(dissenting).
I find myself in accord with much that has been written by Judge Bastían in his dissenting opinion, concurred in by Judge Miller, but in noting my dissent as to both presently pending appeals, I wish to emphasize certain other factors.
Re No. 12,374, the appeal of Hayward-Schuster Woolen Mills, Inc. which sought to intervene as defendant on the side of the Secretary, not because it believed the minimum prevailing wage as determined by the Secretary was the correct wage, but because appellant believed it should not be lower than $1.20 per hour although appellant tells us it is paying the highest prevailing wages of any manufacturer in the industry. Appellant urges that the Fulbright amendment1 granted it intervention as of right. On that ground, appellant insists that it comes under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and further, that the Rule entitles the appellant to intervene as of right because the representation of the interest of appellant is or may be inadequate and the appellant will be bound by a judgment in the main action. Appellant argues that in any event it is entitled to permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), but the record discloses no showing that the District Judge abused his discretion. As will be developed in my views, the Secretary’s determination has resulted in no fixing of private rights nor does the situation present the elements of a litigable adversary action stemming from the administrative order whose review is sought. I believe the appellant’s claims in these particulars must be gauged in the light of the purposes of the Walsh-Healey Act and by what the sponsors of the Fulbright amendment sought to accomplish. Thus tested, I believe the appellant’s position is untenable.
The Walsh-Healey Act was designed to permit the government to prescribe the standards /which would obtain when it purchased its own supplies. Congress *774sought “to obviate the possibility that any part of our tremendous national expenditures would go to forces tending to depress wages and purchasing power and offending fair social standards of employment.” 2 Indeed, Congress sought affirmatively through the Act “to use the leverage of the Government’s immense purchasing power to raise labor standards.” 23 The Walsh-Healey Act “was not intended to be a bestowal of litigable rights upon those desirous of selling to the Government; it is a self-imposed restraint for violation of which the Government — but not private litigants — can complain.”4 Congress knew very well that some manufacturers would be excluded from public contracts if they failed or refused to raise their standards. It knew, equally, that a determination by the Secretary compels nothing of any private party since he need not submit bids for nor work upon government orders. Notwithstanding, Congress provided that determinations under the Act are to be made by the Secretary to the end that the Government may exercise its “unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases.” 5 The provisions of the Act are not merely permissive, they are mandatory, and “Congress submitted the administration of the Act to the judgment of the Secretary of Labor, not to the judgment of the courts.” 6
Among the sections of the Walsh-Healey Act administered by the Secretary are §§ 35-39 and §§ 41-43,7 including, of course, wage determinations under § 35(b).
Thus, when Congress adopted the Fulbright amendment, by its subsection (a) it made applicable to the administration of the mentioned sections of the Walsh-Healey Act certain provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, and, applicable to this particular case, the judicial review provision.8 The Fulbright amendment says that review of a wage determination or of its applicability may be had “by any person adversely affected or aggrieved.” The Administrative Procedure Act added nothing to status for it provides for review only by a person “suffering legal wrong” or “adversely affected or aggrieved.” A reading of the scope of review authorized9 makes it clear that the amendment has created no legal “right” where none existed. To persons “adversely” affected or aggrieved were accorded “proper procedural and judicial safeguards.” 10
It is to be assumed that when Congress imposes certain duties upon the Secretary to effectuate Congressional purpose and policy, those duties will be performed. They are to be carried out as Congress directed, and when a determination shall have been made “on the record after opportunity for a hearing” and agreeably to law, “that decision was stated by the Act to be conclusive as to matters of fact for purposes of the award of government contracts. Congress sought to have the procurement officers advised by the experience and discretion of the •Secretary rather than of the District ■Court.”11 I see no room here for a prospective bidder to become a party defendant on the side of the Secretary whose action is challenged by those “adversely” affected.
