Dissenting:
I dissent because Title VII does not apply to this case at all and Kang did not file his California wrongful termination claim on time.
A. Title VII
In order for an employer to be covered by Title VII, it must have at least 15 employees during at least a portion of the year. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). U. Lim America never had more than 5 employees. Thus, on its face, Title VII does not even apply to U. Lim America.
Kang recognizes as much, but he argues that the employees of U. Lim de Mexico should be swept into the count, and it would then be far over the 15 employee requirement. It is true that there are times when the employees of two separate entities can be treated as if they belonged to one entity for Title VII purposes. See, e.g., Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir.1995); Childs v. Local 18, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 719 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.1983); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337-39 (6th Cir.1983); cf. Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 486 (3d Cir.) (Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 345, 151 L.Ed.2d 261 (2001); Hukill v. Auto Care, Inc., 192 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir.1999) (Family and Medical Leave Act). But, we need not consider whether the structure of the various U. Lim enterprises would allow us to combine the employees of U. Lim America with those of U. Lim de Mexico for Title VII purposes1 because it would not advance Kang’s claim, if they were combined.
The plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) which, while generally unhelpfully defining an employee as “an individual employed by an employer,” goes on to state that “[wjith respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.” Thus, it is apparent that “[u]n-less an American citizen, a person employed abroad is not an ‘employee’ under Title VII.” Russell v. Midwest-Werner & *821Pfleiderer, Inc., 955 F.Supp. 114, 115 (D.Kan.1997). In other words, the definition of employee does not automatically include all persons working abroad because, if it did, there would be no reason to expressly include United States citizens. Rather, non-United States citizens, who are working abroad, are not employees within the meaning of Title VII and cannot be counted when we decide if an entity is an employer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
The above reasoning is compatible with and underscored by the reasoning of the Supreme Court on the related question of whether aliens working in the United States are covered by Title VII. The Court pointed out that because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) provides that Title VII does not apply “ ‘with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State,’ ” it must apply “with respect to the employment of aliens inside any State.” Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 95, 94 S.Ct. 334, 340, 38 L.Ed.2d 287 (1973). Similarly, if Congress has declared that employee does include “an individual who is a citizen of the United States,” working abroad,2 it must mean that it does not include “an individual who is [not] a citizen of the United States,” working abroad. Each instance is encompassed by the hypostasis of that old rule of construction (rather than of logic): inclusio unius est exclusio alteri-as.
I recognize that this may conflict with a holding of the Second Circuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39 (2d Cir.1998). In Morelli, the court addressed an argument that only the domestic employees of a foreign employer should be counted for ADEA purposes. Id. at 44-45. It would seem that the court could have answered that question by pointing to the fact that United States citizens employed abroad are included in the ADEA definition of an employee (just as they are included under Title VII), even if they are not located domestically. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f). The court went further, however, and stated that if Congress intended to “exclude a foreign employer’s foreign workers,” it could have said so. Morelli, 141 F.3d at 44. That seems to turn matters upside down; as I have already indicated, it seems pellucid that Congress included United States citizens working abroad because, otherwise, they would be excluded along with other persons who work abroad. In a further dictum, the court declared that “a U.S. corporation with many foreign employees but fewer than 20 domestic ones would certainly be subject to the ADEA.” Id. at 45. With all due respect, I am unable to embrace that alleged certainty.
As I see it, the root of the Second Circuit’s decision is a belief that the purpose of the employee numerosity requirement is to protect smaller employers, and companies with a number of foreign employees in a foreign land are not small employers. Id. at 45.3 Maybe not, but Congress could easily have put that concept in the statute, if that was what it meant. Moreover, the statute speaks with enough clarity to permit (nay require) one to stop with its own words, rather than undertaking to stravage in a wilderness of possible legislative purposes. See Or. Natural Res. Council, Inc. v. Kantor, 99 F.3d 334, 339 (9th Cir.1996). In fine, to the *822extent that the Second Circuit’s holding differs from my view, I disagree with it.
