concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 25] This is but another example of the erosion of the bargain struck between workers and employers, specifically in the area of benefits for an aggravation of a preexisting condition. See Saari v. ND Workers Compensation Bureau, 1999 ND 144, 598 N.W.2d 174; Baldock v. ND Workers Compensation Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 441 (N.D.1996); compare N.D.C.C. § 65-05-15 (1989) and N.D.C.C. § 65-05-15 (1997). The problem is further compounded by Bureau attorney Reagan Pufall’s representation to the legisla*81tive committee that the deletion of the language that the condition be “active” at the time of the work injury did not change the concepts of the 1989 aggravation statute and all the precedent developed by this Court, when in fact, it did, as pointed out in the majority opinion in footnote one.
[¶ 26] I concur with the majority in Part B, but respectfully dissent from Part A. The opinion of Dr. Dilla that Mikkelson had fibromyalgia before the October 1997 work injury has no factual basis. In fact, Dr. Dilla testified he was unable to state “definitively” Mikkelson had fibromyalgia in 1993 or 1994 only that her “trigger points” “palpated out by her therapists and other treating physicians” were “consistent with fibromyalgia.” Bureau hearings must be conducted in accordance with the due process and fair hearing ground rules set out in the Administrative Agencies Practice Act (“AAPA”). N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32. “[The AAPA] outlines what evidence can be presented at the hearing, and what evidence can be considered in reaching decisions. N.D.C.C. §§ 28-32-06, 28-32-07.” S & S Landscaping Co. v. ND Workers Compensation Bureau, 541 N.W.2d 80, 83 (N.D.1995). Under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-06(1), “[t]he admissibility of evidence in any adjudicative proceeding before an administrative agency shall be determined in accordance with the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.” Although an administrative agency may waive application of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, “only relevant evidence shall be admitted.” N.D.C.C. § 28-32-06(1). The evidence on which the Bureau bases its findings must be both relevant and competent, however. Sunderland v. ND Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 370 N.W.2d 549 (N.D.1985); O’Brien v. ND Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 222 N.W.2d 379 (N.D.1974); Erickson v. ND Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 292 (N.D.1963). Our decisions have stated a medical opinion must be stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty or probability. Kunnanz v. Edge, 515 N.W.2d 167, 173 (N.D.1994).
[¶ 27] No one ever diagnosed Mikkelson with fibromyalgia before her October 1997 working injury. Dr. Krause, who treated Mikkelson following her 1993 car accident, never diagnosed fibromyalgia. In addition, Dr. Songsiridej, with whom Mikkel-son sought treatment in 1998 for symptoms associated with her work injury, states that Mikkelson, in her opinion, did not have fibromyalgia after the car accident. The only diagnosis of fibromyalgia was made by Dr. Dilla, who performed a review of Mikkelson’s medical records and an examination of Mikkelson at the request of the Bureau on January 15, 1998, which was after her October 1997 work injury. As Dr. Dilla himself acknowledged, fibromyalgia must be carefully diagnosed by identifying a minimum of 11 trigger points and determining that all the criteria for fibromyalgia are present. There is no evidence that everyone who suffers a paracervical strain or “whiplash” develops fibromyalgia. A reasoning mind could not have reasonably concluded from this evidence that Mikkelson had preexisting fibromyalgia, known in advance of the work injury, which caused substantial interference with her functioning. There are no facts to support the conclusory opinion of Dr. Dilla. The findings of fact are, therefore, not supported by any competent evidence, only pure speculation. I would reverse the Bureau’s decision that the aggravation statute applies in this case and remand for reinstatement of full benefits due.
[¶ 28] Mary Muehlen Maring