The majority have ordered a remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the constitutional competency of petitioner’s trial counsel in his capital murder case. The majority conclude that Street-man’s allegations imply that facts material to determining his counsels’ effectiveness were, through no fault of his own, not brought out in the state court habeas proceedings. I respectfully dissent for several reasons. In my view, Streetman’s belated accusations are not material under the “deficiency” prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Streetman either merits no additional federal court evidentiary hearing because he has deliberately bypassed the state court system, or the district court should conduct a hearing on the preliminary issue of deliberate bypass. Finally, I believe that the conduct of an evidentiary hearing, unrestrained by the presumption of correctness contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), represents an unwarranted disregard of the state court’s thorough findings on the competency of Streetman’s trial counsel.
A brief recharacterization of the strategy pursued by Streetman’s habeas counsel and the testimony before the state habeas court shed important light on the “new” material facts which the majority now seek to emphasize. Streetman was tried in 1983, and his capital conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1985. On January 3, 1986, in open court, Streetman expressed his desire to have the execution date set as early as possible and to avoid any further action taken on his behalf to delay execution. Execution was set for February 6, 1986. On January 29, Streetman was prevailed upon to sign an affidavit attached to an application for state writ of habeas corpus. The application, which recited in detail the perceived flaws in his attorneys’ trial strategy, was not filed until the afternoon of February 3, five days later. The court ordered an evidentiary hearing the following morning. Streetman and his family appeared at the hearing with his attorney, Will Gray. The court delayed the hearing for 40 minutes to allow Streetman and Gray to confer. Gray more than once requested a continuance of the hearing for the purpose of obtaining expert witnesses to testify on the issue of trial counsel’s effectiveness. The trial court, which originally stated that he did not mind if the hearing should continue another day, ultimately refused to do so when it appeared that the sole reason for continuance would be to obtain expert testimony.
The hearing lasted several hours and involved lengthy, detailed, and meticulous examination on the trial strategy employed by Streetman’s defense attorneys. The hearing transcript is nearly 200 pages long. Testimony on the admissibility of Street-*962man’s confessions occupies a not insignificant portion of the transcript.
Gray acknowledged in oral argument before this Court that some of Streetman’s family members told him, before the state hearing concluded, about alleged promises made to Streetman to induce him to confess. Despite their presence in the courtroom, counsel neither called these witnesses nor informed the state trial court of their testimony. Streetman did not testify.
The trial court made written findings of fact and conclusions of law, described accurately the reasonable trial strategy of Streetman’s counsel, recommended that relief be denied, and forwarded the record to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on February 5,1986. Execution was stayed in the Court of Criminal Appeals until March 17, 1986. During those six weeks, Street-man never even attempted to inform the Texas courts that his claims were not adequately developed.
The state habeas court was thoroughly apprised of the basis for defense counsel’s failure to challenge the admission of Streetman’s confessions at trial. Street-man’s counsel Mr. Coe outlined his trial strategy as evolving from Streetman’s repeated admissions of guilt and statements that he wanted the death penalty rather than to spend his life in jail. Coe specifically inquired about Streetman’s confessions to the police, and Streetman responded that he had been treated well. Streetman further told Coe that if he were required to take the stand, he would admit his guilt. On the basis of Streetman's firm pronouncements to Coe, supplemented by conversations with the interrogating officers and Streetman’s wife, Coe concluded that the confessions could not be suppressed. Mr. McNeely, the “second-chair” defense attorney, testified in vague terms that he would have attempted to suppress the confessions because he felt they were involuntary. When pressed on the reasons for involuntariness, McNeely said only, “he told me that [he had not been in any way coerced] and also he told me that he had been coerced. He told us 40 different thousand things during this trial.”1
I.
Stripped to its essentials, Streetman claims, and the majority find superficially persuasive, that his trial counsel failed properly to investigate the admissibility of his confessions because Streetman withheld from counsel at the trial level critical facts concerning the confession. Street-man has always held the key to unlocking this information. It is not the failure of counsel or of state proceedings, but of Streetman himself that creates the predicament in which he appears before, this Court.
Under these circumstances Streetman’s contention that his confessions were induced by valium and threats or promises should be unavailing. Effective assistance of counsel depends upon the objective reasonableness of counsel’s conduct as well as the prejudice caused by an alleged error. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). No one can question the prejudice that Streetman would have suffered if his trial counsel unreasonably failed to investigate the background of his confessions. Strickland, however, requires a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments, particularly when they are based on information supplied to counsel by the defendant:
The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information. For example, when the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be considerably diminished or *963eliminated altogether. And when a defendant has given counsel a reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable. In short, inquiry into counsel’s conversations with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel’s investigation decisions. ...” 466 U.S. at 691-92, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-67.
