(dissenting).
I dissent. I agree that “questions of this nature do not lend themselves to a mechanical analysis; rather each case must be considered in light of its particular jurisdictional facts” and that the legislature by enacting I.C. § 5-514 “intended to exercise all the jurisdiction available to the State of Idaho under the due process clause of the Constitution.” However, I must disagree with the rationale by which the majority has reached its narrow interpretation of Idaho’s long arm statute.
This court has held:
“The purpose of the 1961 Act and particularly § 5-514 thereof, was to furnish, so far as possible, a local forum to resi*934dents of this state who have a grievance against a nonqualifying foreign corporation, growing out of its business activities here. The statute is remedial and is to be liberally construed to achieve that purpose.” B. B. P. Association, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 91 Idaho 259, 264, 420 P.2d 134, 139 (1966).
The majority concludes that since Idaho has no jurisdiction under I.C. § 5-514 the court does not have to consider the due process questions which would be raised on these facts. It is established that Idaho courts can assert personal jurisdiction to the full extent of the due process clause. Doggett v. Electronics Corp., 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969); Intermountain Business Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Business F. Co., 96 Idaho 538, 531 P.2d 1183 (1975). I disagree with the majority that two issues are to be decided, one statutory and one constitutional. The statutory question cannot be decided without also deciding the constitutional question.
The proper approach, I believe, in this case is to determine whether constitutional guarantees of due process would be violated by requiring Kelleher to defend the instant action in Idaho. If the constitutional guarantees would be violated, then Idaho can of course have no jurisdiction. If not, then the doors of the Idaho courts are open to Akichika. The general test to be used is contained in the still viable language of International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945):
“Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”
Those minimum contacts need not be continuous but may be an isolated act “by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). Therefore to state as does the majority that Kelleher’s contacts with Idaho were “only incidental to the transaction, and not an integral part of the transaction at issue,” is completely beside the point.
In requiring Kelleher to defend this action in Idaho I see nothing offensive to “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Kelleher knowingly did business with a person who lived in Idaho. It was not only foreseeable' to Kelleher that the truck which he owned would enter Idaho, he knew it for a fact. The transfer of title to the vehicle was to take place in Idaho and for that purpose Kelleher availed himself of the services of the Idaho First National Bank at Homedale, Idaho. Kelleher personally entered Idaho and attempted to personally obtain possession of the vehicle. When that effort failed, he attempted to use the Idaho legal machinery to gain possession of the vehicle. Kelleher precipitated the dispute by taking the first legal steps within the State of Idaho and I believe it is certainly within notions of fair play and substantial justice to require him to adjudicate the entire case in Idaho.
At this juncture there is no need to decide if the action is one in tort or in contract, which state law is to be applied, or if Idaho has exclusive jurisdiction. The fact that the courts of Oregon might be able to also assert personal jurisdiction is no bar to the Idaho action. In my judgment a liberal construction of our long arm statute requires a reversal of the judgment of the trial court.