dissenting.
Judge McBryde acted with courage and pertinacity in defending his judicial authority against the actions of assorted lawyers, bureaucrats, and colleagues. He succeeded, fully and unequivocally. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vindicated his position, and returned his cases to his docket. In re McBryde, 117 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.1997). My colleagues on this panel hold that because the defense of his official acts required Judge McBryde to seek a writ of mandamus, he was therefore not a “defender” of judicial authority, but simply a “plaintiff initiating offensive litigation.” On this ground the court holds that Judge McBryde is not entitled to the benefit of the statute whereby judges are recompensed for the attorney fees incurred in defense of actions taken in their official capacity.
The stakes for the nation are high. When a judge’s cases are transferred in order to change the result, such actions threaten the public’s right to an independent judiciary. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 831 (1978):
As early as 1872, the Court recognized that it was “a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own *1370convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”
(quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871)).
The attorney services statute, 28 U.S.C. § 463,1 is based on the premise that judicial acts must be free of intimidation and that the defense of judicial acts should not be at the personal expense of the judge. We are not here called upon to decide how far a district or circuit court can go in overseeing the way a judge performs his duties, for the Fifth Circuit decided that issue in favor of Judge McBryde. The only question before us is the statutory entitlement to reimbursement of attorney fees.
The Judicial Acts
The incidents that triggered these events are not irrelevant to this review, for they make clear that Judge McBryde had “taken acts in his official capacity,” 28 U.S.C. § 463, and that he became obliged to defend these acts. In two cases, that of Torres and of Satz, the chief judge of the district court transferred the pending cases from Judge McBryde’s docket to his own, and withdrew orders that Judge McBryde had issued and substituted his own, thereby changing substantive rulings.
In the Toms case, the court clerk discovered that the clerk’s office, through inadvertence, had not followed Judge McBryde’s order four years earlier that the sum of $40,000 awarded to a minor named Grecia Torres should be placed in an interest-bearing account. On discovering the error the clerk contacted the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and received the advice that the minor should file a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Judge McBryde rejected this remedy, and issued an Order that stated:
The court is disappointed that there would even be a suggestion that Grecia Torres, a minor, acting through a person or persons who might legally be qualified to act on her behalf, would be required to go to the time and expense to eMiaust administrative remedies, through a tort claims process, before being able to obtain relief from violation of an order of this court....
The clerk, upon consultation with Chief Judge Buchmeyer, responded in a manner that Judge McBryde deemed “disrespectful” and “insolent.” Judge McBryde insisted that action under the Tort Claims Act was an inappropriate remedy for the court’s error, whereupon the Chief Judge removed the case from Judge McBryde, reassigned it to himself, vacated Judge McBryde’s orders, and sealed the file.2 Chief Judge Buchmeyer filed a memorandum stating that the reassignment was necessary “to avoid public humiliation and damage to the District Clerk, as well as to the reputation of this Court.”
The second case involved the criminal trial of a defendant named Satz. After jury trial and conviction of Satz, Judge McBryde denied the government’s request to delay sentencing until after sentencing of Satz on a similar conviction in Arizona. The issues were complex,3 and after various hearings Judge McBryde held an As*1371sistant United States Attorney in contempt for failing to comply with an order of the court and refusing to answer questions about the Arizona proceeding, Judge McBryde stating that the AUSA “engaged in falsehood and deception.” The AUSA complained to Chief Judge Buchmeyer, who vacated Judge McBryde’s contempt order and reassigned the ease to himself. Judge McBryde objected, and attempted to enter the judgment and sentence. Chief Judge Buchmeyer then directed the clerk to file only materials signed by himself; he declared Judge McBryde’s orders void, and sealed the file. Judge Buchmeyer issued an order that described the accused AUSA as “entirely truthful,” and quoted the Arizona U.S. Attorney as stating that Judge McBryde’s action in unsealing the file jeopardized an Arizona grand jury investigation.4
Judge McBryde filed a “Request for Assistance in Resolution of Dispute” with the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council. Circuit Chief Judge Politz referred the matter to a Special Investigatory Committee. The Committee heard testimony from Judge McBryde, but refused his request to be present during the testimony of the other witnesses, Chief Judge Buchmeyer and the clerk and AUSA who had been criticized. The Judicial Council adopted the Committee’s recommendations, ruling that Judge McBryde’s accusations “threaten[ed] irreparable damage to the professional reputations and career of’ the clerk and the AUSA, and criticized other actions in these cases as “an impediment to the effective administration of justice.”5
Judge McBryde appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, his appeal taking the form of a petition for a writ of mandamus for the return of these two cases to his docket. The Department of Justice provided counsel to Chief Judge Buchmeyer, the clerk, and the AUSA; the Judicial Council retained private counsel; and Judge McBryde retained private counsel. Following a hearing, the Fifth Circuit issued the writ of mandamus in favor of Judge McBryde. The court observed that “reassignment of cases in response to disagreement with substantive rulings pertaining to those cases threatens the very structure of the federal court system.” McBryde, 117 F.3d at 223.