Strickland answers the intimation by the majority that Streetman’s failure to confide in or to supply complete information to his trial counsel renders the attorneys’ performance constitutionally defective.2 See Johnson v. Cabana, 805 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir.1986). The information on which defense counsel relied was fully aired in the state habeas hearing. Attorney Coe repeatedly stated that Streetman denied having been coerced and that from conversations with family members he had no reason to believe the confessions were inadmissible. Coe was no stranger to criminal lawsuits. He had been the district attorney in Hardin County for twelve years, and, by the affirmation of. the federal district and state courts, he was a wily, careful and extremely competent practitioner. McNeely, questioned pointedly about the factual basis underlying his professed belief that Streetman confessed involuntarily, could allege no specific statements by Streetman or family members to substantiate his fear. McNeely, on the contrary, testified that Streetman told him “forty different thousand things.” In summary, I believe that even if Streetman’s most recent allegations are absolutely correct, he cannot prevail on his constitutional ineffectiveness of counsel claim because he prevented its assertion in the trial court.3
II.
The majority rely on Guice v. Fortenberry, 661 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc), which holds that the criteria enunciated by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963) for a mandatory federal habeas hearing supplement the procedures set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Townsend mandates a federal evidentiary hearing inter alia, “[i]f, for any reason not attributable to the inexcusable neglect of petitioner, ... evidence crucial to the adequate consideration of the constitutional claim was not developed at the state hearing.” 372 U.S. at 317, 83 S.Ct. at 759. Under Guice and Townsend, a petitioner must establish the absence of excusable neglect or intentional bypass of the state court procedures.
The majority, by focussing on the self-serving statements of petitioner’s habeas counsel, have interpreted far too generously the standard for inexcusable neglect or deliberate bypass. The purpose of this standard is to enforce both the integrity and completeness of state court proceedings. If a petitioner could present one set of facts allegedly constituting ineffectiveness of counsel before the state court arid then elaborate upon those facts in order to secure a second federal evidentiary hearing, the integrity of the state judicial process would be compromised. Encouraging such tactics is inimical to judicial economy in both the state and federal court systems.
Ordinarily, courts hold an evidentiary hearing preliminarily to determine whether a petitioner or his counsel was guilty of *964excusable neglect or deliberate bypass. Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 519 (5th Cir.1978); Thomas v. Zant, 697 F.2d 977, 986-88 (11th Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 3325, 92 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986). Erroneously, I believe, the majority bypassed that requirement in holding that “habeas counsel’s lack of preparation and consequent failure to fully articulate his ineffective assistance of counsel argument before the state district court was the cause of his failure to adequately develop the evidence.” The majority also emphasize “the extraordinary time pressure under which habeas counsel was operating.”
With all due respect, I cannot agree with this appellate court’s findings of fact. Petitioner’s habeas counsel Mr. Gray is among the most experienced capital defense counsel in the country. The paramount importance of Streetman’s confessions can hardly have escaped his attention. Gray conferred privately with Streetman for 40 minutes before the hearing began. Gray carefully and extensively cross-examined Coe and McNeely concerning the basis on which they evaluated the confessions. His interrogation on all other issues demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the trial record and was bolstered by numerous transcript references. Gray represented to this Court that he became aware of Street-man’s allegations of coercion during the state habeas hearing, while elsewhere Gray stated he did not find out these allegations until after the close of the hearing. In either event, the failure to bring this evidence before the Texas courts during seven weeks of proceedings there is significant, and I believe, inexcusable.
Guice v. Fortenberry, 661 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc) cited by the majority, represents a narrow holding on the issue of deliberate bypass and is distinguishable from this case. Critically, Guice concluded that a federal evidentiary hearing was necessary because the state trial court never made findings of fact on the issue raised by the petitioner. Id. at 506. Second, the court referred to “the confused nature of the presentation of the claims to the trial court,” Id., suggesting that, “the defendants and their attorneys did not appreciate fully the relevance of the missing evidence.” Id. at 507. Guice cannot be reconciled with this case, in which petitioner has been represented by able counsel at trial and in post-trial efforts and in which the state courts thoroughly considered Streetman’s ineffectiveness claim.
An enlightening case in this area is Thomas v. Zant, 697 F.2d 977, (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 3325, 92 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986), where the petitioner for the first time supplied the federal district court with an affidavit of his trial counsel that suggested a complete lack of trial preparation. Explaining why neither the affidavit nor any testimony from the trial attorney surfaced during state habeas corpus proceedings, the petitioner charged his habeas counsel with ineffectiveness. No such claim has been made here. The Eleventh Circuit, confronted in Thomas a more convincing case of attorney oversight than the present one, nevertheless remanded for a preliminary hearing on the issue of deliberate bypass.
