after' making the foregoing statement' of facts-delivered the opinion df the court.
The-Supreme Court of Illinois, by its decision' in this case, has but followed its prior decision upon- the same question be-' tween these patties, reported in 174 Illinois; 177,• decided in* 1898. It there held that the éxómptióñ was limited t5 property used in immediate connection'with the Séminary,'and. did not include such property as is involved in‘these cases, which was' not-property used in immediate cohriectioh' with 'thé'.’seniinary,' but was other-property séparate and’ apart therefrom,' and owned- or rented or held by the seminary as an investment, the income from which was nevertheless used solely for school-purposes. ' . • - '• ' •
The rule of construction 'followed by the Supreme.'Court Of Illinois -in construing this act exempting property f torn taxation is so well established by this and other courts as scarcely to need the citation of authorities. One or two, however, from this court may be' given. Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; New Orleans City & Lake Railroad v. New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192, 195; Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, 146.
The rule -is that, in claims for éxémption from taxátion under legislative authority;, the exemption must be' plainly and unmistakably granted; it cannot exist by implication onlya" doubt is fatal to the claim.
The'reasoning of the Supreme Court of'Illinois, 174 Illinois, supra, in refusing, the exemption claimed, so far as relates, to the property not connected with the seminary, is best stated' in the language of the bpinion of that court-.' After stating the rule of construction, as above mentioned, the court said (p. 181):
“If, however, taking the express words of theact, and with*673out extending their meaning By. implication, they. may be held to include all property belonging or appertaining to the. ‘ seminary ’ mentioned in the. second section, or to include all the property belonging or appertaining to the corporation, and there is reasonable ground for doubt.which- vyas intended by the legislature, that doubt .must be resolved in. favor of' the State. In other \\-ords, if the. language is capable of a. broad or more restricted meaning, the latter must be adopted. The second section of the charter mentioning certain .property to be located in or near the city of Chicago, and which is -denominated ‘ the seminary,’ we think the:.words-in the fifth section, ‘ said seminary,’ refer to that particular property, and to só hold seems to do no more than to give the language .of. the two sections their literal and ordinarily understood meaning. To say,' as is contended by. appellee, that ‘said seminary ’..was intended to mean, the corporation, is. to, extend the meaning of those words by implication, which.is not permissible. . .
“ It is said that, the only entity mentioned in the charter capable of owning property is the corporation, and therefore it could not have been intended that property, belonging or appertaining to the seminary was meant by section 5. ¥e think this position is based upon a . too limifed meaning of the words ‘ belonging or appertaining,’ as here used. Of course, if the language of section 5 had been, that the. property, of whatever kind or .description, owned by the said seminary shall be forever free from all taxation, .etc,,.'.or if, as counsel seem to assume, the words ‘ belonging or appertaining ’ here necessarily meant ownership of the property, then there, would be force in this argument of counsel.. .It is undoubtedly true that'the word ‘belonging.’ may mean ownership, and very often does. But that is not its only meaning. Webster’s International Dictionary defines it: ‘2. That which is connected with a principal or greater thing; an appendage ; an appurtenance.’ Tie also defines the word ‘ pertain ’ as meaning, ‘ to belong or pertain, whether by right of nature,,appointment or custom; to relate, as “ things pertaining to life.” ’ Manifestly, the purpose of section 5 was to exempt property owned by the corporasion, but it does not follow that- the intention was to include in *674that exemption all property owned by it used for purposes of the school.”
We think there is force in this reasoning, and we are disposed to concur in the result arrived at.
It is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error that the words “ said seminary,” contained in section 5 of the charter, referred to the corporation created by the act and not to the school buildings and grounds, and that, therefore, the exemption necessarily exempted from taxation all the property against which the judgments below were rendered.
Here are two different constructions of the exemption clause, each of which might be maintained with some plausibility. That view which limits the range of the exemption to property used in immediate connection with the seminary might seem to .many to be the correct one, while in the opinion of others, the broader claim of total exemption would be the best founded. The judges of the Supreme Court of Illinois have unanimously taken the former view, while counsel for the plaintiff in error very strongly and very ably has taken and maintained the other. We can ourselves see that a construction either way would not be clearly erroneous, or, at any rate, either construction Avould not be so obviously erroneous as to leave no doubt upon the question. In such cases we think the rule as to the construction of statutes of exemption from taxation should be applied, and as there may be room for reasonable doubt whether a total or only a partial exemption was meant, the partial exemption should alone be recognized. Great weight ought also to be attached to the decision of a state court regarding questions of taxation or exemption therefrom under the constitution or laws of its own State. As is said in Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U. S. 399, 412:
“Especial respect should be had to such decisions when the dispute arises out of -general laws of a State, regulating its exercise of the taxing power, or relating to the State’s disposition pf its public lands. In such cases it is frequently necessary to recur to the history and situation of the country in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of the laws, and knowledge of such particulars will ihost likely be found in the *675tribunals whose special function is to expound and interpret the state enactments.”
