Rydalch v. Glauner

On Rehearing

Appellants’ petition for rehearing was fully granted and heard.

Primarily appellants’ contention on re-hearing is that I.C. § 33-519, governing appeals from orders of the.Board of County Commissioners, on school reorganization matters, to the the District Court and from the District Court under the provisions of I.C. §§ 31-1510, 31-1511, and 31-1512, is a special statute; that I.C. § 13-201 is a general statute. Such contention, however, overlooks that I.C. § 31-1512 deals with appeal from the District Court to the Supreme Court in matters appealed to the District Court from rulings of the Board of County Commissioners, and which provides :

“* * * either party may, within ninety days, appeal to the Supreme Court * *

is co-extensive with the provisions of I.C. § 13-201, last amended by SX.1957, Ch. 105, § 1, p. 183, now reading:

“ * * * An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from a district court.
1 * * * from a judgment rendered on an appeal from an order, decision or action of a board of county commissioners; within sixty days after the entry of such judgment;”

The time for appeal of I.C. § 13-201, thus is controlling over that mentioned in I.C. § 31-1512.

Appeal dismissed. Costs to respondents.

TAYLOR, C. J., and SMITH, J., concur.