The majority artificially narrow the issue of deliberate bypass to the conduct of Gray, ignoring Streetman’s critical role in his own defense. Guice and Thomas properly reviewed the conduct of counsel because the issue or error or ineffectiveness in those cases turned on information not ordinarily known to the defendant. An enormous gulf separates that type of inquiry from this case. Streetman never confided the details of his allegedly coerced confessions to trial counsel or to Gray until during or after the state evidentiary hearing. To this day, we have received only allegations, and not a single affidavit from Streetman or any other proposed witness, concerning the confessions. Surely a petitioner may not escape the charge of deliberate bypass of state proceedings by never revealing or adequately revealing a claimed constitutional defect to his attorneys in connection with the evidentiary development of the case in state court. Equally fatal to his access to federal court should be habeas counsel’s failure to seek a new *965hearing in the state court for the purpose of adding significant additional allegations to petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim.
III.
By far the most troubling aspect of the majority’s opinion is the signal sent to would-be habeas petitioners and to the state courts. If “crucial evidence” under Townsend can be satisfied by statements out of the petitioner’s own mouth, and if a petitioner has no obligation to bring before the state court system his complete allegations concerning a constitutional claim, the obvious incentive is to give the state courts only a small taste of the grounds alleged for habeas relief.4 Streetman could have raised his allegations in the normal course, aired them fully in the state courts, and received federal review under the presumption of correctness accorded state fact findings by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). His dilatory tactics have unfortunately led the majority to order a federal evidentiary hearing in which the state court findings will be accorded no deference.
The effect of ordering a mandatory federal evidentiary hearing in this case particularly causes friction with the state criminal justice system. Streetman waited until the eleventh hour to seek a stay of execution and then obtained two successive stays while the courts have been reviewing his claims. He had a full and fair hearing in the state trial court, which culminated in the issuance of specific findings and conclusions pertaining to effectiveness of counsel.5 This Court, never having laid eyes on Streetman or his trial counsel, concludes that his late-breaking allegations of failure by counsel to investigate undermine the state court’s findings concerning the nature of and basis for that strategy. Those findings have previously withstood attack in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and in the federal district court, which carefully and independently reviewed and approved the state court fact findings.
It is not the role of this Court even under the auspices of the Great Writ to accord state procedures so little deference. I respectfully DISSENT.
. McNeely acknowledged that he had attempted to bargain for a life sentence for Streetman, a decision which implicitly concedes the admissibility of the confessions.
. Recognizing that constitutional effectiveness of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070, the Supreme Court nevertheless recognized that a state court’s factfindings subsidiary to that issue, such as whether counsel’s decision was based up on sound trial strategy, are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Id. The state habeas court made comprehensive findings on the strategy employed by Streetman’s trial counsel.
. The allegations springing from Streetman’s relatives are no more convincing on the merits of his claim. First, Coe spoke with Streetman’s wife and McNeely with other relatives prior to trial and came up with no memorable evidence of involuntariness. Second, the family members had at least as much incentive as Street-man to inform defense counsel fully of the facts, and there is no suggestion that they were unavailable or unwilling to cooperate. Third, the duty to investigate the confessions rests, in fine, on counsel's evaluation of the facts related by Streetman, and he gave them nothing to go on.
. As the majority point out, this "weak case/strong case” tactic has been dismissed by the federal court when the state argued lack of exhaustion in the state courts. Certainly, it is an appropriate remedy to send Streetman back to the state court system to present his "real” claims initially. Joyner v. King, 786 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 653, 93 L.Ed.2d 708 (1986). This is not, however, an efficient remedy, and it plays into the hands of counsel, particularly in capital cases, who typically use every possible delaying tactic, secure in the belief that no judge will impose sanctions on them for exceeding the bounds of acceptable procedure.
. The Fifth Circuit has been consistently reluctant to order a federal evidentiary hearing after a habeas petitioner underwent a state court hearing on the claim he brought to federal court. See West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 510 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.1975) en banc; Baldwin v. Maggio, 704 F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 2669, 81 L.Ed.2d 374 (1984). Federal hearings have been required, by contrast, in cases where the state court made no factual findings on the constitutional issue, Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d 717, 722 (5th Cir.1976), or where the state courts held no hearing on counsel’s effectiveness, Clark v. Blackburn, 619 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir.1980).