*775Re No. 12,331, the appeal of Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, which sought to intervene on the side of the Secretary because it is a labor organization representing certain employees in the woolen and worsted industry and is the exclusive collective bargaining representative as to the employees of six of the appellees. Like the manufacturer-appellant, the Union relies largely upon Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. From much of what has been said it may seem that the Union occupies no different status than that of HaywardSchuster, but the law and its legislative history, as I read it, place the Union in an even less secure position. “If the general law permits prospective bidders to challenge each wage determination of the Secretary in the courts, by a like token all employees affected could obtain judicial review.”12 The Court clearly demonstrates that as to either group, no such power was ever intended by the Walsh-Healey Act, and if not to individual employees, not to their union, either. The wisdom of its prescience may be demonstrated by cases pending in this very court where the effectiveness of the prevailing wage determination has been so far deferred that it ultimately may turn out to be obsolete. Surely, the Fulbright amendment was never designed, nor did Congress in passing it expect, to make a shambles out of the Walsh-Healey Act by admitting hordes of “parties,” each with a right of appeal, each engendering further delay. That is why it is limited to those adversely affected and hence does not reach those “who show no more than a mere possible injury to the public.” 13 Thus, the Union acquires no status under Rule 24(a), and so far as application of 24(b) is urged, the court is specifically commanded in exercising its discretion, to “consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.”
I know that Senator Fulbright, in the legislative footwork involved in passing his amendment, expressed the view that a union in some situations might acquire status under it. See 98 Cong.Rec. 6530 (1952). But comment in debate is not usually taken as a substitute either for committee reports or for what Congress voted. At one point, Congress actually had before it a proposal which would have included employees and labor organizations, but it was not pressed. The sponsors may have concluded that if a union is in a superior economic status, it always can bargain for more than the minimum, while the employer, regardless of its economic power, can not bargain for less. In this very case many of the employees represented by the Union already receive more than the alleged prevailing wage. Let it be remembered that Congress was acting for a public purpose, not for private objectives, and it limited review to those “adversely” affected. Whatever the reason for the action taken, we may note from the history that the Fulbright amendment in its original form expressly provided for review of prevailing wage determinations by:
“(1) any person adversely affected or aggrieved thereby;
“(2) any manufacturer of, or regular dealer in, materials, supplies, articles, or equipment purchased, or to be purchased, by the Government from any source; and
“(3) any of the employees of such manufacturer or regular dealer, or any labor organization recognized by such manufacturer or dealer or duly certified by the National Labor Relations Board, as representing such employees.” See S.Rep.No. 1599, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1952).
Surely it is not without significance that clause (3) of the proposed amendment was entirely omitted when the bill came to the attention of the Senate. 98 Cong. Rec. 6529 (1952).
One more word: a contract of hiring runs between the employer and the employee. Even where a duly constituted
*776bargaining representative sought to enforce a collective bargaining agreement between it and the respondent employer, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress conferred no jurisdiction on the federal courts. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 1955, 348 U.S. 437, 75 S.Ct. 488, 502. Mr. Justice Reed, concurring, said:
“The reason, I think, that this union cannot recover from the employer in this suit under § 301 [29 U.S. C.A. § 185] is that the claim for wages for the employees arises from •separate hiring contracts between the employer and each employee. The union does not undertake to do work for the employer or even to furnish workers. The duty, if any there be, to pay wages to an employee arises from the individual contract between the employer and employee, not from the collective bargaining agreement.”14
By analogy, it seems to me that the Union here lacks standing. I would affirm the District Court’s orders in both cases.
. 41 U.S.C.A. § 43a (1952).
. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 1940, 310 U.S. 113, 128, 60 S.Ct. 869, 877, 84 E. Ed. 1108.
. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 1943, 317 U.S. 501, 507, 63 S.Ct. 339, 342, 87 L.Ed. 424.
. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., supra note 2, 310 U.S. at page 127, 60 S.Ct. at page 877.
. Id., 310 U.S. at page 127, 610 S.Ct. at page 876.
. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, supra note 3, 317 U.S. at page 507, 63 S.Ct. at page 342.
. 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 35-39, §§ 41-43 (1952).
. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009(a) (1952).
. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009(e) (1952).
. S.Rep.No.1599, May 27, 1952, to accompany S. 2594; cf. Conference Report No. 2352, June 28, 1952.
. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, supra note 3, 317 U.S. at page 509, 63 S. Ct. at page 343.
. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., supra note 2, 310 U.S. at page 131, 60 S.Ct. at page 879.
. Id., 310 U.S. at page 132, 60 S.Ct at page 879.
. Cf. Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters’ Union, 5 Cir., 1955, 223 F.2d 842.