dissenting.
[¶51] I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the district court judgment entered after a bench trial, finding NDSU engaged in age discrimination in terminating Ellis’s employment and awarding Ellis damages, which included back pay, front pay, costs and disbursements, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees.
[¶ 52] Relying upon the constitutional authority of the Board of Higher Education (“Board”) to hire and discharge its employees, the majority opinion concludes the district court erred by conducting a trial on Ellis’s statutory cause of action under the North Dakota Human Rights Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 14-02.4. The majority *204further concludes the district court was bound to review the prior proceedings before NDSU’s staff personnel board under the “reasoning mind” standard this Court applied in Peterson v. North Dakota Univ. Sys., 2004 ND 82, 678 N.W.2d 163. The majority concludes that, contrary to the district court’s analysis, the power delegated to and exercised by the staff personnel board has the constitutional power and authority of the Board of Higher Education. The majority reasons that the Board “has, in furtherance of its powers, exercised its ‘power to delegate to its employees details of the administration of the institutions under its control,’ in this case, the authority to dismiss an employee.” Majority, at ¶ 32; see N.D. Const. art. VIII, § 6(6)(b).
[¶ 53] The majority’s expansive reading of the constitutional authority of the Board, however, fails to acknowledge that the Board is still subject to legislation. Article VIII, § 6(6)(b) of the North Dakota Constitution plainly states, in relevant part: “The said state board of higher education shall have full authority to organize or reorganize within constitutional and statutory limitations, the work of each institution under its control, and do each and everything necessary and proper for the efficient and economic administration of said state educational institutions.” (Emphasis added.) Although the majority states that it is “doubtful that a legislative enactment can supersede the constitutional authority of the Board of Higher Education to hire and discharge its employees,” Majority, at ¶ 39, this statement effectively eliminates the constitutional constraint that the Board’s authority must be exercised “within statutory limitations.” I do not believe the constitutional status of the Board can be interpreted to grant unfettered discretion in all employment matters. Here, the legislature in enacting the Human Rights Act does not “supersede” the Board’s constitutional authority, but instead properly limits the Board’s exercise of its discretion in employment decisions by defining and prohibiting discriminatory conduct. See N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-03.
[¶ 54] The language of the Human Rights Act clearly indicates a broad scope in its intent to apply to all employers including the state itself, when acting as an employer. In so doing, N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-01, states: “It is the policy of this state to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, the presence of any mental or physical disability, ...; to prevent and eliminate discrimination in employment relations, ...; and to deter those who aid, abet, or induce discrimination or coerce others to discriminate.” Section 14-02.4-03, N.D.C.C., provides, in relevant part, “It is a discriminatory practice for an employer to ... discharge an employee ... because of ... age.”
[¶ 55] At the time of Ellis’s termination in June 2004, “employee” was defined as “a person who performs services for an employer, who employs one or more individuals, for compensation, whether in the form of wages, salaries, commission, or otherwise .... [and] does include a person subject to the civil service or merit system or civil service laws of the state government, governmental agency, or a political subdivision.” N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-02(6) (2004) (emphasis added). “Employer” was defined as “a person within the state who employs one or more employees for more than one quarter of the year and a person wherever situated who employs one or more employees whose services are to be partially or wholly performed in the state.” N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-02(7) (2004). The term “person” is broadly defined to mean “an individual, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company, un*205incorporated organization, mutual company, joint stock company, trust, agent, legal representative, trustee, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, labor organization, public body, public corporation, and the state and a political subdivision and agency thereof:’ N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-02(12) (2004) (emphasis added).
[¶ 56] The broad definitions provided by the Human Rights Act provide a clear intent that the act is intended to apply to all employers, including the Board of Higher Education and its institutions. Even considering the special constitutional status of the Board, the Human Rights Act is such a statutory limitation contemplated by N.D. Const. art. VIII, § 6(6)(b). I believe the majority opinion is wrong in concluding that the Board is beyond the reach of the Legislature for purposes of creating a cause of action under the Human Rights Act. By broadly defining “employer” the Legislature intended to reach the Board and the institutions under its control.