Kang, who felt oppressed by his employer, which hired only Koreans and thought of him and other Koreans as a kind of working elite, seeks to maintain a Title VII action against that employer, U. Lim America. However, U. Lim America had a very slight presence in this country, and very few United States citizens working for it anywhere. In fact, over the whole time he was with the company, it had a total of seven employees (five at any one time) and of those no more than two were United States citizens. Even were we to consider the employees of U. Lim de Mexico, no United States citizens would be added. Thus, the total of employees in the United States and United States citizen employees abroad never came even close to the 15 employees required before Title VII applies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). None of Kang’s arguments can immask that fact.4
B. California FEHA
The district court dismissed Kang’s wrongful termination claim because California’s one year statute of limitations barred it. See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340; Funk v. Sperry Corp., 842 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir.1988). I agree with that.
Kang was terminated on February 2, 1998, and did not file his action until February 16, 1999. He perceives the difficulty, but believes that the statute should have been tolled while proceedings under Title VII, and under the California Fair Housing and Employment Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940, were pending. Of course, California does apply equitable tolling principles when a party is pursuing one avenue of -relief and others are possible. See Arnold v. United States, 816 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.1987); Addison v. California, 21 Cal.3d 313, 319, 578 P.2d 941, 943-44, 146 Cal.Rptr. 224, 227 (1978).
I am satisfied that California would not apply equitable tolling here because the few days that an administrative proceeding was pending5 ended long before the wrongful termination statute of limitations ran. Those proceedings did not interfere with his filing of the wrongful termination action; he could have filed it in a timely manner with no difficulty whatsoever. He was sent the last of his right to sue letters November 20, 1998, and, even without tolling he had until February 2, 1999, to file his action.
The California Supreme Court has pointed out that nothing actually impedes a person from filing his tort claim in a timely fashion and then amending to join a delayed FEHA claim later. See Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal.3d 65, 88, 801 P.2d 373, 388, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 145 (1990). It would, undoubtedly, look with a jaded eye upon Kang’s assertion that he did not have to file his tort claim, even though he had his right to sue letter long before the statute of limitations expired. Kang cites no authority to the contrary. Cf. Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal.3d 410, 413, 525 P.2d 81, 83, 115 Cal.Rptr. 641, 643 (1974) (statute of limitations expired while first action pending); Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 8 Cal.3d 247, 268, 502 P.2d 1049, 1063, 104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 775 (1972) (same); *823Addison, 21 Cal.3d at 319, 578 P.2d at 943-44, 146 Cal.Rptr. at 227 (same). Moreover, I do not see Kang’s pro forma filings with the agencies and wait of months before filing his action as anything approaching “reasonable and good faith conduct” on his part. Addison, 21 Cal.3d at 319, 578 P.2d at 943, 146 Cal.Rptr. at 227.
Finally, even if the 12 days6 during which his claims were before the public agencies tolled the statute of limitations, his wrongful termination action was still filed 14 days later, which was one day too late. As is too often the case, Kang, or his advisors, played chicken with the statute of limitations, and lost.
Thus, I respectfully dissent.
. I do note that the test has been used in an attempt to make the "affiliated" corporation liable for the acts of the immediate employer. See Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1069-70 (10th Cir.1998). Here, Kang does not seek that — U. Lim de Mexico has not even been joined in this action. Kang seeks to make the immediate employer liable and to count the employees of an alleged affiliate for the purposes of meeting the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) only. There is no need to decide that question. But see Rogero v. Noone, 704 F.2d 518, 520-21 (11th Cir.1983).
. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
. See also, Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 271 F.3d 903, 908-09 (9th Cir.2001) (Graber, J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2002) (No. 01-1435).
. Because U. Lim America is not covered by Title VII, neither is Yoon. In addition, individual defendants are not liable under Title VII. Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir.1993).
. Kang expressly asked that there be no actual administrative proceeding and, thus, his claim was pending before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for a mere seven days and before the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing for an even shorter five days.
. Kang asserts that because his DFEH complaint purports to have been signed by him on September 23, 1998, it must be taken as filed on that date, but the department's stamp shows it was actually received on October 15, 1998. The notice to sue states that as the date of filing, and because he asked for an immediate right-to-sue notice, it gave it to him on October 20, 1998.