigns” (Emphasis added). Both Beamish and

Kubinski initialed this language. Defendants’ suggestion that the term is ambiguous and that

their proposed meaning is a valid alternative meaning that could be read from nothing more

than the words “Personal Guarantor” is disingenuous. Defendants have only presented a

disagreement about the subjective, intended meaning of the words “Personal Guarantor,” not

an argument about ambiguity. Defendants’ argument is directly refuted by a host of case law.

Founders Insurance Co. v. Munoz, 237 Ill. 2d 424, 433 (2010); Ringgold Capital IV, LLC v.

Finley, 2013 IL App (1st) 121702, ¶ 19; Doyle v. Executive Ethics Commission, 2021 IL App

(2d) 200157; Richard W. McCarthy Trust Dated September 2, 2004 v. Illinois Casualty Co.,

408 Ill. App. 3d 526, 535 (2011); Shields Pork Plus, Inc. v. Swiss Valley Ag Service, 329 Ill.

App. 3d 305, 310 (2002); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Iles, 2013 IL App (5th) 120485 (“The

absence of a definition does not render a policy term ambiguous, nor is it ambiguous simply

because parties can suggest creative possibilities for its meaning.”). “A contract is not rendered

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ambiguous merely because the parties disagree on its meaning. Additionally, we will not strain

to find an ambiguity where none exists, nor will we consider an interpretation that is

unreasonable or leads to absurd results.” Sweet Berry Café, Inc. v. Society Insurance, Inc.,

2022 IL App (2d) 210088, ¶ 34. Here, there was no ambiguity and so there was no genuine

issue of material fact. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant partial summary

judgment.

CONCLUSION

¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we find we lack jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s decision

on the motion to substitute judge as of right, but we affirm the circuit court’s grant of partial

summary judgment.

¶ 48 Affirmed.

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