[¶ 1] Eldin Komad appealed from a district court judgment of conviction for theft alleging his constitutional and statutory right to be present at trial was violated by the district court. Komad was charged with theft by the City of Fargo. Komad initially appeared and was tried and convicted in Fargo Municipal Court. Komad appealed his municipal court conviction to the district court. Komad was not present on his scheduled trial date in the district court. The district court conducted Ko-mad’s trial despite his absence. Komad was found guilty of the theft crime. We reverse and remand.
*621I
[¶ 2] On December 12, 2005 at 1:30 p.m., the date scheduled for trial in the district court, Komad’s attorney was present but Komad was not. Komad’s attorney explained to the judge that Komad contacted his attorney that day to explain he was stranded in Chicago due to bad weather and he was waiting for a flight. Komad’s attorney explained Komad would not be in Fargo until 4 p.m. that day.
[¶ 3] Due to Komad’s absence, his attorney requested a continuance. The City opposed the continuance arguing Komad’s excuse was false. The City asked that a bench warrant be issued. The judge listened to the request, denied the continuance and asked if it would be appropriate to dismiss the appeal. The City then moved to dismiss Komad’s appeal. The district court judge stated the trial would proceed or the appeal would be dismissed. Komad’s attorney stated he had no choice but to proceed with the trial despite Ko-mad’s absence. The bench trial proceeded and Komad was convicted of the theft charge. Komad asks this Court to reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
II
[¶ 4] Section 40-18-19, N.D.C.C., allows a defendant to appeal a municipal court judgment of conviction to the district court “in accordance with the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.” N.D.C.C. § 40-18-19 (2005 Supp.). When a defendant appeals a municipal court conviction to the district court, the action is transferred “to such district court for trial anew.” Id.; N.D.R.Crim.P. 37(j); City of Grand Forks v. Lamb, 2005 ND 103, ¶ 7, 697 N.W.2d 362. “The district court does not review the record and decision of the municipal court, but holds an entirely new trial and independently determines whether the defendant has violated the ordinance.” Lamb, at ¶ 7; see City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 380 (N.D.1994) (stating that although the appeal procedure under N.D.C.C. § 40-18-19 is “cumbersome and duplicative,” appeals must be for trial anew because municipal courts are not courts of record).
Ill
[¶ 5] The right of a defendant to be present at trial is rooted in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. City of Mandan v. Baer, 1998 ND 101, ¶ 8, 578 N.W.2d 559. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” in all criminal prosecutions. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Baer, at ¶ 8. We have a similar guarantee in the North Dakota Constitution: “In criminal prosecutions in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right ... to appear and defend in person.” N.D. Const, art. I, § 12; Baer, at ¶ 8. “One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970).
[¶ 6] “North Dakota has long recognized the constitutional right of a defendant to be personally present during the whole of a trial.” Baer, 1998 ND 101, ¶ 9, 578 N.W.2d 559. The right to be present is not absolute and may be voluntarily waived by the defendant. N.D.R.Crim.P. 43(c)(1) and (2); Baer, at ¶ 9. The right may also be lost by a defendant’s unruly and disruptive behavior. N.D.R.Crim.P. 43(c)(3); Baer, at ¶ 9.
[¶ 7] Here, however, Komad did appear in the municipal court for trial and the current proceeding is an appeal from the conviction in municipal court. In City *622of Minot v. Davis, 84 N.W.2d 891, syll. 1 (N.D.1957), this Court held: “A trial anew in district court, by virtue of a right of appeal and a statute directing the procedure upon appeal, is not the exercise of original jurisdiction by the district court.” We conclude Komad’s constitutional right to be present at trial was met when he appeared and was tried in municipal court and that there is no constitutional right to be present for trial anew on appeal.
IV
[¶ 8] However," in addition to the constitutional guarantee, N.D.R.Crim.P. 43(a), one of the rules of criminal procedure made applicable to the appeal by N.D.C.C. § 40-18-19 requires a defendant to be present at the initial appearance, the arraignment, the plea, every stage of the trial, and sentencing. The defendant waives the right to be present at trial under N.D.R.Crim.P. 43(c) if, after being initially present at trial or having pleaded guilty, the defendant is voluntarily absent or persists in disruptive conduct justifying the removal of the defendant from the courtroom. Rule 43(b), N.D.R.Crim.P., states the defendant need not be present for a misdemeanor offense if the defendant gives written consent for arraignment, plea, trial, and sentencing to occur in the defendant’s absence, the proceeding involves a conference or hearing on a question of law, or the proceeding involves a sentence correction or reduction.
[¶ 9] In construing a statute whose language is clear, certain and unambiguous, the only duty of the court is to give effect to legislative intent expressed therein and, if the statute does not violate some provision of the constitution, the court must give effect to the law. Brenna v. Hjelle, 161 N.W.2d 356 (N.D.1968). We will not disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit and only when the statute is ambiguous on its face will we resort to legislative intent. Douville v. Pembina County Water Resource Dist., 2000 ND 124, 612 N.W.2d 270. We apply the same settled principle of construction to the rules we adopt as we do to the statutes enacted by our co-equal branch of government.