The Fifth Circuit observed that the circuit’s Judicial Council is not an appellate court, and “Chief Judge Buchmeyer as a district judge lacks the power of appellate review over his fellow district court judges.” Id. The Fifth Circuit decision is not subject to collateral review; nor is it subject to administrative interpretation in application of 28 U.S.C. § 463. However, when Judge McBryde requested reimbursement of his attorney fees from the Administrative Office, as the statute provides, the General Counsel and Associate Director issued a “decision” denying reimbursement, ruling that the mandamus action was offensive rather than defensive.
*1372I
I do not speculate whether any of the participants in these events might have acted more temperately, mindful of “the egos that sometimes flourish under the shelter of Article III,” as the Fifth Circuit put it. The only question is whether Judge McBryde, who did not receive assistance of counsel from the Department of Justice under § 463, is entitled to reimbursement of his attorney fees under § 463.
The panel majority holds that Judge McBryde was neither “sued in his official capacity” nor “required to defend acts taken or omissions made in his official capacity.” The majority’s theory is that because Judge McBryde’s defense of his official acts took the form of petitioning for a writ of mandamus, he was not a defender but a “plaintiff.” However, the mandamus proceeding was solely in defense of Judge McBryde’s judicial actions and authority. A judge need not be subpoenaed, as the majority argues, in order to be in the position of defending “acts taken in his official capacity,” in the words of § 463.
The panel majority proposes that Judge McBryde could have simply acquiesced in this assault on his judicial authority, and thus have avoided the legal cost of defending his official acts. My colleagues read the words “otherwise required to defend” in § 463 to mean that the statute excludes legal services in any situation where such acquiescence is possible. I suppose a person can always choose not to defend oneself against attack. However, when the attack strikes at the independence and convictions of the judge, relief from the financial cost of that defense is- provided by § 463. As reiterated in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982):
[O]ur Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle — that the “judicial Power of the United States” must be reposed in an independent Judiciary. It commands that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear institutional protections for that independence.
An independent judiciary requires independence not only from the other branches of the government, but from pressures and influences of persons within the judicial institution, including the reassignment of cases in order to change their disposition.
Judicial independence and judicial integrity are inseparable. It is not Judge McBryde’s personal rights that are at issue; it is the nation’s right that judges be free of attempted dominance or pressure, that they conduct their judicial business in accordance with their conscience, and stand up for their convictions. Justice Charles Evans Hughes referred to the judge’s “bedrock of conviction” as the foundation strength of the nation’s system of justice. See The Supreme Court of the United States 49 (1928).
With finality of the Fifth Circuit’s decision, Judge McBryde’s entitlement to reimbursement of attorney fees under § 463 was established. This entitlement vested with the decision of the Fifth Circuit; there is no discretion in the Administrative Office to withhold reimbursement. Neither the Court of Federal Claims nor the Federal Circuit nor the Administrative Office has authority to re-eharacterize the proceedings in the Fifth Circuit. My colleagues on this panel appropriately point out that the Administrative Office was not created under Article III, and does not exercise policy authority over Article III judges. (Of course, neither was the Court of Federal Claims, to whom my colleagues consign this policy authority, created under Article III.) Section 463 is a fee-shifting statute, not a new cause of action. Whether the statutory conditions of § 463 *1373are met is the business and authority of the Fifth Circuit; and when the circuit court resolved Judge MeBryde’s defense of his official acts, reimbursement under § 463 is entirely ministerial. Indeed, congressional intent that this reimbursement be ministerial, and not subject to collateral review under the Tucker Act, is apparent in the structure of § 463, which directly authorizes the Administrative Office to dispense these funds. My colleagues err in holding that the Tucker Act applies and that the Court of Federal Claims (and the Federal Circuit on appeal) have authority and obligation to review the Fifth Circuit proceedings in order to decide entitlement to attorney fees.
II
Judge Cranch wrote that it “becomes the duty of the Judiciary calmly to poise the scales of justice, unmoved by the armed power, undisturbed by the clamor of the multitude,” United States v. Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189 (C.C.D.C.1807) (No. 14,622). Judge MeBryde’s positioning of the scales of justice was at a cost of $103,922.19. From my colleagues’ decision that these fees are not reimbursable under § 463, and from the procedure whereby reimbursement under § 463 requires satellite litigation in the Court of Federal Claims and potential appeal to the Federal Circuit, I respectfully dissent.
.28 U.S.C. § 463. Whenever a Chief Justice, justice, judge, officer, or employee of any United States court is sued in his official capacity, or is otherwise required to defend acts taken or omissions made in his official capacity, and the services of an attorney for the Government are not reasonably available pursuant to chapter 31 of this title, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may pay the costs of his defense.
. The facts are more fully set forth in the opinion of the Fifth Circuit, In re McBryde, 117 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.1997).
. See n. 2 supra.
. The Fifth Circuit found this "curious,” since earlier disclosures of the same information were not made under seal:
Curiously, this effect of Judge McBryde’s order [alerting targets of the investigation] is asserted in spite of disclosures made by AUSA Umphres’ first motion for a continuance, filed on April 4 not under seal and presumably served on Satz's attorney....
In re McBryde, 117 F.3d at 216.
. The majority opinion at its footnote 1 suggests that there were a "plethora” of "charges” against Judge McBryde. That is incorrect; the only issues related to these phases of the Torres and Satz cases. These charges did not concern "conduct on the bench,” as the panel majority states, but substantive acts taken in the judge's official capacity.