We acknowledge and affirm the principle that this court in this class of cases must decide upon its own responsibility as to the existence and meaning of the contract, but in arriving at such meaning in a case like this, the decision of the state court is entitled to exercise marked influence upon the question this court is called upon to decide, and where it cannot be said that the decision is in itself unreasonable or in violation of the plain language of the statute, we ought, in cases engendering a fair doubt, to follow the state court in its interpretation of the statutes of its own State.
The case of University v. People, 99 U. S. 309, is no authority for the construction contended f.or by the plaintiff in error. In that case the charter provided “ That all property, of whatever kind or description, belonging to or owned by said corporation, shall be forever free from taxation for any and all purposes.” The difference between the two provisions is intrinsic and material. What is lacking in the case at bar is present in the case cited, namely, a provision exempting all the property “ owned by said corporation.” In the case before us it is the property “ belonging or appertaining to said seminary,” and the word “ belonging ” is construed by the Supreme Court as not synonymous with “ owned by,” nor is the word “ seminary” regarded in this connection as the equivalent of the word “ corporation.”
But the plaintiff in error contends that however correct the construction adopted by the state courts might be if founded upon general rules of construction pertaining to claims for exemption from taxation, it is plainly erroneous under the provision of section 6 of the charter, providing that the act “ shall be deemed a public act, and shall be construed liberally in all courts fop the purposes therein expressed.”
To adopt the construction contended for by the plaintiff in error would call for a reversal of the rules otherwise prevailing in and governing claims for exemption from taxation. But it is nevertheless urged that if in any way the language of exemption can "by a liberal construction be said to cover the whole *676property owned by the corporation, such construction must be adopted by reason of the provisions contained in section 6. We think this is claiming'entirely too much for the language of that section. • ' -
As is therein stated, the act must be construed liberally for the purposes therein expressed. What are those purposes ? In this respect the word " purposes ” in. section 6 is synonymous with the word óbject ” in section 2, as we think, and we find ‘that the object or purpose is stated in section 2, “ To furnish instruction and the means of éducation to young men preparing for the gospel ministry, and the institution shall be equally open to all denominations of Christians for this purpose.” It is for the accomplishment of this purpose or object that the act is to be liberally construed. If a question should arise regarding the meaning of the language to furnish instruction or the means of education,” and how far the words should be extended and what they should include, the words should be liberally construed as provided for in the sixth section, because to furnish instruction or the means of education is the expressed purpose or object óf the áet. So in regard to the powers of the board of directors as provided fdr in the charter; those powers should be liberally construed for the furtherance of the object stated in the charter. To do so would not violate any well-settled rule of construction and would nevertheless be sufficient in case of doubt to turn the decision in favor of a construction more liberal in its nature than might otherwise be properly adopted. But we do not think if was intended by the language of the sixth section to provide a'complete overthrow of a canon of construction such as the one in question, which has obtained for so many years and has been so universally and so strictly adopted and adhered to by the courts of the whole bountry. We again resort to the language of the opinion of the Illinois court for the presentation of its'own reasons for the somewhat strict construction of the' exemption clause adopted by it. After stating-that it should not be presumed that the legislature 'intended to exempt property from taxation, but such intention must appear affirmatively, and it will be strictly construed, and *677that any ambiguities must operate against the parties who claim the exemption, the court (p. 181) continued:
“ That laws exempting property from taxation are generally subject to these rules of construction is not seriously questioned, but counsel for appellee say said rules do not apply here, because by section 6 of the charter it is provided that the act ‘shall be construed liberally in all courts for the purposes therein expressed.’ We do not think this language was intended to or could be held to change or qualify the general rules of construction applicable to the section under consideration. Here the very question to be determined is, what is the purpose expressed in that section? And to' say that liberal rules of construction must, under section 6, be applied in favor of the contention that all property belonging or appertaining to the corporation is exempt would be to beg the whole question. In determining what purpose is expressed in the section, resort must necessarily be had to the general rules for considering such laws. When that purpose is ascertained, liberal rules of construction, if necessary, are to be resorted to, to gi ve effect to such purpose. . . . We think this case turns upon whether or not the words ‘ said seminary,’ used in the fifth clause, should be given the meaning of ‘ said corporation.’ In our opinion the application of the rules of construction above referred to do not warrant such a construction.”
This is not such an unnatural, strained or unreasonable construction of the act as shows it to be erroneous, and while it might be otherwise construed so as to effect a total exemption, we are not prepared to hold that the state court so clearly erred as to call upon us to reverse its determination. We, therefore, adopt, though we admit with some hesitation, the views of the state court, which lead to an affirmance of the judgments.
Affirmed.