dissenting.
Twenty-one years ago Patrick Hampton began to serve a sixty-year sentence for deviate sexual assault, attempted rape and related crimes. At his trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of two of the three victims, Martha N. and Denise M., who clearly identified and implicated Hampton in the brutal crimes. In addition, the prosecution presented the testimony of a security guard at the concert, who unequivocally identified Hampton as the person he saw actively participating in the sexual assault of Denise M. Despite this evidence, the court has held that primarily because Hampton’s attorney failed to interview several of Hampton’s friends who were also at the concert, and possibly present their testimony, his representation of Hampton at trial was constitutionally deficient. However, even if we assume that Hampton’s attorney could have performed better in his service, because of the strong evidence of Hampton’s guilt it is not reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Therefore, because the Illinois Appellate Court reasonably applied relevant federal law to the facts of this case, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the district court’s grant of habeas corpus.
In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner is required to demonstrate that his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced by that sub-standard performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Strickland’s prejudice inquiry looks at whether “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a *261trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This requires the defendant to show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability, under Strickland, “is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. Additionally, under the AEDPA, a federal habeas court must consider whether the state court’s decision was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland regarding the prejudice prong. Roche v. Davis, 291 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir.2002). Here, Hampton cannot meet the Strickland requirements for demonstrating prejudice and therefore the Illinois state court’s application of those requirements was not unreasonable.
Although Hampton’s attorney Rodgon failed to investigate three of Hampton’s friends who may have testified that Hampton did not participate in the crime, this does not necessarily demonstrate prejudice. Even if we assume that all three witnesses would have testified at trial, it is likely that their testimony would have been conflicting, as demonstrated by their conflicting affidavits, and could have been more of a hindrance than a help.
Additionally, the court relies on the fact that because one of Hampton’s codefen-dants, Ronald Mallory, was acquitted, it demonstrates that further investigation into defense witnesses may have produced a different result for Hampton. Such reliance is misplaced. Ronald Mallory only had to contend with the identification of one victim, whereas three individuals — the two victims and one security guard — clearly and concisely identified Hampton.
Finally, his attorney’s failure to present Hampton’s own testimony to the jury or present evidence of his lack of gang affiliation, after promising to do both in his opening statement, similarly does not rise to the level of prejudice under Strickland. The court does not hold that the testimony that Hampton would have delivered in his defense could have swayed the jury, but instead holds that Rodgon should have explained why his client did not testify. But any explanation could be complicated and risky, and might have simply underscored the fact that he did not testify. The court also does not mention that Rodgon did not need to present evidence as to Hampton’s gang affiliation, despite his promise in his opening statement, because the State did not present any evidence with regard to Hampton’s gang affiliation. Without such evidence, Rodgon did not have anything to rebut. In fact, without the State’s evidence, it would have been potentially damaging for Rodgon to broach the issue of Hampton’s possible gang affiliation.
I
Therefore, because of the questionable prejudice caused by Rodgon’s alleged errors and the strong evidence of his guilt, Hampton has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of his trial would have been different. These deficiencies similarly preclude a finding that the Illinois Appellate Court’s dismissal of Hampton’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. I would, therefore, reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to deny the petition for habeas corpus, and I respectfully dissent.