[¶ 10] Here, the statute unambiguously provides that an appeal from a municipal court judgment of conviction to the district court is to be “in accordance with the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.” There is no ambiguity in those words. Although ordinarily judicial procedure is for the judicial branch to determine, N.D. Const., Art. VI, § 3. Section 8 of the Constitution provides that the “district court shall have ... such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law or by rule of the supreme court.” Thus the judicial and legislative branches share authority when establishing the procedure for the appellate jurisdiction of the district court.
[¶ 11] The Legislature exercised its authority in authorizing an appeal from municipal court to the district. While there may be no constitutional requirement for an appeal in these instances in which the defendant has not chosen to remove the action to district court in order to have it tried by a jury, see N.D.C.C. § 40-18-15.1, once the Legislature has authorized the right to appeal it becomes the obligation of the judicial branch to assure that the right of the defendant to that appeal is protected. The legislative grant of the right of an appeal from municipal court contains two components, one, that the appeal is to take the form of a “trial anew” and the second is that it be taken in accordance with the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. The “trial anew” provision recognizes that municipal courts are not courts of record, see N.D.C.C. *623§ 27-01-01, and there is no record for the district court to review on appeal. The second component of the statutory right to appeal is that it be taken in accordance with the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 37, N.D.R.Crim.P., entitled “Appeal As Of Right To District Court; How Taken” specifies the procedure in taking the appeal but it does not specify the procedure of the “trial anew” once the appeal is taken. The proceedings at the actual trial are necessarily found in the other rules of criminal procedure.
[¶ 12] There is no limitation in the legislation as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to the appeal from municipal court nor has the judicial branch supplied any such limitations. Rule 43 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, entitled “Defendant’s Presence” and found under the heading “General Provisions” therefore applies to appeals from municipal courts as well as to criminal actions initiated in district court. Rule 43, N.D.R.Crim.P., provides in part:
(a) When Required. Unless this rule provides otherwise, the defendant must be present at:
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(2) every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the return of the verdict;
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(b) When Not Required.
A defendant need not be present under any of the following circumstances:
(1) Misdemeanor Offense. The offense is punishable by fine or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, and with the defendant’s written consent, the court permits arraignment, plea, trial, and sentencing to occur in the defendant’s absence.
(2) Conference or Hearing on Legal Question. The proceeding involves only a conference or hearing on a question of law.
(3) Sentence Correction. The proceeding involves the correction or reduction of sentence under Rule 35.
(c)Waiving Continued Presence. The further progress of the trial, including the return of the verdict and the imposition of sentence, may not be prevented and the defendant waives the right to be present if the defendant, initially present at trial or having pleaded guilty:
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has begun (whether or not the defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to remain during the trial);
(2) is voluntarily absent at the imposition of sentence; or
(3) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will cause the removal of the defendant from the courtroom, persists in conduct that justifies the defendant’s exclusion from the courtroom.
[¶ 13] Clearly under Rule 43(a) the defendant must be present at the actual trial as well as other proceedings in addition to trial. Rule 43(b) specifies when the presence of the defendant is not required. None of those provisions is applicable to the facts in this case. Rule 43(c) specifies when the defendant waives the right to be present at trial. Again, none of those provisions is applicable to the case at hand.
[¶ 14] Nothing in the record indicates Komad gave written consent to be tried in absentia or otherwise voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial. Rule 43, N.D.R.Crim.P., provides the defendant voluntarily waives the right to be present by actions taken after being initially present at trial; thus the right to be present is not absolute and can be waived without the defendant’s consent if the defendant is unruly or disruptive during the trial and the defendant’s behavior justifies removing the defendant from the court*624room, or if the defendant is voluntarily absent after trial has begun. Here, Ko-mad was never present at trial in the district court.
[¶ 15] The City argued Komad’s excuse for his absence from the trial was false but the City failed to support its assertion with any evidence. Furthermore, assuming for purpose of argument only, that the district court had the discretion to dismiss the case or order it to trial without the presence of the defendant, the district court made no findings. We are without reason as to why, on the record before us, the district court insisted on conducting the trial in Komad’s absence or dismissing the appeal other than his failure to appear. Whether that failure was justified or unjustified is not apparent, yet that determination is essential in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in giving Ko-mad’s counsel the Hobson’s choice between dismissal or proceeding with trial without Komad being present. On this record, neither choice protected Komad’s statutory rights.
[¶ 16] Komad was tried in violation of N.D.R.Crim.P. 43. The City speculates the error was harmless but predicates its speculation on the premise that the district judge had the discretion to dismiss Komad’s appeal to the district court. The district judge’s discretion was to determine whether to grant the continuance or issue a bench warrant for Komad or to do both. We have concluded that dismissal of the appeal would have been a violation of N.D.R.Crim.P. 43 and the judge was without discretion to dismiss. The error was not harmless.
V
[¶ 17] We reverse and remand for a new trial.
[¶ 18] CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, J., concurs.