[¶57] The majority correctly observes that under N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-19, a person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory practice may either bring an action in the district court or file a complaint with the Department of Labor. The majority then posits that under N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-23, an unresolved complaint filed with the Department would go to an administrative hearing under N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, which would then be reviewed by the courts under the deferential standard applied in Peterson. How the courts would review a complaint filed with the Department after an administrative hearing, however, is irrelevant, as the majority misses the point of N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-19. Simply put, the Human Rights Act does not require an administrative proceeding, but allows any person claiming discrimination to choose whether to bring an action in the district court or file a complaint with the Department of Labor. The majority opinion effectively forecloses that choice for employees of the university system by eliminating a court action under the Human Rights Act for those employees.
[¶ 58] Even more troubling is that administrative proceedings, either at the Department of Labor or, as in this case, at NDSU, would not provide the full measure of relief and protections a person may receive in pursuing an action under the Human Rights Act in the district court. The majority acknowledges as much when it states: “If the department determines the respondent has engaged in a discriminatory practice under the Human Rights Act, many of the same remedies available to a court other than compensatory or punitive damages, are available to the department. N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-20.” Majority, at ¶ 45 (emphasis added).
[¶ 59] By foreclosing a university system employee’s ability even to choose to bring action in the district court, and limiting such an employee only to a deferential review by the courts, these employees are denied the full measure of relief and protections contemplated by the Legislature in enacting the Human Rights Act. This is inconsistent with the Human Rights Act’s stated purpose “to prevent and eliminate discrimination in employment relations” and “deter those who aid, abet, or induce discrimination or coerce other to discriminate.” How can the Board and its institutions claim insulation from the complete relief afforded by the Human Rights Act when the state itself does not claim such insulation?
[¶ 60] I do not believe that Peterson, 2004 ND 82, 678 N.W.2d 163 is controlling in this case. In Peterson, at ¶¶ 13-14, this Court concluded that a person adversely affected by a Board decision must bring a separate action in the district court to *206secure review because there was not a statute or rule providing for an appeal to the district court. This Court then applied the deferential standard of review for Peterson’s breach of contract claim. Id. However, here, because Ellis’s action is based on an independent statutory cause of action under the Human Rights Act, the deferential standard articulated in Peterson, which applied to the terminated faculty member’s breach of contract action, does not properly apply to Ellis’s human rights claims.
[¶ 61] Whether the university system has discriminated under the Human Rights Act is not an “academic” decision, entitled to special protection based on the majority’s concept of the Board’s special constitutional autonomy. The Human Rights Act does not directly control the Board’s discretion. It limits the exercise of the Board’s discretion only to the extent the Board engages in defined discriminatory practices. To that extent only, the Human Rights Act provides a right to initiate action in the district court to obtain relief. The Act and cases decided under it allocate the burdens of proving a case and establishing defenses so that due deference is given to institutional actions that do not constitute discriminatory practices. See Jacob v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 ND 56, ¶ 13, 693 N.W.2d 604 (reiterating framework for analyzing discriminatory treatment allegations and discussing Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass’n, 528 N.W.2d 374, 379 (N.D.1995) and Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 229 (N.D.1993)). The complexity of this examination is far more suited to the unfettered judicial process than to limited review under Peterson. The legislature has provided that option. N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-19.
[¶ 62] By filing this action in the district court, Ellis was not seeking to secure appellate review of the NDSU staff personnel board’s decision, but instead was litigating an independent statutory cause of action. Ellis was seeking the full measure of relief and protections provided to employees in the state under the Human Rights Act, including compensatory damages and attorney fees. The majority’s conclusions are contrary to the clear legislative intent of the Human Rights Act and deprive employees of the university system the full measure of protection from discrimination prohibited under the Human Rights Act.
[¶ 63] I would affirm the district court’s judgment entered after a bench trial because the district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.
[¶ 64] LAWRENCE A. LeCLERC, S.J., agrees.